

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 7 AND JULY 31, 2002

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CONDUCT OF OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 2002

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m. in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Cleland, Landrieu, Akaka, Bill Nelson, Benjamin E. Nelson, Carnahan, Dayton, Warner, Inhofe, Roberts, Sessions, Collins, and Bunning.

Committee staff members present: David S. Lyles, staff director; and Christine E. Cowart, chief clerk.

Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; Richard D. DeBobes, counsel; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Jeremy L. Hekhuis, professional staff member; Maren Leed, professional staff member; and Terence P. Szuplat, professional staff member.

Minority staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, Republican staff director; Charles W. Alsup, professional staff member; L. David Cherington, minority counsel; Edward H. Edens IV, professional staff member; Brian R. Green, professional staff member; Carolyn M. Hanna, professional staff member; Mary Alice A. Hayward, professional staff member; Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff member; George W. Lauffer, professional staff member; Patricia L. Lewis, professional staff member; Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional staff member; Joseph T. Sixeas, professional staff member; and Scott W. Stucky, minority counsel.

Staff assistants present: Daniel K. Goldsmith, Thomas C. Moore, and Nicholas W. West.

Committee members' assistants present: Erik Raven, assistant to Senator Byrd; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Andrew Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator Cleland; Marshall A. Hevron and Jeffrey S. Wiener, assistants to Senator Landrieu; Neil D. Campbell, assistant to Senator Reed; Davelyn Noelani Kalipi, assistant to Senator Akaka; William K. Sutey, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Neal Orringer, assistant to Senator Carnahan; Benjamin L. Cassidy, assistant to Senator Warner; John A. Bonsell, assistant to Senator Inhofe; George M. Bernier III, assistant to Senator Santorum; Robert Alan McCurry, assistant to Senator Roberts; Douglas Flanders, assistant to Senator Allard; James P. Dohoney, Jr. assistant to Senator Hutchinson; Arch Galloway II, assistant to

Senator Sessions; Kristine Fauser, assistant to Senator Collins; and Derek Maurer, assistant to Senator Bunning.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. The committee meets this morning to receive testimony from General Tommy Franks, Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command, on the conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom, the campaign against the al Qaeda terrorists and the Taliban regime that harbored them.

Senator Warner and I traveled to the Afghan theater over Thanksgiving to visit our forces and to discuss the campaign with General Franks and his subordinate commanders. Other members of our committee have since traveled to the region. Everyone who has visited our forces comes away deeply impressed by their professionalism and commitment and also deeply impressed by the leader who joins us today.

General Franks, thank you for your assistance during our visits. Thank you for your usual candor in our discussions, and I welcome you back to the committee to continue those discussions.

Four months ago, America's Armed Forces and our coalition partners launched the first wave of Operation Enduring Freedom, and on the first day of the war General Franks sent the following message to our men and women in uniform: "Today, the might of our coalition stands poised to strike at the heart of those who challenged our liberties and brought terror to our shores on September 11. Soon, you will enter into harm's way and strike the first blow in what will be a long and arduous campaign against terrorism. Our goal," General Franks said, "in this campaign is neither retaliation nor retribution, but victory. Today, the eyes of the world will be upon you. I know you will do your duty."

Well, for the past 4 months, the eyes of the world have, indeed, been on our forces as they have done their duty. Led by General Franks, they have used innovative techniques and revolutionary technologies to destroy the heart of the al Qaeda network, to topple the Taliban, and to liberate the Afghan people from tyranny. We have seen our Armed Forces conduct not only combat sorties but humanitarian food drops—reflecting America's compassion for the suffering Afghan people alongside our determination to bring terrorists to justice.

We have seen small teams of special operations forces serving alongside Afghan opposition forces, 21st century warriors on horseback coordinating attacks and calling in precision air strikes against Taliban and al Qaeda targets. We have seen precision-guided munitions more often than ever before.

The Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers, told the committee Tuesday that nearly 60 percent of all munitions used in Afghanistan were precision-guided, compared to 10 percent during the Gulf War 10 years ago. We have seen unmanned aerial vehicles, Global Hawk and Predator, reveal the location of enemy forces and quickly relay that information to fighters and bombers overhead for precision air strikes, sometimes within minutes.

We have seen an unprecedented level of cooperation between the military services: Marine helicopters ferrying Army soldiers from

Navy ships into landing zones in Afghanistan that were secured by special operations forces, with air cover from the Navy and Air Force. That is joint operations at its very best. It is the foundation upon which the services need to continue building. The excellence and innovation of our forces in and around Afghanistan is a tribute to many factors: first and foremost the versatility of our brave men and women in uniform, the investments in planning over many years, and as General Myers testified, “a good plan” from General Tommy Franks.

General Franks, the Nation is grateful for your leadership in this most important mission. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld testified Tuesday that the Defense Department has already begun the process of assessing the lessons learned from our operations in Afghanistan. This committee will look carefully at those operations as we work with the Department to give our forces the support they need in, as General Franks put it, the “long and arduous campaign against terrorism,” and as we work to shape our forces for the future. Today’s hearing is an important step in that process.

Senator Warner.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That was a very sincere, heartfelt statement you delivered. The chairman and I remember well our trip, General Franks, and it was made successful with your help and guidance. We thank you.

The chairman and I have served in the Senate 24 years now. This is our 24th year. We have seen a lot of commanders, we have studied about many more, and you are going to take your place in a long line of distinguished senior combat commanders in American military history. If I may say, as I have come to know you very well in the past year or so, you carry out your responsibilities with an unusual sense of humility, and your hallmarks are taken from your name. You are frank, honest, and straightforward, and you ask nothing in return but the privilege to wear that uniform, serve your country, and be with your men and women of the Armed Services. Well done, sir.

I want to also mention that we talked yesterday about the troops under your command. All too often, we overlook the fact that the Central Intelligence Agency served right alongside the individuals from the combat troops, along with other Federal civilians who served their role quietly and with great dignity. They, too, take their place in the historical annals of this combat situation.

Senator Levin and I were also very moved when we met these teams because history is being written by the noncommissioned officer and petty officer—teams often composed of one commissioned officer and a dozen or more noncommissioned officers. They are really the fighting sergeants and petty officers. They, too, have written an extraordinary history. So it is a tribute to your leadership and the men and women under your command that we have achieved, in my judgment, many of the goals that our distinguished and courageous President laid down with clarity.

Since this war began on October 7, al Qaeda has been severely fractured and its remaining members are on the run. Terrorist training camps in Afghanistan have been dismantled and de-

stroyed. The Taliban regime has been defeated, and the nation of Afghanistan has been returned to its people to take up another great challenge, and that is to achieve some form of democracy. I want to talk a little bit about that.

We did not go there, and our President made this very clear, with any timetable. As he said, we will take as long as it is necessary to achieve our goals. We are not going to be an occupation Army, and I want to repeat that. We are not there as an occupation Army. We, working together with our allies, are to “turn that land over to its people.” You mentioned to me yesterday when we visited that some 40 or 50 nations are making this possible.

But now we have to, with some greater degree of clarity, explain first to the men and women in uniform and their families, and then to the American people, what we have achieved and what, in your professional judgment, remains to be done. We must determine how we very carefully begin to phase out of the combat operations and put those remaining units of the U.S. military in such support roles as necessary to enable the international organizations and other organizations and agencies of our Federal Government to go about the tough business of nation-building. We cannot do it all in a day, but our President said we will take whatever time is necessary.

We have to make it very clear that, as the combat role phases down, this other challenge comes up, and it is a gray area, and that explanation is needed not only for our own people but the other people in the world. As our President has correctly said, we are going to defeat terrorism wherever it is in the world, and these forces now under your command who have performed so bravely and courageously may be needed tomorrow or the next day elsewhere to fight this global war on terrorism.

You know that requires retraining, that requires the opportunity for them to rejoin their families and get ready for whatever the next operation may be, and the equipment itself has been under a lot of strain and needs to be reworked. So I hope that today, as the two of us discussed yesterday privately, we can lay down some of the guideposts as this transition takes place. It is not going to be a cut-and-run approach. No one would ever support that. Our President has repeatedly said we are going to be there as long as is necessary, but those roles are going to change.

So we wish you well. We must always keep in mind September 11. Yesterday I was visited by families who lost loved ones on that day. It was a tragic day for our country, and we will never forget it as our Nation rebuilds and moves forward from that day. It was a defining and unifying moment for our country, and out of it that tragedy grew a support for our President, and for those in uniform and others engaged in this battle, unlike any support since World War II.

Now Congress, particularly this committee, is solidly behind you, and we are going to address the budget our President has sent to us a budget to provide for the enhancement of our military forces, and to better care for the men and women of those forces.

So I thank you again, General, and those who are with you for your service.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Warner. There is going to be a vote at 10:05, I believe, and we will try to work right through that vote as we did the other day.

At this time, we are going to, of course, recognize General Franks for his opening remarks and we will then proceed to a first round of questions of 6 minutes for each Senator on the basis of the early bird rule, and then following that one round of questioning in open session the committee is going to go into a closed session with General Franks in Hart 219.

General, welcome.

**STATEMENT OF GEN. TOMMY R. FRANKS, USA, COMMANDER
IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND**

General FRANKS. Chairman Levin, Senator Warner, first let me say that I am honored to appear on behalf of the coalition to discuss our role in Operation Enduring Freedom, America's global war on terrorism. I am privileged to command today more than 78,000 men and women, of them 14,000 coalition forces from 17 nations in the theater as we speak today. I am proud of their commitment, their incredible competence, their success, and their sacrifices.

Our Secretary directed on 12 September that we should prepare credible military options the day after one of the most horrific strikes on this country in our history. The concept of a plan and mission were proposed to President Bush on 21 September. He approved and directed the continuation of planning. Planning was completed. Forces were beginning to stage by 30 September.

The plan, including target sets, sequencing, force requirements, and command and control relationships, was briefed to Secretary Rumsfeld on 1 October in final form and briefed to and approved by President Bush on 2 October, when he issued an attack order to commence operations on 7 October. Forces were staged and ready by 6 October. Our forces began combat operations on the 7th, as directed, 26 days after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

I could not be more pleased with the professionalism of that decision-making process. It was absolutely first-rate, all the way from the principals I mentioned to their staffs to other agencies of the Government. The concept briefed and approved included coordination of basing, staging, and overflight requirements, the execution as well as what we have described as lines of operation conducted simultaneously rather than sequentially, including, to name but a few, the direct attack of al Qaeda and Taliban command and control, and also humanitarian assistance, as the chairman mentioned, for more than 26 million Afghan people.

Another line of operation was operational fires, the delivery of kinetic munitions from air to ground: yet another, reconnaissance and direct action by special operating forces. Others included support to opposition forces on the ground in Afghanistan, information operations, and political military activities, including coalition-building. Those operations, as I mentioned, were conducted simultaneously. The very simple purpose was to build and maintain pressure inside Afghanistan, with the objective of the destruction of the al Qaeda terrorist network and the government of the Taliban.

On 7 October, al Qaeda and the Taliban controlled more than 80 percent of the country of Afghanistan, and terrorists were, in fact, harbored and sheltered in that country. On 22 December, 76 days later, a new interim administration was established in Kabul, and all of us are familiar with Chairman Hamid Karzai, who gives Afghanistan a chance.

Our activities today remain focused on gaining and exploiting intelligence in order to preempt and disrupt planned future terrorist acts, to positively confirm or deny all over Afghanistan the presence of Taliban or al Qaeda fighter pockets, to search through each possible location for evidence of weapons of mass destruction. We remain committed to the conduct of military operations to eliminate pockets of resistance to the interim administration of Afghanistan and to a long-term government.

We work to support Afghan forces as required, and we continue to conduct and support civil military operations in an advisory capacity in the country of Afghanistan. As we speak, the coalition includes more than 50 nations, as mentioned by Senator Warner. Twenty seven of those nations have national liaison elements at our headquarters in Tampa, Florida. That team remains cohesive and, in fact, is continuing to grow.

Our forces today operate from 15 nations, from within 30 bases. The forces we see committed to this fight today originated from 267 bases and ports around the world, and have consistently overflown 46 nations. I am pleased with the progress, but much work remains to be done.

The real story of Operation Enduring Freedom is a story of human spirit, U.S. coalition men and women in uniform and, as the Senator mentioned, civilian patriots. They come from many nations. They are united by a sense of duty and they evidence every day a great deal of selfless service. Our pride in these people is boundless, and our thanks is the same. They are the reason that this campaign will succeed.

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, let me simply say that the will and the support of the American people as they are represented, as those wishes are represented by Members of Congress and our Commander in Chief, have left nothing for this CINC to desire. The men and women of Central Command express their profound appreciation to the American people, to this body, and our President and Secretary of Defense, for continuing steadfast resolve, support, and leadership.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would ask that my prepared remarks be entered into the record, and I would be pleased to take your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Franks follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN. TOMMY R. FRANKS, USA

Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, members of the committee: I am honored to appear before you today to describe U.S. Central Command's role in America's Global War on Terrorism—a fight that involves every element of our national power and extends around the world. I am privileged to command a coalition force of more than 75,000 men and women at work today in the central region as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. I am so very proud of them—their professionalism, their commitment, their resolve, their successes, and their sacrifices. Our operations thus far represent the first steps in what we all know will be a long, difficult, and dangerous campaign. We have been very successful to this point, but much work remains to

be done. I have visited Afghanistan several times since the campaign started and can attest to the dramatic changes coalition forces have brought to the lives of the Afghan people. Talented and dedicated men and women in uniform, side-by-side with diplomats, arm-in-arm with anti-Taliban Afghans, supported by the American people and the international community, executing an unconventional war—these are the characteristics of the fight we've seen.

The events of 11 September have impressed upon all of us the vulnerability of a free and open society to those who do not value human life and, in fact, despise the principles for which America stands. The violence of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon indicate the increasing lethality of terrorist networks with global reach. These attacks further define a pattern we have seen emerge over the past several years. At my confirmation hearing in June 2000, I described the nature of the threat posed by a number of terrorist organizations, many of which are resident in Central Command's area of responsibility. This region has long been associated with some of the most dangerous terrorist organizations, including al Qaeda and Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Three of the seven nations on the State Department's list of states sponsoring terrorism are in our area. Over the past 7 years American interests have been attacked five times in countries within this region: the Office of Program Management for the Saudi Arabian National Guard, 1995; Khobar Towers, 1996; the American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998; and the U.S.S. *Cole* in 2000. As I said last year in my remarks to this committee, "These attacks demonstrate that our opponents are dedicated, determined, and resourceful."

On 11 September 2001, I was enroute to Pakistan, to meet with President Musharraf, to discuss a number of issues, among them, security cooperation and terrorism. The events of that day caused me to curtail my trip and return immediately to Tampa, Florida, where my staff was already working to ensure, what we refer to in the military as, "command and control survivability" while continuing to develop "situational awareness" along with Defense and other government agencies. On 12 September the Secretary of Defense directed the preparation of "credible military options" to respond to international terrorism. For Central Command, that directive guided the preparation of the warplan we see unfolding in Afghanistan today. The concept, which I briefed to the President on 21 September proposed that "U.S. Central Command, as a part of America's Global War on Terrorism . . . would destroy the al Qaeda network inside Afghanistan along with the illegitimate Taliban regime which was harboring and protecting the terrorists. . . ."

When I returned to Tampa our headquarters and subordinate commanders were finalizing plans for combat operations. Planning involved not only the evaluation of the current enemy situation, but also the history of military operations in Afghanistan and the political and military situation across the region. This "mission analysis" resulted in my recommendation of a military course of action which was approved by Secretary Rumsfeld on 1 October. I briefed the concept to President Bush on 2 October, and he directed that combat operations should begin on 7 October—26 days after the attacks on New York and the Pentagon.

Operations would involve the full weight of America's national power, and would include significant contributions from the international community. Coalition nations were already joining the fight against terrorism and many were sending military liaison teams to our headquarters in Tampa. The coalition has grown to more than 50 nations, with 27 nations having representatives at our headquarters. Of our currently deployed strength of approximately 75,000 personnel, 14,000 are coalition forces.

With the cooperation and support of this coalition and the integration of virtually every agency of our Government, we have executed multiple "Lines of Operation", attacking simultaneously on several fronts. Our intention from the outset was to seize the initiative and reinforce success, while keeping in mind the lessons of previous campaigns in Afghanistan—avoid "invading", and work with (rather than against) the people. A critical enabler of the strategy was the coordination of basing, staging and over-flight. This political-military coordination set (and maintains) the conditions necessary to execute and support sustained combat. Among the lines of operation which characterize the campaign have been "Direct Attack of the Leadership of al Qaeda and the Taliban", and the provision of "Humanitarian Aid" to the Afghan people. Another line has focused on "Destroying the Taliban Military," using unconventional warfare forces alongside Afghan opposition groups whose goals were consistent with our own. "Operational Fires" directed by horse-mounted Special Forces troopers have also proven to be unique and successful. Additionally, we have employed Special Operating Forces (SOF) in "Reconnaissance and Direct Action" roles while maintaining the capability to introduce "Operational Maneuver" (conventional forces) if required. Through the course of the operation, more than 100 "Sen-

sitive Site” exploitations have been conducted, seeking evidence of development or production of weapons of mass destruction. As forces have attacked “Caves and Tunnels” to deny enemy safe harbor, “Radio Broadcast and Leaflet Programs” have effectively informed the population of our goals and encouraged enemy forces to surrender.

The success of these lines of operation, which have been applied simultaneously rather than sequentially, is a matter of record. On 7 October, the Taliban controlled more than 80 percent of Afghanistan, and anti-Taliban forces were on the defensive. Al Qaeda was entrenched in camps and safe houses throughout the country. In fact, Afghanistan was a terrorist sponsored state. By October 20 we had destroyed virtually all Taliban air defenses and had conducted a highly successful direct action mission on the residence of Mullah Omar in the middle of the Taliban capital, Kandahar. During this time frame Special Forces detachments linked up with anti-Taliban leaders and coordinated operational fires and logistical support on multiple fronts. Twenty days later, the provincial capital of Mazar-e Sharif fell. In rapid succession, Herat, Kabul, and Jalalabad followed. By mid December, U.S. Marines had secured Kandahar Airport and the Taliban capital was in the hands of anti-Taliban forces. Within weeks the Taliban and al Qaeda were reduced to isolated pockets of fighters. On 22 December I traveled to Kabul to attend a moving ceremony marking the inauguration of the Afghan interim government—78 days after the beginning of combat operations.

Today, the Taliban have been removed from power and the al Qaeda network in Afghanistan has been destroyed. We continue to exploit detainees and sensitive sites for their intelligence value in order to prevent future terrorist attacks and to further our understanding of al Qaeda—their plans, membership, structure, and intentions. We are investigating each site to confirm or deny the existence of research into, or production of chemical, biological, or radiological weapons. Coalition forces continue to locate and destroy remaining pockets of Taliban and al Qaeda fighters and to search for surviving leadership. The coalition continues to grow and remains committed to America’s Global War on Terrorism.

President Bush said last week in a joint statement with Chairman Hamid Karzai, that our two nations have committed to building “a lasting permanent solution for Afghanistan security needs . . . based upon strengthening Afghanistan’s own capacities. We will work with Afghanistan’s friends in the international community to help Afghanistan stand up and train a national military and police force.” We are working today with Afghanistan’s interim authority to fulfill this promise. The standup of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul is an example of progress to date. The ISAF’s daily operations with local police are providing needed security and stability for the citizens of Kabul, and U.S. Central Command will continue to support these efforts. There is much work left to be done, and to quote the President again, “It will take as long as it takes.”

In the 149 days since 11 September, our forces have amassed a remarkable record of achievements. Following are but a few examples: All positioning and resupply of forces in the theater has been accomplished by air as a result of a remarkable effort by U.S. Transportation Command. In addition to providing the firepower and “staying power” of two carrier battlegroups, the Navy steamed the U.S.S. *Kitty Hawk* 6,000 miles at flank speed to establish an afloat forward operating base for Special Operating Forces. In terms of operational fires, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force pilots have delivered in excess of 18,000 munitions, of which, more than 10,000 were precision guided. During Operation Desert Storm we averaged 10 aircraft per target; in Operation Enduring Freedom we have averaged 2 targets per aircraft. Our airmen have flown the longest combat fighter mission in our Nation’s history (more than 15 hours), and conducted the longest surveillance mission (26 hours). The extensive use of unmanned aerial vehicles has permitted around the clock surveillance of critical sites, facilities, and troop concentrations. Our psychological warfare operators have delivered more than 50 million leaflets, and transport crews have delivered 2.5 million humanitarian daily rations, 1,700 tons of wheat, and 328,200 blankets. More than 5,000 radios have been provided to the Afghan people, and our broadcast capabilities continue to bring music to people for the first time in more than 6 years. We also have made enormous improvements in our ability to bring firepower to bear rapidly. Through improved technology and training the Tomahawk targeting cycle has been reduced from 101 minutes during Operation Allied Force to 19 minutes during Operation Enduring Freedom, with half of our Tomahawks having been fired from submarines.

We are now in the preliminary stages of capturing the lessons of this campaign. It is too early to draw final conclusions because the fight continues, but we do have some emerging insights:

Combining the resources and capabilities of the Defense Department, Central Intelligence Agency, and other agencies of the Federal Government has produced results no single entity could have achieved. Similarly, the adoption of flexible coalition arrangements has enabled us to leverage individual national strengths. "The mission has determined the coalition; the coalition has not determined the mission."

This operation continues to be commanded and controlled from Tampa, Florida with fielded technology that provides real time connectivity with air, ground, naval, and Special Operations Forces 7,000 miles away. Our forces which have deployed from over 267 bases; are operating from 30 locations in 15 nations; and over flying 46 nations in the course of operations; yet our ability to "see" the battlefield literally and figuratively at each location provides unprecedented situational awareness.

Security cooperation, diplomacy, and military-to-military contacts have built personal relationships which have proven invaluable during the campaign. Humanitarian airdrops; economic and security assistance to coalition partners and regional allies; visits to the region by senior administration, congressional, and military officials; and a U.S. commitment to post-conflict reconstruction of Afghanistan have permitted us to build upon these essential relationships. Our investment in security cooperation has been repaid tenfold in access to basing, staging, and overflight rights with regional partners. We must not underestimate the worth of our commitment to these programs.

Precision guided munitions are more than a force multiplier. They have reduced the numbers of air sorties required to destroy targets and have resulted in unprecedented low levels of collateral damage. From this perspective, precision guided munitions have had a strategic effect.

As we have said in the past, the availability of strategic airlift is critical to the success of operations which require force projection. Our current airlift fleet requires strict management and innovative scheduling. This would seem to validate the testimony the committee received last year. We must continue to expand our strategic lift capabilities.

The importance of combined and joint operations training and readiness has been revalidated. The power of a well-trained air-ground team has permitted the melding of 19th century Cavalry and 21st century precision guided munitions into an effective fighting force.

A continuous, unimpeded flow of intelligence remains key to success on the battlefield. Human intelligence is essential when mission objectives include locating, identifying, and capturing or killing mobile targets. This requires people on the ground. Similarly, unmanned aerial vehicles have proven their worth in the skies over Afghanistan. We must continue to expand their use, develop their capabilities, and increase their numbers.

Information Operations also have been vital to the success of Operation Enduring Freedom. Psychological operations, electronic warfare, and a number of special capabilities have proven their value and potential. To maintain information dominance, we must commit to improving our ability to influence target audiences and manipulate our adversary's information environment. Continued development of these capabilities is essential.

Again, these are only glimpses of lessons we may take from the campaign in Afghanistan. Much study is required to separate "useful truths" as they may relate to the enduring nature of warfare, from observations which, while interesting, may not offer much as we prepare for an uncertain future.

Our operations to this point represent a first step in what will be a long campaign to defeat terrorism. The terrorist attacks of 11 September have impressed upon all of us the importance of taking the fight to the enemy and maintaining the initiative. Our Command remains "on the offensive".

The real story of Operation Enduring Freedom is a story of the human spirit—U.S. and coalition men and women in uniform and civilian patriots—those who serve and those who support, those who command and those under command. From Special Forces troopers representing nine nations in Kandahar to the "Red Shirt" ordnance handlers aboard our aircraft carriers, to Jordanian medics serving in a hospital in Mazar-e Sharif, new standards of excellence have been set. Our pilots and airlift specialists, intelligence analysts, staff specialists, those who stand sentinel, and members of government agencies whose bravery will likely never be known, have worked hand-in-hand toward a common goal, each of them serving tirelessly without complaint, many in harm's way and under extreme environmental conditions. They come from many nations, but are unified by their sense of duty and selfless service. Our pride in these people should be boundless, our thanks the same. They are the means by which we will defeat the scourge of terrorism.

In a great work, "On War," published in 1873, Baron Carl Von Clausewitz affirmed that successful war required the "trinity" of the people, the government, and

the military . . . to enter into war without this support would be folly. Operation Enduring Freedom rests firmly upon the foundation of that trilogy. The will and support of the American people, represented by Members of Congress and our Commander in Chief, have left nothing to be desired. The men and women of Central Command express their profound appreciation to the American People, to this body, and to our Commander in Chief for continuing steadfast resolve.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, General Franks. The statement will be incorporated into the record in its entirety.

General, let me start off by asking you a question which was asked of the CIA yesterday, and that has to do with the damage that has been done to the al Qaeda network as a result of our operations in Afghanistan. Can you give us your assessment as to how much damage has been done to al Qaeda's ability to carry out terrorist operations worldwide, to their command and control structure and to their leadership structure?

General FRANKS. Mr. Chairman, I would be pleased to do that. I will take it in reverse order of your presentation initially, which talked about the Taliban, this illegitimate government that initially sponsored and harbored al Qaeda. Obviously, the harboring is gone. There is no more Taliban government inside the country of Afghanistan, and so I believe that makes it difficult for al Qaeda to operate from the battlespace of Afghanistan.

I believe that the command and control architecture of al Qaeda has been disrupted. There certainly are no longer cells of coordinated planning activity linked with, in some cases, state-of-the-art communications operating from within Afghanistan. So, Mr. Chairman, I would simply summarize by saying the harboring is no longer there, the networks are not free to operate on their own terms, and a great many of the terrorists themselves have been captured or killed.

There are al Qaeda left inside Afghanistan, and they remain the subject of our ongoing military operations which, as Senator Warner said, will continue until we are finished. But I think, sir, that that is a summary of where we stand right now. The network does not operate as a network from inside Afghanistan.

Chairman LEVIN. The Central Command is investigating the circumstances of the January raid by U.S. special forces in the village of Hazar Kadam. A media report suggests that 18 people were killed and 27 taken prisoner. Can you tell us what the status of that investigation is, and what you found out about that incident so far?

General FRANKS. Mr. Chairman, I would be glad to.

We had intelligence information that led up to a special operation on two compounds in the area of Hazar Kadam, as you mentioned. I, too, have read the reports in the media that you have outlined, and in a discussion with Chairman Hamid Karzai a few days after that incident in Kabul, when I visited him, he told me that he was not certain as to the circumstances of that, and that he believed there may well have been some friendlies associated with him in the general area of this contact.

I told him that based on that I intended to conduct an investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the operation. That investigation is ongoing as we speak today. I suspect, as Secretary Rumsfeld said yesterday, that within 2 weeks time that investigation will be completed. A determination that we made early

on was that the 27 detainees that we took from these two sites in Afghanistan would be interrogated, and when a determination was made that they were neither Taliban nor al Qaeda, nor possessed any information that would permit us to do the mission that I described to you a minute ago, that we would turn them over to Afghan authorities.

I have also read that the 27 detainees were released yesterday. In fact, the 27 detainees were given to Afghan authorities yesterday, and the suspicion at the point when we gave them, surrendered them to the Afghan authorities, is at least some number of them were criminals, and they were received by Afghan authorities as criminals.

Chairman LEVIN. General, we have, as you pointed out, ongoing operations in Afghanistan, ongoing pockets of resistance, ongoing conflicts between warlords competing for control of territory, still chaos in places, threats in places. You said that interim President Karzai gives Afghanistan a chance, and I could not agree with you more.

He has strongly urged that it may be necessary for the United States to participate at some level in the international security assistance force until there is a national army which is put in place, and trained. There has to be an international security assistance force. I think everyone agrees to that. The question is whether or not, if U.S. participation at some level proves to be necessary in that force, we would participate as the interim president suggests may be necessary. Can you give us the pros and cons of that, and has a final decision been made?

General FRANKS. Senator Levin, I would not prejudge decisions that our President may take on that, and I would not really talk about our military-to-military and security cooperation relationship with either the interim or transitional or permanent government of Afghanistan, because we certainly will have a security cooperation relationship with Afghanistan as it continues to develop.

An international security assistance force by a very narrow mandate from the United Nations provides for this capability, which the United Kingdom currently leads, by having set up police precincts and so forth inside the city of Kabul. There is no question that we will consider such things as the training and the support of Afghan forces as we work with them to create a national army for Afghanistan. There is no question about that, but the implication of that statement, at least in my mind, is not that we will pick up a substantial role within the international security assistance force.

So we remain committed—based on the guidance that I have from the Secretary and from the President—to the assistance of this growing Afghan capability. We intend to help them form an Afghan national army, there is no question about that. We intend to remain engaged with this country for the foreseeable future.

The specifics of the contribution by this country, our country, or the contributions by the international community, remain open. It is being discussed, and the specific relationship between assisting in the creation of a police capability within Afghanistan, and the assistance provided to create an Afghan national army, a lot of discussion is continuing to be done about that, but one should take

that we will remain engaged in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future.

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. I will pick up on that line of questioning in following my observations in my opening statement. It is not to be an occupation army, correct?

General FRANKS. Correct.

Senator WARNER. Good, and the responsibilities of our service persons will not be those of policemen in the streets, once we can establish within the Afghan government structure the ability to do that, am I not correct on that?

General FRANKS. Senator, I believe that is correct.

Senator WARNER. Good, but we have to explain the proper role of the U.S. military so that the families of our military people and the people here in this country realize our success. We may not yet have caught the leadership, bin Laden or Omar, but we are going to achieve that some day. Don't you agree?

General FRANKS. Sir, there is no question about that.

Senator WARNER. The remarkable series of goals laid out by our President have now been achieved. We can now begin to look to transition and have other agencies of our Federal Government and international agencies come in to pick up those responsibilities, because you want your forces ready and positioned to pursue the terrorists elsewhere in the world if that be the decision of our President, and hopefully coalition members.

General FRANKS. Senator Warner, as we said, our operations, as part of Operation Enduring Freedom, represent one piece of our national approach, our strategic approach to this global war on terrorism. So yes, sir, I would say that the way you described it is precisely correct.

Senator WARNER. There is a remarkable chapter in this conflict, and indeed your own role. One day you are a combat soldier, the next day you are a diplomat. You are dealing with not only the border nations but many others who come in, and then, if I may say with a little levity, politicians. Today's *Washington Post* carries a very interesting story about how allegations are arising that Iran is shipping in arms and support for one of the warlords, as they are referred to. How many warlords are there?

General FRANKS. Sir, I could not tell you how many warlords there are, because I really do not use that term. There are a great many pockets of power within the country.

Senator WARNER. Pockets of power, that is again your diplomacy coming through. But again here it says, "unpredictable warlords could move out to destabilize the situation." This is remarkable.

I had a great deal of respect for General Clark, our former NATO commander, and the operations in Kosovo, preceded by those in Bosnia. A great deal of his time was needed to reconcile the differences among the NATO nations as they sat around the councils deciding what authority would be given to him as the Commander in Chief of the forces. You have had a greater degree of authority and perhaps, maybe, a greater degree of cooperation from those countries that have stepped up to contribute in this effort. Is that a fair observation?

General FRANKS. Sir, I do not know that I would say that the degree of authority I have had is any greater than that Wes Clark had during the campaign you mentioned. I would say that the remarkable clarity of guidance from the Defense Secretary and from our President, the degree of confidence which they have placed in our ability to direct this campaign, deserves note.

One of the lessons to be taken from this at the strategic level is the value of what I just described, and so, sir, it is true that on a great many occasions I have traveled through the region. I have met with the leaders, and we have discussed the issues that needed to be resolved in order to ensure basing, staging, overflight.

I would also point out that a great many diplomats, as well as our own Secretary, have traveled to the region. I would not need to remind the Chairman and you, Senator Warner, of the value of your trip into this region to meet with leaders. All of this served as an enabling approach to let the military operation be executed in the way we described it to our President, the way we wanted to go after the operation, and all the pieces and parts of that, sir, I would say came together in a way that produced an approach which has served our interest up to this point.

Senator WARNER. When I said I thought you had more authority I had a little bit of a foundation for that, and that is a statement made by the President in Crawford, Texas, when you stood by his side and he said, "when Tommy Franks says 'mission complete, Mr. President,' that is when we start moving troops out." Remember that?

General FRANKS. Senator, I do.

Senator WARNER. That is an extraordinary statement of trust reposed in you by the Commander in Chief.

General FRANKS. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. Can you give us some boundaries of the definition of mission complete, as you see it now and hope to achieve it?

General FRANKS. Senator Warner, what we see inside Afghanistan, as I described in the first part of the hearing, has to do with Chairman Hamid Karzai and the people of Afghanistan having a chance. That is not to be confused with the operational construct of the mission of Operation Enduring Freedom which we see ongoing in Afghanistan today, and therein lies, sir, the issue with definition. I believe it is what our President had in mind when he said the mission is completed when the Commander in Chief says the mission is completed.

Now, what that means is, if we take a look at the objectives that we had for this campaign from the day we started the destruction of the al Qaeda terrorist network inside Afghanistan, the destruction of this illegitimate government of the Taliban which was in place and harbored that network, sir, if you take only those two points, it is possible to determine the end state of the military operational mission inside Afghanistan.

What does that involve? Well, we know that al Qaeda as an operating network, as I described it earlier, is not conducting operations within Afghanistan because the connectivity, the ability to plan and think inside Afghanistan has been taken away by the incredible work of the men and women who, sir, you described earlier, so that is where that is.

So what remains to be done? Analysis of every piece of intelligence information with respect to where we may find potential weapons of mass destruction sites, where we have reason to believe that there may have been pursuit of such weapons. Senator, we have to go there with military forces to investigate these places, to gain intelligence information, to gain insight into the construct of the al Qaeda network.

We have said more than 60 countries are influenced by this. What do those operations look like? We have benefitted by the exploitation of a great amount of information already taken from sensitive sites and potential weapons of mass destruction sites. We have not been through all of them in enough detail yet, and so, sir, this CINC will not tell my Secretary or our President we have reached the end of the military piece until we have been through all of them, until we have satisfied ourselves, sir.

A second point. We will not reach a military operational end state in Afghanistan as long as there is any credible threat from puddles or pockets of al Qaeda or residual hardcore Taliban. Sir, those two issues relate to the operational construct that my forces see inside Afghanistan.

The relationship between our forces in Operation Enduring Freedom and the international security assistance force currently operating under UN mandate inside Kabul is one that is designed to ensure that the operations of ISAF do not conflict with the operational considerations which I just described to you. The international security assistance force as it is set in Kabul has a liaison element from me, more than 30 people. Every operation that we conduct, ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom inside Afghanistan, is coordinated. When we reach the point where we have accomplished the objectives, Senator Warner, which I described, then I will go to the Secretary of Defense and say, Mr. Secretary, this is what we see, this is what we believe, and I believe it is okay for you to tell the President that the description he gave at Crawford, Texas, has been met.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, General. That is very helpful. My time is up.

Chairman LEVIN. We expect a vote to start any minute, and again we hope to work through the vote. This is the order we have. Senator Landrieu, Senator Sessions, Senator Ben Nelson, and Senator Collins will be the next four.

Senator Landrieu.

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for calling this hearing. General Franks, let me take this opportunity to welcome you and to sincerely thank you for your outstanding commitment to all of the men and women in uniform that you so ably represent. Thank them for their extraordinary work and dedication, and tell them they have made us all very proud.

I want also to commend you for the way you have conducted the humanitarian efforts which support our tactical efforts on the ground, because as you and I talked about earlier, before the hearing, those are equally critical to our long-term success as our military operations.

Getting back to that statement in Crawford, Texas, before I get on to my questions, I think the President has put to you an ex-

traordinary responsibility to help us determine when we have accomplished what we set out to do. Destroying the Taliban, destroying the immediate threat, is clearly something we can all agree to. The more difficult question becomes, how far should we go to minimize a threat that could be created by leaving an atmosphere where a similar regime could stand up?

That is an extraordinarily difficult question, and I am confident that you and the men and women you serve with can provide us with good leadership, because we most certainly do not want to spend the time, the energy, the money, and the lives to leave the job undone and to cause there to be additional threats to our Nation, to innocent men and women here, or to our allies around the world, so I look forward to working with you in that regard.

Let me ask if you could comment—and I know this will be a great joy for you to comment on—about the tremendous work that our special operations forces have done.

It has been interesting, the sort of high tech/low tech dichotomy of how we have won this war, with some of the most extraordinary precision weapons and things that have come out of books that we could not even imagine used to win this war. But we have also seen our special forces riding on horses and donkeys, climbing into caves. Could you comment for our committee on the special work that our special operations forces have done, and share with us the three most important ways we can support them, strengthen them, and help them in the future?

General FRANKS. Senator Landrieu, I would be pleased to do that. Let me make a quick comment about humanitarian assistance. I mentioned earlier the benefit which I think has accrued to the people of Afghanistan, and I mentioned the number of more than 26 million of them. As we started this operation, about 7 million people were believed to be at risk for loss of life as a result of conditions inside Afghanistan. What we find today is half a dozen airports opened, and we find the lines of communication opened from a variety of countries providing for the required amount of food to get into Afghanistan.

Our specific operation resulted in these humanitarian daily rations which have been described and more than 2½ million of them brought in by air drop, 328,000 blankets delivered to people who needed them, 1,700 tons of wheat, hundreds and hundreds of sorties committed to this. Afghanistan remains a tough place.

Just for a minute on our special forces, and special operations issues, one of the characteristics of this campaign was our linkage with opposition groups of Afghanistan. Many people have said we aligned ourselves with the Northern Alliance. In fact, it was opposition groups, some in the north and some in the south, and it was our special forces teams who linked with and worked with and assisted in training and provided logistics support to and leveraged operational fires during the course of this operation, hundreds of these men involved in activity, as you described it, some on horseback.

The interesting point is that a great many of them on horseback were nonetheless equipped with some of the very best technology that our Nation has to offer, which gave them even though in small numbers the ability to work with these opposition groups in pur-

suit of objectives which were informed by our plan. With these people being in touch with us, incredibly brave people—I have spoken to a great many of them.

I remember a medic I met one night in Mazar-e Sharif in October, a noncommissioned officer, and I asked him what had been his experience, and he described it to me like this. He said, “well, when you are riding on horseback, and you have never ridden a horse before, on a mountain path with a few thousand feet above you on one side and a few thousand feet down on the other, it occurs to you to wonder whether your greatest preoccupation is with medicine or staying on the horse.” I thought that was an appropriate comment.

I said, “well, what sorts of maladies have you treated?” and he said, “I have given a lot of aspirin, and I have also conducted some amputations.”

That is a comment both to the professional excellence of these young people, as well as to their motivation. The activities that they have undertaken in Afghanistan are remarkable. They will be recorded in history, thought about, talked about for a long time into the future. They have included unconventional warfare activities and they have also included direct action operations, virtually nonstop since 19 October.

Senator LANDRIEU. My question is, in light of that, because they have played such a key role in our victories and our new strategies, and it is clear to us how successful they have been, what are the three things this committee or this administration could do to support their efforts to either give them more training, more equipment, more supplies, or change? Is there anything you can see already from lessons learned about the one or two things we could do for our special ops forces?

General FRANKS. Ma'am, I think what we will find when we roll up the lessons of this is that the technologies with which we have equipped these special ops forces have been tremendous. I believe that everything from the science and technology work (S&T) that is included in this budget for 2003 to the procurement of some of the technologies that are used, that were used in Afghanistan by these people will pay us great dividends in the future.

I think that in terms of structure considerations, whether we want more certain sorts of branches or services in our special forces will be the subject of analysis that will come out at the end of this. Some people have said we are not nearly large enough, and so we need to have more. I think we will all be in agreement with the value of special forces. I think what we will be careful of is to be sure that the standards for training—and this is a very long, very difficult training process, so these people are very highly qualified.

We are going to want to retain that doctrine. We are going to want to retain that training, and to set some standards, but technologies as I have described it will be something that I think the lessons will bear out for us in the future, and we will also find some technologies that we want to apply to some of our air frames that we have identified high value in.

Senator LANDRIEU. That leads me to my next question, and my time has almost expired, but giving the Members some time to come back, let me just ask my second question. That is about the

unmanned aerial vehicles, the platforms you talked about. What is the next generation that you would perceive based on the lessons learned? Where can we be looking to the future? What is your vision for our unmanned aircraft?

General FRANKS. Yes, ma'am. I think that the sense for over a year has been that unmanned aerial vehicles were of high interest to us. I think we have recognized that since before even we started operations in October last year. I think the first thing we will want to do, and I think it is reflected in the budget, is we are going to want procurement of some platforms and capability which we already know about, where we want to expand in terms of numbers.

We also want to take some technologies which we have been able to identify which exist in part of our fleet and not in the other part of the fleet. We are going to want to increase the technologies, the technological capabilities on these platforms as we procure them. I think we are going to want to use S&T money over time to determine where we can move ahead to advanced technologies that we are not even quite sure of yet, but we are going to want to conduct that experimentation, and I believe that is reflected in this budget.

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you. My time has expired. Let me recognize Senator Inhofe next for questions.

[The prepared statement of Senator Landrieu follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR MARY L. LANDRIEU

Thank you Mr. Chairman:

I would like to thank you for calling this hearing. I would also like to take this opportunity to welcome and thank General Franks for the outstanding commitment you and every uniformed man and woman assigned to Central Command, and across the globe, continue to bring to the war on terrorism.

The prosecution of this war, under your watchful eye, is not only the first of its kind in the 21st century, but the first of its kind ever in the history of warfighting. No longer can we rely on the honor of sanctioned states fighting a war of symmetry. We now find ourselves thrust into a new era of rogue individuals and regimes who know no honor. They not only risk our lives, but the innocent lives of the men, women, and children in their own states.

We have, from the beginning, fought a "just" war. We have fought with honor and special compassion for non-combatants. The women of Afghanistan can once again pursue their dreams of an education. The children can hold soccer games in the street and watch television without fear of reprisal or even death at the hands of the Taliban. I would like to commend the General for the humanitarian operations, which are just as critical to our long-term success and long-term security, as wiping out the asymmetric threats we face from within the states we aid.

Now is the time to work together, unified in our determination to be ready. A "ready" fighting force is one which is ready physically—with the proper clothing, weapons, and supplies. One which is ready mentally—to face brutal uncertainties and yet, deal compassionately with those who are innocents. One which is ready spiritually, for some, who should be given that opportunity whenever and wherever it is needed.

Today's readiness definition is much more complex than the definition of a decade ago. The leaders responsible for maintaining it face even greater challenges than ever before. The end of the Cold War changed the security landscape for the foreseeable future.

Today, we are not simply concerned about whether our forces are trained and equipped to respond to a major theater war, but rather our readiness for a wide range of small, and potentially destabilizing, local and regional conflicts.

We must have a consensus about the nature and priority of threats the United States will most likely face and a consensus among military leaders about the steps that should be taken to counter them.

I know that I speak in unison with my colleagues when I say that this committee and the American people remain extremely grateful to our men and women in uniform for their continued dedication and service and to leaders of the caliber of Gen-

eral Franks. Again, welcome General Franks, I have a couple of brief questions for you regarding the war on terrorism.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

First of all, I think you have quite a few members who got here a little late, General Franks, because of the prayer breakfast, which went off in a beautiful way, so it was very rewarding. I would say that our good Admiral did a great job, too.

General Franks, because I was communicating with your office, I spent the last couple of weeks out in different places. I commented when we had our hearing a couple of days ago that back when Republicans were important I was the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness, and so I made a habit of getting out and really trying to see, at the level of where the troops are, what our readiness was. Of course we have gone through a real problematic time in every category, from modernization to quality of life to force structure.

It is force structure that is of concern to me, because as the budget came down, as we told the Secretary, one of the two areas of weakness was force structure and the other was in military construction, because they were relatively flat in this budget. If you look at our force structure in terms of where we were in 1991 and where we are today as we start rebuilding up, we are really at about half the force strength that we were back during the Persian Gulf War in terms of Army divisions, tactical air wings, ships, and last week we were at a number of different installations: Ramstein, Aviano, Vicenza, Camp Darby. One thing that I noticed, and I would just love to make this a permanent thing, I have never seen such enthusiasm of our troops. I have never seen such commitment.

I talked to a number of those who were injured in Lanstuhl. I know you have been over there, and two of them had gone down in a helicopter with the 101st. There was a heavy equipment accident in which Corporal Justin Ringle was severely injured.

The one that touched me I guess more than anyone else was Latoya Stennis, ironically on U.S.S. *Stennis*, and she had been pulled overboard and fell 65, 70 feet, which would normally be to her death, and it did crush both of her lungs, but she sat there, a very small young lady. She said, I am just anxious to get back. Each one without exception, the ones I talked to in the hospital who had been injured, they all said they wanted a career, and a lot of them had not been that way before.

Now, my concern is this, that we have, as I look at this map before us here, so many volatile areas. You have done just a miraculous job in Afghanistan, but I look at some other places where we could be all of a sudden having to deploy troops. I spent time at the 21st TACOM, or 21st TSC, I guess it is, that is responsible for the logistics, and certainly the commitment that they have in taking care of the Balkans, where I went up and looked there, too, is using that capacity.

Now, if something should happen in the Persian Gulf, and as volatile as things are down there we have to consider that, it would be very difficult—in fact, I believe we would have to withdraw our troops from Bosnia and Kosovo to go through a retraining, and certainly severely limit what we would be doing in logistical support.

We were told by a number of people in the field that if something like that happened we would be 100 percent dependent on Guard and Reserve. As you well know, right now our Guard and Reserve are in a critical situation. They are all dedicated, and they want to be there, but there are a lot of employers who just cannot handle that kind of deployment, and so we have a very high OPTEMPO of our regular services and all services over there. We have a crisis, certainly, with some MOSs in the Guard and Reserve, and I would like to have you address for just a minute the inadequacy or the adequacy of the number of troops on hand, and what we would do if another MTR should come forward, how we would handle it.

It looks like I am the only one here, so we have all the time we want. You are used to that luxury. I am not.

General FRANKS. Senator Inhofe, we could just have a long conversation here.

Senator INHOFE. That is right.

General FRANKS. I think both our technologies and our structure will be informed by the lessons of Afghanistan. I would not want to prejudge the specifics, as I mentioned to Senator Landrieu, of whether the structure, for example, of our special forces would grow or change in character. I think there is a double edged sword involved in it. I think were we not able to be informed by the lessons of Afghanistan, it may well be that we would have structured in a way that may have been inappropriate if we had increased the structure absent the information we have gained from Afghanistan. I think you are also correct that one size will not fit all, and certainly Afghanistan is one level of contingency and a major theater war is another.

I think what we will try to do is take the lessons out of Afghanistan, take the ones that are enduring as they relate to capabilities we see in the future, and I think, sir, you will see in time adjustments to structure by MOS as will be warranted in order to do that.

I agree with you on your comments, certainly, about the commitment and the selfless nature of these people, the ones in the hospital and also the ones on the ground, wherever it is that they may be, supporting combat search and rescue, or flying from aircraft carriers. They are incredible.

I do identify with your point about the Guard and Reserve and employers, because I recall from previous service the need to talk to employers and not penalize people, our people who are coming on active duty, by putting them in a position where it was not good for them or their employer in terms of overall end strength and things like that.

Senator Inhofe, I think I would leave that to the services to make their judgments on, but I do believe that the structure will be informed by some of the lessons we have taken out of Afghanistan.

Senator INHOFE. When you talk about employers, there are employers who are just superpatriots and would like to do it, and we can talk to them, but also it is a competitive world out there and so there are some who just absolutely cannot do it. So the only choice then they have is to get out, and that is a sad thing. This has been a great concern to me.

You mentioned Afghanistan. We do not know—I am sure that did affect the thoughts as we go forward with force structure changes and other things. We would not have had any idea 6 months ago that we would be doing what we are doing. I can remember sitting at this very table in this very seat when the people were saying, well, we are no longer going to be needing ground troops, that is going to be a thing of the past. So it is a moving target, and we do not know here today but what 6 months from now it might be a totally different type of conflict, and so we have to be ready for the totally unexpected, unfortunately.

I am sure you are aware of it, even though it was thought to be more of a Navy and Marine Corps issue, that is the training on Vieques. It is really an all-services issue for a number of reasons. A couple of weeks ago I went out on the U.S.S. *Wasp*, the U.S.S. *Mount Whitney*, and the *JFK*, where they are doing training. Now, they were lucky enough to have inert training before the deployment. However, the *Washington* may not be that fortunate, and this is the concern I have, because you are receiving these trained troops over there.

We want to be sure that they are trained to the ultimate, but I have to say this, as I went out and I talked to all of these elements that were training, they said three things. Number 1, you cannot do it all. It has to be unified in order to really train them to the degree to meet our expectations; number 2, that it is great that we have the training for the *JFK*, some of it was on Vieques where it could be unified, but it was inert; and number 3, it would have been better if we had been able to have live training.

Do you have any thoughts about that, or any input on that issue? Keep one other thing in mind: if there is one thing that is more important than the level of training, it is the fact that if we allow this to happen, every range in the world is at risk, all of the ranges. With that in mind, what thoughts do you have?

General FRANKS. Senator, the combatant commanders are blessed by receiving well-trained and equipped forces from the services, and as I would say to our great Navy, I would also say to the Army and to our Air Force that the things that provide for them and the things that support them in the training and the readiness levels for their formations I support, and all the unified commanders will support.

The thing that I do not think the unified commanders are capable of doing honestly is trying to help them figure out—in the case of the Navy—whether it is Vieques or all of the other issues that have gone into that. We are blessed because the forces we have received in our theater up to this point have been well-trained, well-equipped, and extremely ready.

I am very much aware of the issue that you brought forth, and I think we all have it as a concern. The solution, though, is not on the tip of my tongue.

Senator INHOFE. It is a tough one. I talked to General Jones and he felt the level of training could be better if we had had that full, live opportunity as we have in the past.

Lastly, and then my time will be up and Senator Nelson will be next, I just wanted to mention this. I have long, since 1987, been one of the real advocates of the V-22 and that technology, using

it not just for the Marines, not just for the Coast Guard, but for all the other applications.

As you look at the effort that you have been running over in Afghanistan, if you had had that vehicle, how would that have affected you? What value would that have been to you?

General FRANKS. Sir, I had a discussion with someone in the last few days about the V-22, and I am pleased, as a unified commander, to see the program move forward, but it made me think of exactly that question.

The first place that we introduced our Marines into Afghanistan, you will recall, was forward operating base Rhino, much reported. Interestingly, the distance from the ships, the amphibious readiness group that was used for that, to forward operating base Rhino was 350 miles. In order for us to get in there just in this one particular case, some refueling was required in Pakistan, as a matter of fact.

I started thinking about the 500-mile combat radius of the V-22, and I started thinking about the speed of it and its carrying capacity, and it became more clear to me, in the context of this operation in Afghanistan, whereas you know, we did not—Afghanistan is a land-locked country, yet we were doing a great deal of our work from the sea, and so that did occur to me, and I thought about that, and in this particular case that air frame or something like it would have been great for our operation.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you very much, General Franks. Thank you for all you are doing over there.

General FRANKS. Sir, thank you for your support and the visit.

Senator INHOFE. Senator Nelson.

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.

General Franks, on this 128th day of Operation Enduring Freedom, I would like to begin by thanking you for your efforts, and applaud your efforts, and the results of your command from the integrated joint and coalition missions. I would also congratulate you for your selection of forces and for your simultaneous supervision of Operations Southern Watch and Northern Watch and the deployed forces around the Horn of Africa, all well-executed with few casualties.

You must be proud, as we are, of your marines, your sailors, your soldiers, and your airmen, and I simply want to thank you on behalf of the people of the State of Nebraska, and I know I speak for all Americans.

I have a couple of questions regarding the mission in Afghanistan, the fiscal year 2003 defense budget, and a couple of members of the axis of evil that seem to be close under your command.

First of all, with the objectives in Afghanistan to destroy the Taliban and al Qaeda, to be able to go through and analyze the materials and the information that is available and then eliminate the residual Taliban and al Qaeda operations, to what extent do you believe that we have destroyed the underground operating centers, or the tunnels and the caves we hear about in Afghanistan?

Obviously, they have been struck on numerous occasions with heavy duty munitions, but are we certain that these facilities cannot be used again? Because if we are going to eliminate the resid-

ual areas, obviously, we have to degrade their capacity to be able to continue. That is my first question.

General FRANKS. I think that it would not be accurate to say that each cave complex that exists in Afghanistan has been closed, because there literally are thousands of them. Interestingly, we even received some great assistance by the National Geologic Survey as we were determining which of these could support command and control of operations in size and depth and this sort of thing.

In fact, Senator, as you said, hundreds of these complexes have been destroyed, some destroyed to the point where it was not worth our energy to go and completely dig them out. What was in there will remain in there for eternity.

In a great many cases, we have reopened them and gone into them and then reclosed them, and so I will not even try to give you an answer that is directly objective in terms of no, there is no possibility. What we want to be sure of is that there is neither the capability of people to go back in them, nor the inclination of a state to support people who would go back in them such as al Qaeda did.

Senator BEN NELSON. That would be one of the things that you would want to have accomplished before you told the Commander in Chief the mission is accomplished in Afghanistan?

General FRANKS. Absolutely.

Senator BEN NELSON. Then with respect to the 2003 Defense budget, I have reviewed a great deal of the budget and, of course, listened to General Myers yesterday say 60 percent of the weapons that were used were smart weapons, strategic weapons, and that the munitions are also in low supply, and we have to rebuild our supply. Are we going to be able to have enough conventional weapons to continue to do the kinds of things we need to do while we rebuild the smart munitions?

General FRANKS. Senator, as best I can tell, we can do what we need to do. As you certainly know and as I think Dick Myers said, we expended something around 18,000 munitions in this and about 10,000 of those were precision munitions. Probably half of that 10,000 were these pieces of ordnance you described that we used also in cave closings, the JDAMs, and so I think there is a major effort being supported by this committee as well as the other body to move forward with procurement of additional munitions in the future.

Whether we have enough to do anything we may ever have to do in the interim until all of that comes online, sir, I would not want to speculate, but we do still have substantial stockage levels.

Senator BEN NELSON. Well, it is probably a question that if we were going to get into specifics, we had better raise it and answer it during the closed session, but for the benefit of the American people, we are not at that point where we cannot continue to do what we need to do.

General FRANKS. That is right, Senator.

Senator BEN NELSON. In terms of Iraq, do we think at the present time that it is a strategic threat to the United States? Obviously, there continue to be concerns that there are weapons of mass destruction being created and maintained there, and support, maybe, of some of the enemies that we are trying to rout out, but is it a strategic threat at the present time?

General FRANKS. Sir, since the end of the Gulf War we have seen no evidence that Saddam Hussein was willing to undo his weapons of mass destruction program, so he had the interest and he continues to have the interest, and I believe, sir, were there no other reason to characterize Iraq as a strategic risk, I would do so on that basis. In my opinion this pursuit of weapons of mass destruction is a great threat to a great many nations on this planet, and so I would say yes, it does represent a strategic threat and, of course, remains on our list of states which sponsor terrorism, and I think I would probably leave it at that point, sir.

Senator BEN NELSON. I believe my time is up. Thank you very much, General Franks, and continued good fortune in your endeavors. Thank you.

The next Senator is Senator Sessions.

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Franks, congratulations on your leadership. I know you had some second-guessers there for a while, but you were a soldier's soldier. You developed a good plan that you believed would work, and you have been proven correct.

We also need to celebrate and recognize the terrific courage displayed by our men and women in uniform who helped execute the plan that you developed, and we should not forget the loss of life, too, from my home State of Alabama, Michael Spann in the prison riot and Gunnery Sergeant Bryson in a helicopter crash.

So we did lose some lives, but I have to tell you, I think at the beginning if it had been said that the loss would turn out to be as small as it is, people would not have believed it in light of what has happened. I think that is a tribute to you and to the strategies and tactics that you undertook.

There are a couple of things that I have been concerned about. I will change the subject a little bit. I have been the ranking member on the Seapower Subcommittee, and you mentioned the demands that were placed on you with regard to bringing in supplies and munitions and transportation, and actually you requested, as I understood it, three carriers at the beginning.

General FRANKS. That is correct, sir, and we now have them.

Senator SESSIONS. The third was the *Kitty Hawk*.

General FRANKS. Yes, sir, it was.

Senator SESSIONS. That carrier, did it fulfill its responsibilities and requirements?

General FRANKS. Yes, sir, it did.

Senator SESSIONS. What use was made of the *Kitty Hawk*?

General FRANKS. Sir, a general comment if I can, first. One of the great things about a naval carrier battle group is not only its fire power, which is there, to be sure, but also its staying power, and what we have seen in this campaign is both the fire power and the staying power of our Navy in the Northern Arabian Sea.

The *Kitty Hawk* was used, sir, and I think, as has been well-advertised, as a forward operating base for special operations forces for a period of time. It was very effective in that role, and one wants to always consider the capabilities and the capacities of a carrier battle group.

On the other hand, one always wants to think about the plug and play capabilities we have in our military, and during a given

point in time, how can those be best used to accomplish the mission. I applaud not only the flexibility but the capability of the United States Navy to have been able to set conditions for the success of this campaign which, make no mistake about it, Senator, they certainly have done.

Senator SESSIONS. Well, I think so, too. I visited the *Kitty Hawk* in Japan recently, and it is set for decommissioning, and it makes you wonder—it was in the region, it got there quickly and played a critical role, performed the mission completely, and it is painful for me to think that a ship with that much capability may not be with us much longer.

General FRANKS. Sir, I understand the point, and I think that Admiral Vern Clark and the Secretary of the Navy are giving every possible consideration to the amounts of resources they want to commit to the readiness equation compared to the amount they want to commit to the modernization equation. Even though that really is not my business or my line of work, I do have great confidence that they will make the right decision about the Navy, and I think the decision they make will be supported by Secretary Rumsfeld.

Senator SESSIONS. With regard to the prisoners that are at Guantanamo, it strikes me as quite plain that their conditions are superior to our troops in most areas in Afghanistan now, if not all of them. Is it not true that a lot of our troops are still not getting hot meals, and they have very temporary quarters at best?

General FRANKS. Sir, that is true.

Senator SESSIONS. Can you give us some of the hardships they are working under right now in the wintertime?

General FRANKS. Sir, as we speak we have the forces I described earlier in 30, 40, 50 different areas in very small groups. They are essentially what I would have described years ago when I was first in Germany, they are living on the economy, so to speak. They are mobile, they are moving about from day to day, they are enduring environmental hardship, and they remain about as dedicated and motivated as any group of American military people I have ever seen.

Senator SESSIONS. It is true, is it not, that they have to assume at any time they could be the target of some terrorist who may not have been captured?

General FRANKS. Senator, that is exactly right.

Senator SESSIONS. Well, we salute you, and each one of them, and I appreciate the service and contribution of all those men and women. We particularly are saddened by the loss of life that has occurred. I mentioned Gunnery Sergeant Steven Bryson. He was in the KC-130, and I know that in Guantanamo Bay there are people being held there who participated in the prison riot that resulted in the death of Michael Spann from Winfield, Alabama. It is just a personal thing to think that these matters are not all intellectual. Our people's lives are at stake.

Thank you for your leadership.

General FRANKS. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

Senator Dayton.

Senator DAYTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, I would join with my colleagues in paying my highest tribute to you for your leadership. As you say, all of the different elements came together. It has been an extraordinary success thus far.

General FRANKS. Thank you, sir.

Senator DAYTON. I was one of a group that also went over last month to Afghanistan. In Uzbekistan, we were briefed by General Hackenbeck and at the special operations center in Bagram by General Harold. I was so impressed there with the quality and the professionalism of those men and their officers, and they described in detail as well, as you have described here today, the planning and the execution of that plan, and professionalism, and courage resolved in carrying it out.

General FRANKS. Sir, they are wonderful.

Senator DAYTON. We had lunch at one place and dinner at another with some of the troops, and again I was just really impressed with how high their morale is. I want to qualify, Senator Sessions, that they are not getting hot meals, but they are getting warm meals, because the MREs can now, with modern technology, put it in a little warming pad there and it does not get hot, but it gets warm. Though I do know, with regret, that I did not see any Spam in any of those MREs, since that is produced in Austin, Minnesota. But some things must pass.

General FRANKS. Sir, the CINC has no comment. [Laughter.]

Senator DAYTON. That was the response I got from the troops, too. [Laughter.]

I think one of the most impressive aspects of this operation which you referred to earlier was the rapidity of our response. It is probably not exactly comparable, but as I recall the Operation Desert Storm build-up occurred over a period of 5 or 6 months before we engaged militarily, and you commenced the military engagement, as you said in your testimony, 7,000 miles away, only 26 days after the September 11 attack. I think that is extraordinary.

What are the key changes during that decade, or even not comparing it to Operation Desert Storm, what has enabled you to make that kind of rapid response?

General FRANKS. Senator Dayton, I would just give two quick points. One, there is now a much different composition of force. I think 10 years ago what my predecessor had to grapple with was the same relative distance that we are working with, but he also had to grapple at that time with hundreds of thousands of people, whereas we have not had that footprint.

Additionally, I think a great many lessons were taken from Operation Desert Storm, some of which had to do with positioning of assets, others with diplomatic efforts to build relationships in this region where one can coordinate some staging and basing and over-flight opportunity.

Sir, I guess the third point I would give would be the overwhelming international support of Operation Enduring Freedom. The world feels as though it was attacked on 11 September, and any capital one goes to, at least the ones I have been to, that is very evident, and their willingness to support us has been and remains incredible.

Senator DAYTON. If you addressed this question when I was voting, I apologize for the redundancy, but in your full statement that is in the record you referred to some of these, again, very preliminary lessons that have been drawn from this experience, and you referred then to the very complex movement of troops and equipment and supplies and the like. I can attest to that, having tried to get into those two locations on C-130s. It is amazing, at least the sophisticated movement of all of these factors.

What are the choke points, particularly as they would relate to this committee's view of what needs to be replenished? What are we short of?

General FRANKS. Sir, I think that the unified commands over the past years have talked on the need for strategic lift. Our lift capability is—I will leave others to describe all of the numbers associated with that, but one of the first things that a combatant commander will address is this business of how many tons can we move in a given period of time a long way away, and so I think, rather than creating a revelation, the experience in Afghanistan served as a reminder at least to me that we need to retain some focus on our strategic lift and our ability to move these forces around.

I think we have taken a lesson out of Afghanistan. We have taken an awful lot of them, sir, that I will not waste the committee's time with, but we have learned the value of combined arms and joint training, having Army, Air Force, Navy people together. I mean, we have learned some lessons like that which have been of tremendous impact. We have learned lessons that have to do with the application of technology.

As I have told many people before, my headquarters sat in Tampa, Florida, and commanded and controlled forces at work in the country of Afghanistan while we were moving international forces from more than 250 bases from around the world, from 30 different countries. That was enabled by technology, by some foresight, some application of money over a period of time that set us up for success.

I think we will take lessons from that and say, where are the places that we do not yet have enough? What technological lessons did we learn in command and control, for example, that we need to move forward with? I think those will be lessons that we will come out of this with.

Senator DAYTON. Thank you.

There is always an intense media focus on the civilian and non-combatant casualties, which is necessary and is important. I think the 99-plus percent of missions that are carried out successfully without loss of noncombatant life do not get the same attention, and referencing some points some others have made, the relatively low loss of American men and women and casualties, given the scope of the operation, I think is commendable. Any loss is too much, but again, what are the key lessons we can draw from this experience? What are the factors in that?

General FRANKS. Senator, I think I would join a great many people in saying any loss of innocent life is a shame. It is not something that anyone would be proud of, wearing the uniform on the ground, or as we sit here. I think at the same time, though, I would

point out that the loss of thousands of lives—with a great many nations represented—in New York and Washington and Pennsylvania on 11 September set conditions where our Nation was ready to go to war, and war is terribly demanding. I think this committee recognizes that this decision was not taken lightly.

My view is that this has been the most accurate war ever fought in this Nation's history. I believe that the precision of this effort has been incredible. When we have identified an error where we have put precision guided munitions in the wrong place, we have been very quick to say we did that, and, sir, we will continue to do that.

The thing that I do not think we will do is be quick to rush to a judgment that takes as truth information that may be provided by sources who do not share the same value of human life that we share in this country, and sir, I have to leave it at that point. I am extremely proud of the professionalism and the performance of our people in this campaign. That does not say that mistakes have not been made. They surely have, and each time they have, we have worked hard to acknowledge it.

Senator DAYTON. My time is up, but I share your assessment, and I wanted to point out, as you said, I would agree that I think the degree of success and precision has been extraordinary, and also it is a fact of minimizing the loss of American life or casualties, too, so I salute you again.

Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Dayton.

Senator Collins.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Franks, let me begin by echoing the thanks of my colleagues for your outstanding service and leadership. We have had tremendous support from long-time allies like Turkey, as well as from newer friends such as Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in conducting the war against terrorism in Afghanistan.

When I was in the region and met with Turkish officials, however, they expressed great concern about any expansion of our operations, particularly if we were to go into Iraq. They expressed concerns about what the impact would be on regional stability, on Turkey's economy, on a possible breakup of Iraq into a separate Kurdish state in the north. They were concerned about a flow of refugees similar to what Turkey experienced after the Gulf War. Could you comment on efforts that are being made as far as military leaders that you are discussing with in the region to maintain the strength of the coalition?

General FRANKS. Yes, ma'am, I would be pleased to.

One of the things I applaud is the fact that we have a magnificent Turkish officer on my staff in Tampa, and have had since the very beginning of this, along with, as I mentioned earlier, 26 other nations who have national representatives on our staff. The coordination that has made possible, to include, in fact, a lot of NATO countries, has been an enabler of this operation.

I think that the focus of this coalition and the focus of this work is on Afghanistan. We have not had discussions, military-to-military, with other nations about Iraq or about any of the other countries in our region, so through my experience, I would say that

whatever actions are deemed appropriate, there will be efforts if our operations expand, as they well may around the world, and not just in our area of responsibility. This will result in consultations by the leadership in our State Department and by our President with the people with whom they need to consult and discuss the concerns such as the ones you mentioned. That is really the best I can give you. We have had no military-to-military discussion of potential future operations in Iraq.

Senator COLLINS. Have military leaders of Turkey and other countries in the coalition expressed concerns to you about expansion of military operations?

General FRANKS. I would say, sort of. What we do is, and what we have done since we started Operation Enduring Freedom, is I meet with them every day at 9:00 in the morning and we will go around, and there will constantly be interest in any other planning that they may perceive is coming up, and they will ask a question. They will say, what do you have in your mind, General, about the next phase of the operation? We have very open and frank discussions about where we perceive problems, about what we believe potential solutions may be. So I cannot actually say that there is evidence of concern, but there is evidence of interest in each of the countries all of the time.

Senator COLLINS. I want to turn now to a budget question. Earlier this week, General Myers in his testimony before this committee talked about the importance of operations in the information domain, and cited as an example the Navy and Air Force's intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft in guiding our special operations forces on ground strikes and for other purposes.

With regard to this year's Defense budget, do you feel that our manned Navy and Air Force ISR platforms such as the P-3, the EP-3, and the RC-135 are funded sufficiently?

General FRANKS. Ma'am, I am not dodging, but I simply do not know what the numbers look like in the submission for 2003, because I have not looked at the specific numbers for platforms like P-3 or RL, and so I really cannot give you a good answer.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

Senator Cleland.

Senator CLELAND. Thank you very much.

General Franks, it is nice to see you again. We knew you when you were Third Army Commander in Atlanta, and you have a tremendous task on your hands, but you have acquitted yourself beautifully, you and all the people under your command, and we are all very proud of you. The country is united behind you, Congress is united behind you, and that has to give you a good feeling when you tackle the tremendous responsibilities you have.

General FRANKS. Senator, thank you.

Senator CLELAND. Three issues: surveillance, intelligence, and reconnaissance. I have been discussing with the Secretary of the Air Force some ideas that he has put forward that maybe we can combine the JSTARS capability and the AWACS capability on one aircraft, maybe a 767.

Currently, they are on two different aircraft, and knowing how much real-time battlefield intelligence means to commanders such

as yourself, particularly in terms of targeting of precision weapons, is that something that might be useful to you in the experience you have had? That on one platform, say a Boeing 767, you have both the AWACS and the JSTARS capability there, over the battlefield, with long hang time, so to speak? Putting that together in one aircraft, would that be something that would be a plus in terms of your intelligence-gathering capabilities?

General FRANKS. Senator Cleland, first, I certainly would not turn down anything. Any opportunity to use less fuel in order to accomplish the same mission, when in fact we have to bring the fuel, load the fuel, do the refueling, et cetera, is good, so my experience has been that the aggregation of technologies is generally useful.

Now, that is my out-of-my-lane answer, sir. What I would say is that what we have, the results of AWACS and JSTARS in this particular operation in Afghanistan, have been terrific. What they have brought, despite the fact that they operate from two platforms, has been substantial, and I would say, certainly in the case of AWACS, we would have had a heck of a time accomplishing what our airmen have been able to accomplish without it.

Senator CLELAND. Now, can we move on to the use of precision weapons? General Clark, in discussing the Kosovo war, the Balkan war, said that this country had used precision weapons to a level hitherto unknown, and when I was in Aviano, Italy, about a year or so ago, it was made known to me that in the Gulf War in 1991 against Iraq a majority of our weapons were so-called dumb weapons, but by the time we got to the Balkan war a majority of the weapons were precision weapons. I gather here, in the war in Afghanistan, we have taken that even a step further.

Your point about this being the most precise war we have ever fought in terms of attacking our targets, I gather we are still perfecting and continuing to escalate the use of precision weapons and fine-tune it.

General FRANKS. Senator Cleland, one of the obvious characteristics of this campaign has been the accuracy that I described, 18,000 plus weapons having been delivered, 10,000 of those precision munitions, by far and away the greatest application of precision munitions in the history of our country at any point, at any place, at any time.

I think someone told me the other day that in the Gulf War we averaged 10 aircraft per target. In this war we have averaged two targets per aircraft.

Senator CLELAND. That is quite amazing, and the use of special ops or special forces, Rangers, the special forces and Seals and other special operations forces, it does seem to me we have perfected in this war the use of those special operations forces to a very fine degree, and that has helped our precision, it has minimized our own casualties, and it has maximized the lethality of our attack. Is that your understanding?

General FRANKS. Sir, that is my understanding. There is great advantage to precision-guided munitions in any context. One sees a factored or a geometric growth in the effectiveness, even of precision-guided munitions, when there are people on the ground physically in contact with the target, able to see a target. We have seen

that, and I believe that is one of the characteristics of this particular campaign of which our Nation should be very proud. It is the bravery of the people on the ground and the competency of our technologies mated with one another to great effect.

Senator CLELAND. I had the pleasure of visiting with a couple or three special forces servicemen who had been right there on the ground, and so close to a 2,000-pound bomb that they themselves suffered some injuries. They were that close to the target, that engaged, and I think that is something we cannot forget, that young men and women are still putting their lives on the line for the rest of us.

Thank you, General, for your service.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Cleland.

Senator Bunning.

Senator BUNNING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to also add my congratulations to General Franks for his unbelievable accomplishments in Afghanistan. I do have some questions that I hope that he does not take wrong, but if, in fact, our mission was to seek out and destroy the Taliban and al Qaeda, and to help free the Afghani people from the totalitarian government that was there, maybe you can help me out. Why were so many people able to flee Afghanistan that were al Qaeda and/or Taliban?

I see in today's paper, *The Washington Times*, that we actually only have 324 people in custody in Afghanistan and 158 at Guantánamo. That adds up to approximately 500 people.

Now, I know there were an awful lot of people that were Taliban fighters. Do you have any idea of the percentage that were al Qaeda that you were in the process of attacking?

General FRANKS. Sir, I do not know. I am not sure what the al Qaeda percentage of the Taliban was. I think you have asked a valid question. With a mission of the destruction of the al Qaeda network, the al Qaeda network inside Afghanistan, and an illegitimate government harboring them, with those as objectives, one will quickly say, well, this goes to the personality level of the people. I think the approach that has been taken, the destruction of the networks, has necessarily killed some, detained some, and fractured these organizations, and a lot of them have moved, as we say, into the hills, or are puddling in places inside Afghanistan, and some, as I have said before, have certainly left Afghanistan.

So, sir, the description that I would give is, people who are anxious to not be caught, they are on the run. They are working hard to get away and are considering only one border, the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which is about 1,500 miles long. At one point in time President Musharraf of Pakistan had about 100,000 people on that border in areas familiar to them providing assistance and, in fact, have delivered more than 100 of the people that they have detained coming across the border, have rendered them to us. So, sir, I think that is probably the best answer I can give you.

Senator BUNNING. Well, today's headline in *The Washington Times* on the CIA Director's report to the Intelligence Committee yesterday tells us a different story, tells us that most of the people

have escaped through Iran into Iraq, and that they are regrouping and preparing to launch additional attacks on the United States, or what other place they choose to attack.

The Secretary was here 2 days ago asking this committee to approve a budget of over \$1 billion a day.

General FRANKS. Yes, sir.

Senator BUNNING. \$1 billion a day. That is \$370-some billion. Are you telling us that we cannot do a better job of finding out who escaped, where they escaped to? I think you have done an unbelievable job in Afghanistan, as far as the replacement of an illegitimate government with a temporary one, and I think the Afghani people are legitimately pleased that that has happened. But I am not pleased, and I do not think any Americans are pleased, that we have not done a better job on al Qaeda, the terrorist group that attacked the World Trade Center and planned it, and did those things, so I think we are half-way there.

General FRANKS. Sir, I agree with you. I think we are half-way there, and I think the characteristic of what we will see in the future will be the continuing relationship between Defense forces and those of George Tenet as all of us continue to work to finish the 50 percent that you describe, and so I would not argue with you a bit.

Senator BUNNING. Here is my real hangup, though. It looks like we are going to have to go it alone if we go into Iraq. I mean, there are unbelievable things in the newspaper today that really bother me. The average American is bothered by this.

General FRANKS. I must confess, there are things in the media every day which bother me. [Laughter.]

Senator BUNNING. That goes without saying. I do not believe anything I read, and very few things that I am told about personally, but the fact of the matter is, we have had a coalition in Afghanistan. If, in fact, the brains and brawn of the al Qaeda concentrate their efforts, and we know they do this in Iraq, are we ready to do what we have to do?

General FRANKS. Sir, I would leave that decision, certainly, with our Commander in Chief. I think that it behooves all of us to put ourselves in a position to answer the call of America if the decisions are made. I have been very confident in that leadership up to this point, certainly with Afghanistan, and sir, I guess I really would not speculate about what the future might hold.

Senator BUNNING. Well, I am not speculating, but if, in fact, we are in a war against terrorists, and the terrorists happen to be in a certain country preparing other attacks, then I would think that we would definitely take some action against that country.

General FRANKS. Sir, I would agree with that, and I think we have been pretty clear about saying any time, any place. The fact is that this is a global war on terrorism. Our efforts in Afghanistan have represented the first part of it. It is going to take a long time.

Senator Bunning, as I think Director George Tenet probably mentioned to the committee, there are more than 60 places around the world where we see the evidence of al Qaeda. I think he also mentioned, and I am not sure precisely the number, that perhaps 1,000 people from this organization have been arrested since 11 September. I can tell you that within my particular area of respon-

sibility there have been something more than 500 arrests since 11 September outside of Afghanistan, and not counting the ones we described before, because of the willingness of the nations of this world to reach out and continue to pursue these people until, in fact, we can reduce the threat to our own country and to theirs.

But I will say that I do agree with Director Tenet when he said, this is dangerous. These people are committed. There are still a great many of them, and we have an awful lot of work to do.

Senator BUNNING. Well, if we are going to sell the budget, we had better sell the fact that we have still not finished the job.

General FRANKS. Sir, we are going to do our part.

Senator BUNNING. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

Senator CARNAHAN.

Senator CARNAHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Franks, you have certainly distinguished yourself as an innovative tactician and an exceptional leader, and we commend you for that.

Last month, I was standing in Bagram Air Force Base with a young soldier, and his comment to me was, we know why we are here, and we want to stay until we get the job done. So I think that level of morale certainly reveals the leadership that these young people are receiving.

I understand that short-range fighters cannot easily reach deep inland into targets in Eastern, Central, or Southeastern Asia as well as Eastern Africa, so in the future, do you think that the American forces may grow increasingly reliant on, say, Navy fighter jets or long-range bombers? Would you describe the role that you think the long-range bombers and the fighter jets have played in the war in Afghanistan?

General FRANKS. Ma'am, that is a good question. I took a look this morning to see where we were in what we call the sortie count, the number of flights that we do from bases and from naval assets and so forth, and the snapshot that I got from that was about 20,000 sorties, about half of those from carrier-based assets, some very long-range activity. We had global power involved in this, which we were flying from Whiteman Air Force Base here in the United States. These very long missions were performed by pilots who were willing to do an awful lot to go a long ways, an absolutely monumental performance by their effort.

We also had some short-range assets operating over extended ranges, for example, an F-15 pilot who flew a 15-hour mission. We had the longest reconnaissance flight flown in our Nation's history, 26 hours, and those were by Air Force assets. We also had these being flown from the carrier decks at the same time, and so in my own mind I do not have a vision of precisely what that mix should be.

I will say that I do see a need to continue in the future a balance of that mix because of the complementary capability that these airframes bring.

Senator CARNAHAN. One other question. Certainly, the tempo of their operation has slowed down now, and much of what is left now is on the ground by our special forces, and these soldiers are having to rout out the enemy in villages and forts and caves. Can you

describe the action of our special forces troops at this stage of the conflict, and what you think will be in weeks and months ahead.

General FRANKS. Our special operations forces are engaged in many activities. One is to provide assistance and training to Afghan forces. We had been providing assistance, advice, training, and another of the jobs they perform over there is what we call assault, or direct action. We have capabilities to move our people around over there in the air and on the ground. We have very highly trained and capable special operating forces as of this morning, from eight different countries, inside Afghanistan. They are conducting strategic reconnaissance missions today.

They may well conduct direct action missions within the next 24 hours. It is continuing activity, and that activity will continue until we have satisfied ourselves that there are not any more of the pockets that Senator Bunning mentioned a moment ago. We are going to run them all down, and that is what our special operators are doing now.

Senator CARNAHAN. Thank you very much.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Carnahan.

Senator Roberts.

Senator ROBERTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, it was about 3 or 4 years ago that Senator Inouye, Senator Stevens, myself, and others were in South Korea meeting with a certain general who was the CG of the U.S. forces in Korea. We were going to North Korea with the first delegation allowed into North Korea, and we saw this tall drink of water from Oklahoma State with stars on his shoulders, and after the common sense briefing and our experience there, we knew that there were probably some greater things and greater missions to come for this man.

I just want to say, General, you have really exceeded our expectations, not that they were not real high to begin with, and in terms of this Senator's confidence in you, I am going to stand behind you when you take the bows, and you are taking the bows now, and I will stand beside you when you take the boos, and I do not expect any.

By the way, I would report to you that Eddie Sutton has a pretty good team at Oklahoma State. Not good enough to beat Kansas, but a pretty good team. [Laughter.]

No objection there?

General FRANKS. No objection. [Laughter.]

Senator ROBERTS. On page 7 in your statement you indicated the mission has determined the coalition, the coalition has not determined the mission, and Senator Warner talked about that some. We are going to take into consideration the further enlargement of NATO. The specific countries to be added, all deserving, are still unknown, but I am going to ask you three questions and then see if I can get a response from you, because I am worried about NATO. I am worried about the strategic concept that was adopted 2 years ago this spring. I also worry about NATO in regards to Article 9 and their role in something which I think transcends most of this concept, and something they should be involved in, and one concern is from a combat capability perspective. What would be the impact on the war if we were to fight side by side with allies with

significantly less technologically advanced weapons systems? I think we all know the answer to that.

Additionally, what would be the impact on your efforts if the targeting was controlled or dictated from NATO headquarters, as it was with General Wes Clark? My concern is that we are going to enlarge NATO with nations with very limited military capability and exacerbate the capability that we all know exists.

Now, Senator Lugar went over and talked to the folks there. You cannot find a stronger supporter than Senator Lugar for NATO. He said, what would happen if in fact al Qaeda had attacked the Brandenburg Gates, the Eiffel Tower, or God forbid, Big Ben in London, and what we would do, as a member of NATO, under Article 9, one for all, all for one?

Now, NATO's strategic concept involves everything from ethnic cleansing and the environment to crime and drugs. I maintain that if every Senator knew what we were involved with in terms of obligations, I am not so sure they would have bought into that.

So with your statement again on page 7, the mission determines the coalition, the coalition does not determine the mission, I remember when the Apache helicopters could not even land in a particular area because the French had a fuel dump in that area, and President Clinton had to call President Chirac to say, move the fuel dump so we can land Apache helicopters. That was a hell of a way to run a war, and so I am a little worried about the future of NATO and if they do not accept, they meaning all of the nations involved, this mission in regards to international terrorism as best we can, where are we headed here?

General FRANKS. Senator Roberts, you know me, I am not going to say too much about NATO. What I will say is that we have a great many NATO nations operating with us in the Operation Enduring Freedom Task Force.

Senator ROBERTS. So it is a coalition of the willing?

General FRANKS. It is a coalition of the willing, and in that context, which is something I do know about and I can talk to, their contributions have been very powerful, they have been sustained. They certainly have been willing to do this, and so what I see of the nations represented down in Tampa is a very positive contribution.

Now, technological variances, technological differences, the fact that our Armed Forces are well advanced beyond the capabilities brought by these nations, of course that is a consideration. Sir, you know this because you have seen it before, what happens to us is, "plug and play" these assets. We determine the work to be done, we take the very best asset available to do that, and since we are dealing with willing nations, they provide the asset we need, and we have had great success in doing that.

In terms of command and control and this notion of the mission determining the coalition rather than the other way around, sir, I must tell you that since 11 September the willingness of nations to work side-by-side to go after terrorism is incredible, and so I am not sure what may have happened in a standing coalition arrangement like NATO, given the circumstances that you mentioned. But the point that I think we wanted to make, and the reason that we have used the term repeatedly, "a coalition of the willing," a flexi-

ble coalition, and we talked about the mission determining the coalition, is to alert everyone, as the President has said, if you are in this, you are in this, if you are not, you are not. So we are not going to have negotiations of missions, and we are not going to negotiate the next target, the means of attack and so forth.

As I said when we first started, Senator Roberts, we have about 50 nations, more than 50 nations involved in this now, 27 of them with us in Tampa, and that is growing today, not shrinking.

Senator ROBERTS. My time has expired. I just want to toss in one more. Do you have any concern that you are based out of Tampa? Every time I would hear a quote from you I would always think you were in theater. I guess you are in theater, except you are 7,000 miles away. That is unprecedented. It is amazing. Not amazing, but it shows you our capability.

I heard some instant expert on TV last night, somebody way below your rank and that is retired, say that you should be in theater as opposed to being in Tampa. Any comment?

General FRANKS. Sir, I welcome a chance to talk about that. I think 10 years ago—I think what our Nation's military wants and what we need is flexibility, and we need to be able to do what the mission, what the numbers of troops involved and our capabilities and situations direct. 10 years ago we did not have the capability to do that. Now we have the capability to track in real time the situation on the battlefield and, in fact, having brought our assets into this theater from 267 air bases and seaports in 30 countries, we have had situational awareness of this, as you said, Senator Roberts, which is unprecedented.

I think the lesson we want to draw from this is not the lesson that we want to have offset command and control away from a theater for every subsequent operation, and so I do not totally disagree with those who say you want to be in the center of the campaign. I think what we want to do is look at the mission: we want to look at the enemy we are going to fight, the troops available, the terrain, and one thing that I would encourage everyone to remember is the time available in which to do the operation.

The amount of time that is necessary to move a large, unified headquarters in some cases will fly in the face of a decision that says, let us just move it there, and so I do not think one size fits all. I think what we want is the ability to either be remote, or offset, or to be present in-theater. In this case, the judgment was we were best served to use the technologies this committee and our Nation has provided our military. I think they were used effectively, and the situational awareness, as well as I believe the touch with people on the ground has been very good in this effort.

Senator ROBERTS. That also deals with access denial. Your point is well-taken.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

Senator Nelson.

Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Chairman, I want to follow up on that. I have had the privilege of visiting the headquarters twice, and I am amazed that you all have utilized the technology so well, so that everything is real-time from thousands of miles away. I think it is symbolic of this whole new kind of effort that the Sec-

retary of Defense has come here and has spoken to us in saying that what is illustrative of this new kind of war is a special operations troop on horseback with the Northern Alliance calling in to pinpoint air strikes, and because of technology, and because of the space program, and because of the instant communication, you have been able to prosecute the war from there.

Just to follow up Senator Roberts, General Schwartzkopf commanded 10 years before you. I would be curious as to the considerable ease that you have in directing the war compared to General Schwartzkopf from McGill Air Force Base in Tampa 10 years before.

General FRANKS. Sir, it does go to technology. It has to do with the doctrine that we use to structure the Armed Forces which have participated in this effort. We do not talk much about that, but there have been evolutions in our view over the past 10 years. There have been evolutions in our ability to train leaders and decisionmakers and staff people over the past 10 years.

When that is coupled with the ability to videoteleconference, which, Senator, as you have seen with literally all of the leaders involved in this, whether they may be at one of a half-dozen locations in Afghanistan or on a ship at sea, wherever they may be, bringing frontline states the ability to do that 24 hours a day has enabled us to do, or the leaders at all levels to do what we have talked about for years, and that is to be able to see the eye and to gain a sense of the appreciation of a particular campaign, a plan, a battlefield from a long ways away. It is not perfect, to be sure, but far, far beyond what I think we would be seeing had we looked at it 10 years ago.

Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Chairman, I was also struck, the last time I visited there, by the representatives of so many of these nations that have now joined us in the coalition who are directly represented there by military personnel at the CENTCOM headquarters. It was my privilege, with Senator Lieberman, to visit with them and to speak to them, and that is an interesting concept for a military headquarters, that you bring in all of your partners in their military to join with you.

General FRANKS. Sir, it has been a great blessing in this effort. As I mentioned to Senator Roberts, the ability to coordinate these activities without a loss of a lot of fidelity across the nations doing all the hard work has been incredible. It is beyond any of my experience in more than 35 years.

Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Chairman, I have a number of questions if we are going into closed session, particularly with regard to some of the screening that is going on with the detainees, and I will defer until we are in closed session.

Chairman LEVIN. That is fine. I will be, though, asking a question about that in open session, after we are done with Senator Akaka. I do not know if that changes your plan or not.

Senator BILL NELSON. I will defer to the wisdom of my chairman's question.

Chairman LEVIN. The question I have in mind is one that I think can and should be answered in open session, but since you raise that issue I wanted to alert you.

Senator BILL NELSON. You sent me in a delegation from this committee down to Guantanamo as the first to visit, and my concern was not about the humanitarian treatment, because that was quickly apparent, that they were getting treated as well as our marines, but I did have a concern, which I expressed in this committee several days ago to the Secretary of Defense, about whether or not we are getting the information from those detainees, and so whatever is your pleasure.

Chairman LEVIN. My question is a different question from that. Thank you very much.

Senator Akaka.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to join my colleagues, General Franks, to express my gratitude for a job well done in Afghanistan. While no command is easy, the Central Command has had its share of challenges in recent years. I want you to know that I am comforted to know that our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are in your capable command.

General FRANKS. Thank you.

Senator AKAKA. General, one area of concern I have revolves around recent reports of military missions involving the capture and death of civilians who could be or have been determined not to be associated with terrorist organizations. According to articles in this morning's edition of *The Washington Post* and *The New York Times*, the incident involving the release of 27 individuals who have been determined not to be connected to either the Taliban or al Qaeda is under investigation. So my question is, what steps, if any, are being taken to ensure that innocent civilians are protected as we continue Operation Enduring Freedom?

General FRANKS. Senator, that is a good question, and I am pleased to answer it. I think from each experience like this we learn lessons. Some of the lessons will come out when we have completed our investigation of this, as this has been described I think even by Chairman Karzai in the last few days. Afghanistan remains Afghanistan, and there is in fact a great deal of intrigue within this country, and there are pools and puddles and pockets of resistance in places within the country. In some cases there are Afghan forces who are close to or in these pockets. We may on a given day know or not know the locations of these people.

What I want to do is see the results of the investigation, which I think we will have in 2 weeks time, and then we will adjust as we need to adjust in the event that we determine that mistakes were made.

The one point that I would make, sir, is that I read the report you mentioned, and I would make only one correction for the committee, and that is the 27 you mentioned were not, in fact, released. The 27 were turned over to Afghan authorities. Again to be borne out during the course of the investigation, but I believe that among that number there were some criminals which were being sought by Afghan authorities. So as I said, there is a bit of intrigue in this, and there is enough information that led me to want this fully and factually investigated, and so as you would expect, sir, we will do that in due course, and then we will take the action that we need to take.

Senator AKAKA. I also want to commend you on what you just said, and your method of proceeding as you meet these intriguing problems, and you have done a good job in doing this, and I hope you will continue to do that. I happen to chair the Readiness Subcommittee here, and so with respect to readiness, do you feel that the fiscal year 2003 budget that was presented by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld is adequate to support CENTCOM with respect to Operation Enduring Freedom?

General FRANKS. Senator, I do. I have reviewed—and as I mentioned earlier, I have not reviewed in micro detail the insides of each of the service sorts of issues—but in terms of the Central Command and our ability to conduct our operations within our regions, sir, I agree and applaud the submission.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, General.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Akaka. I have just one additional question for the open session. If anybody else has one question, perhaps we could do it that way.

General Franks, you and I have spoken about the issue which I am going to ask you about here, and that is the question of the status of the Taliban detainees under the Geneva Conventions. Here I am referring to the ones that you have control over, because Guantanamo is not in your jurisdiction, but these 300 or 400 people are, and one of the important considerations in any decision as to their status as to whether they are prisoners of war or not is the precedent that would be set and its impact on our people who might be captured. That is our concern. We want our personnel who are captured, whether or not they are in uniform, to be treated pursuant to international law, and to be treated properly.

The regulation, which is titled, "Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees, and Other Detainees," requires that if there is any doubt—and that is the word of the regulation—as to whether or not a person, having committed a belligerent act and been taken into custody by U.S. Armed Forces, belongs to any of the categories enumerated in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, then a three-person tribunal needs to determine their status.

Now, the tribunal that I am referring to here is not the military tribunal which is under consideration for trials of persons that might be charged for international war crimes. That is a different tribunal. The tribunal I am referring to here is the one we provide for in our own regulations for situations where people are detained and where there is a doubt about their status, which is apparently the case with at least the Taliban detainees.

Has such a tribunal been convened in the case of any of these detainees, or has the decision been made to hold these tribunals according to our regulations?

General FRANKS. Mr. Chairman, I think that is a valid question and, as you said, we discussed it yesterday. No tribunals have been conducted up to this point either in Guantanamo or inside Afghanistan, and in my personal view for a very good reason.

That is not to say they will not be conducted, but they have not been. The reason is that this is based on, or will be based on, a determination of categories of what is to be a prisoner of war as

opposed to what is to be an unlawful combatant. Careful review and study by the councils within our own country and within our own government so that we have precise definition in policy terms of this, so that if we have the tribunal that you mentioned, a decision to do so will be in accordance with our laws, and our guidance.

So rather than having anyone try to prejudge the categorization, it is the intrigue of the Taliban as an illegitimate government and al Qaeda as a terrorist network, and rather than any prejudgment of that, I think the policy determination to date is that we will treat these detainees in a way consistent with our obligations and sir, that is the status as we speak.

Chairman LEVIN. The language of the regulation says, if any doubt arises as to whether a person is in one category or another, then the tribunal is, by our regulation, to be appointed to make that status determination. I think we have to realize that this is not a prejudgment issue, this is a question as to who should make the judgment where there is a doubt, and I just hope that being a country of laws and very importantly wanting other countries to treat our people according to international law, that we will proceed with dispatch and with care under our own regulations.

General FRANKS. Mr. Chairman, we certainly will.

Chairman LEVIN. I happen to agree with those who say the issue here is not whether we are humanely treating the detainees, because I am convinced we are. We have had people go down to Guantanamo, and that is clearly not the issue. As people pointed out, they are being treated a lot better than our own soldiers. They have better food, frequently, than our people over in Afghanistan who are fighting, for instance, and so my concern is the capture of our people by others and the precedent that we want to set, that we should be very conscious of it, as I know you are.

General FRANKS. Mr. Chairman, we will do it correctly.

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, I received a number of calls from active and retired servicemen about the concerns of future operations where our servicemembers may be incarcerated. We can get tangled up in too many of these regulations, how the world perceives we have treated the detainees is important. I think under the circumstances the Secretary of Defense has done the best he can, and I think he would be the first to admit that some of the early pictures did not accurately convey the attitude this country was taking towards those people.

To close out with two questions regarding two nations. Saudi Arabia has been an integral part of our deterrence and base structure in the sense of the Prince Sultan Air Base and its integral role. Beginning with the Gulf War in 1991, throughout this conflict, and in the intervening years, they have been a valued ally in enabling the United States, together with other nations, to provide stability in that region.

How do you foresee the continued relationships with regard to security between the United States and Saudi Arabia?

General FRANKS. Senator Warner, thank you for the question.

I remember some of the media commentary and some of the questioning from a week or 10 days ago, perhaps a bit longer, about whether in fact the Saudis had asked us to remove our as-

sets. I said at that time, and sir, I will say again today, that if that has happened that certainly has not happened within the frame of my knowledge, and it is my forces which are located in Saudi Arabia. I am not sure what the future will hold, but I am sure that whatever decisions are taken with regard to the placement of my forces, our forces, will be done in consultation with the government of Saudi Arabia.

I think the ongoing dialogue, which recognizes the contributions the Saudis have made to this effort and to efforts that go back in history, must be maintained. We need to recognize what has been done. That should not prejudice whether or not we may adjust forces, but what I do believe is that if we should choose to adjust forces, it will be done in consultation with the government of Saudi Arabia.

Senator WARNER. I do not doubt that, and we have resolved that somewhat unfortunate situation.

With regards to the female officers and enlisted personnel, we have overcome that. I think the Saudis have played an integral role and, as I look at the region, they have a very large border on Yemen which is figuring more and more in our future plans with regard to deterring terrorism. Is that not a critical role?

General FRANKS. That is true, yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. They have been very helpful in that.

Shifting then to Iran, in the beginning of this operation we received reports here in the committee—indeed, many of them were expressed in the open press—that they had a role in facilitating the operation in the sense that the U.S. and allied nations could first transit food and other supplies, and second there was some overture to the effect that if you have to go in and perform a rescue operation, perhaps some assistance could be given in that venue.

However, in the ensuing weeks and months now, our President has sounded a warning. Has that relationship lessened with regard to their assistance? As I mentioned earlier today, I cannot establish the veracity of that at this point in time, but nevertheless, it is reported responsibly in the press here as far as I can determine. Has there been a lessening of their assistance role?

General FRANKS. Sir, I would not want to oversell the assistance offered.

Senator WARNER. But it was offered at one time?

General FRANKS. It was offered at one time. I will support the comment that Director Tenet made where he said there are reasons for us to be concerned about activities that go on inside Iran with respect to our efforts in Afghanistan even, and so we are very simply watchful, and we heard what our President said.

Senator WARNER. As did I. I just was puzzled. Have you had an opportunity to read this particular article?

General FRANKS. Sir, which one is that?

Senator WARNER. This is today's *Washington Post*, Thursday, February 7, in which they say, "Iran has begun funneling money and weapons to one of Afghanistan's most unpredictable warlords, a move that could further destabilize a country where order remains fragile at best, according to Government authorities here in the Afghan capital."

Dostrum, the man who rules the strategic northern city of Mazar-e Sharif, has been provided cars, trucks, firearms, ammunition, cash for his soldiers, two senior intelligence officials in Afghanistan's interim central government, things of this nature.

General FRANKS. Senator Warner, as a matter of fact, I did read that, and I cannot comment as to the veracity of that particular piece, but I do know from my experience in Afghanistan that Afghanistan is faced with, among others, two direct problems.

One is the frictions that exist between the various ethnicities, tribes, and so forth inside Afghanistan; and a second issue is the support of certain opposition leaders inside Afghanistan by outside states. So without being able to talk about whether Iran has provided these specifics to Dostrum in Mazar-e Sharif, because I am not sure of that, but we are very much aware, and have been for a period of time, of a number of governments with relationships with these opposition group leaders. So I would say, Senator, that the information is not surprising, although I cannot verify the veracity of it.

Senator WARNER. Would their motive be to contribute to instability, or thwart what we are trying to bring about by way of a new government?

General FRANKS. I do not know that I would characterize their motive. I would say that on our side we are watching these activities very carefully.

Senator WARNER. Turning to Pakistan, we should not finish this hearing without recognizing the very important role of that nation and, indeed, the courage of its president.

General FRANKS. Sir, my experience in dealing with President Musharraf over a period of time is that he has evidenced in reality a desire to be a member of the global war on terrorism. I believe that his efforts have been very supportive of us. I have great respect for what President Musharraf has done in support of our efforts in Afghanistan. We all recognize what his objectives are with respect to his own country, his own economy. I believe he has taken risk in order to support us, and I believe we respect it.

Senator WARNER. Likewise Oman. That government has been very helpful in their usual, quiet manner.

General FRANKS. Sir, that is exactly correct. We have had support from nations across our region for this operation, Oman certainly among them.

Senator WARNER. I thank you, General.

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Sessions, did you have a question?

Senator SESSIONS. Yes, one question. You emphasized on the request of what choke points and bottlenecks were that lift was important to you being able to transport materials there. Let me ask you, what kind of airlift did you find most valuable, and what do you think we would need more of in a conflict that required a more rapid transport and more items to transport?

General FRANKS. Sir, I think I am a fan of the C-17. I believe that the airframe bore out tremendous capability in this campaign. I am also a fan of the life extension programs that we work in the C-5 fleet, because it is there, it is available.

What we look for as unified commanders is the ability to get what we call the big gray tails, the larger airframes in and out of

an area, and our ability to have the C-17, the C-130 size airframe, and things like the C-5 are very important to us as we move forward.

Senator SESSIONS. You have been through a conflict that had to transport a lot of materials quickly. Assuming we could be involved in an even larger one in the future, are we sufficiently capable in airlift, and do we need more strength there in your opinion?

General FRANKS. Senator, in my opinion we do need more strength in our strategic lift capability. I looked at the numbers of what we have flown in the Afghanistan operation, and we have flown C-17s on more than 1,500 strategic lifts, C-130s I think on a tremendous number, more than 3,000 inside the theater. We have relied on the C-5 with almost 600 strategic lifts, and the list goes on and on and on.

So one of the first things that will come to the mind, Senator, of any combatant commander is our ability to move quickly and in an agile way into a theater of operations, and so it will remain an issue with us. My view is that the effort we put into strategic lift and mobility is effort well-spent.

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. We will move now immediately to a closed session in Hart 219. Thank you all. We will stand adjourned.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

GENEVA CONVENTION PRIVILEGES NOT ACCORDED TO DETAINEES

1. Senator LEVIN. General Franks, if it is finally decided that the detainees taken into custody in Afghanistan by forces under your control are not entitled to prisoner of war status under the Geneva Conventions, what are the specific privileges that they will not receive that they would have received if they were determined to be prisoners of war?

General FRANKS. The President and Secretary of Defense have determined that al Qaeda and Taliban detainees under Department of Defense control are not entitled to enemy prisoner of war (EPW) status. U.S. Forces are treating the detainees humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of the Geneva Convention.

The practical effect of this determination and its application to detainees held at the short-term detention facility and collection points in Afghanistan has been, and will continue to be negligible. We are ensuring the safety of the detainees and providing them necessary food, shelter, clothing, and medical care. We are working closely with representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross, providing them access to our facilities and the detainees. In fact, the detainees are being provided most of the rights and privileges normally reserved to EPW. However, as the detainees are not EPW, certain privileges of EPW are not being provided (establish canteens, pay EPW stipend, receive musical instruments, scientific equipment, sports outfits, etc.). I am confident that we are satisfying our obligations under international law.

IMPLEMENTATION OF MULTI-SERVICE REGULATION

2. Senator LEVIN. General Franks, the Multi-Service Regulation (Army Regulation 190-8, OPNAVINST 3461.6, AFJI 31-304, MCO 3461.1) titled "Enemy Prisoners of War Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees, and Other Detainees," provides in paragraph 1-6a that "if any doubt arises as to whether a person, having committed a belligerent act and been taken into custody by U.S. Armed Forces, belongs to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, GPW, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal."

Additionally, paragraph 1-4g of the Multi-Service Regulation provides that "Combatant Commanders, Task Force Commanders, and Joint Task Force Commanders have the overall responsibility for the EPW, CI, and RP program, operations, and contingency plans in the theater of operations involved to ensure compliance with international laws of war."

Why haven't you implemented the Multi-Service Regulation by holding the three-officer tribunals called for by paragraph 1-6a and spelled out in paragraphs 1-6b through g of that regulation?

General FRANKS. The President has concluded "there is no doubt" as to the status of the detainees. Consequently, there is no requirement for USCENTCOM to conduct Article 5 tribunals in Afghanistan. We are treating detainees in accordance with the requirements of the Multi-Service Regulation as applied to detainees that are not entitled to enemy prisoner of war (EPW) status, consistent with the President's decision.

Within the Department of Defense, the Multi-Service Regulation implements the Geneva Conventions Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW) and other aspects of international law relating to captured/detained persons. As such, we use this regulation as the basis for the treatment of the detainees held in Afghanistan, and, as noted previously, the detainees are being provided most of the rights and privileges normally reserved to EPW.

Under the GPW and the Multi-Service Regulation, any person who has committed a belligerent act and thereafter comes into the power of another must, if there is any doubt as to status, be treated as a prisoner of war unless a competent tribunal determines that the person is not entitled to protected status under Article 5, GPW.

Prior to initiation of Operation Enduring Freedom and based on the unique character of the conflict and the opposing forces, we requested guidance regarding the appropriate status of any captured/detained persons who might come into U.S. custody. Pending this guidance, on 17 October 2001, we initiated planning for Article 5 tribunals to determine the legal status of individuals captured or detained by U.S. Forces. However, the subsequent determination that al Qaeda and Taliban individuals under the control of the Department of Defense are not entitled to EPW status obviated the need for any such tribunals.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARY L. LANDRIEU

B-52S

3. Senator LANDRIEU. General Franks, Louisiana has a rich military heritage, with all services being prominently represented in the state. Many of our men and women serving under United States Central Command (CENTCOM) and in other areas are assigned to units in Louisiana. I am proud of Louisiana's contributions to all areas of this war. In planning the air attacks and ground support missions, the B-52 was engaged daily in many of these missions. Would you explain the different payloads for the different missions?

General FRANKS. The B-52, like all combat aircraft, is capable of supporting various air-to-ground missions with standard weapons payloads. This allows maximum flexibility to re-task the aircraft after takeoff as the battle evolves. To explain the relationship between aircraft payload and mission, it is useful to briefly summarize the process involved. In general, combat aircraft are scheduled to attack specific pre-planned targets in accordance with current command guidance. During this process however, air planners evaluate the potential for airborne re-tasking and determine the specific weapons payload best suited to meet both primary and alternate mission requirements. The operational art associated with choosing the appropriate payload, strikes a balance between optimal weapons effects and mission flexibility. In certain situations, air commanders may elect to sacrifice specific weapons effects provided by more specialized weapons for the flexibility to execute a variety of missions with general-purpose weapons.

Within the above context, specific B-52 payloads are better suited for specific mission conditions and target types. For example, Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM), satellite guided weapons recently discussed in the press, are heavy-weight general-purpose warheads designed to achieve adequate effects against a wide variety of targets. Recent combat operations in Afghanistan highlighted the diversity of these satellite-guided weapons by enabling B-52 aircraft to employ ordnance in close proximity to friendly forces. This mission, known as CAS, or close air support, is historically reserved for fighter type aircraft capable of visually acquiring both friendly and enemy forces before weapons release. There are two current versions of the satellite guided JDAM including a warhead capable of penetrating reinforced

concrete or bedrock. These weapons are particularly well-suited for attacking caves and other underground facilities used to protect enemy forces and equipment from non-penetrating weapons. Satellite-guided weapons may be employed in any type of weather. This flexibility is extremely valuable to commanders, but the large warhead often presents significant collateral damage concerns. Additionally, JDAM are not quite as accurate as those weapons guided by Light Amplification by Stimulated Emission of Radiation (LASER) energy or video data link. Strikes against discrete mobile targets in urban areas often require smaller, more precise warheads to minimize unintended damage to civilians and infrastructure in close proximity to these targets. In these situations, the B-52 may be tasked to employ the AGM-142, which is an extremely precise video guided weapon with a much smaller warhead. In addition to point targets and infrastructure targets, the B-52 may be employed with an assortment of anti-armor and anti-personnel cluster munitions capable of being dispersed over a fairly wide area. These weapons can also be effective against enemy concentrations in support of friendly ground forces. Recent technological advancements are dramatically improving the accuracy of both the cluster munitions dispenser as well as the individual sub-munitions. Finally, when robust enemy air defenses call for strikes from long range, the B-52 is capable of employing cruise missiles. The Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile can reach targets located hundreds of miles from the launch area in order to keep the B-52 out of harms way.

Perhaps the most valuable B-52 capability is the diversity and size of its payload. Like the B-2 and B-1 heavy bombers, the B-52 can be tasked against multiple targets per sortie. The B-52 may employ precision weapons against several high value point targets, followed by unguided weapons or leaflets before returning to its take-off base.

4. Senator LANDRIEU. General Franks, in your statement, you refer to moving from "10 sorties per target to 2 targets per sortie." Would you say the B-52, even at its current age, has repackaged itself as a premiere carriage of Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs)?

General FRANKS. Yes. The B-52 is now entering its 50th year of active duty (41 years for the H model) and it is still the forefront of this Nation's military capabilities. Its recent use in this theater highlights the B-52's transformational capabilities. The B-52 maintains the capability to slug it out in a full-scale conventional conflict while adapting to carry out pinpoint strikes in support of special operations. The B-52 should not be looked at as a legacy system, but rather as an updated and transforming weapon system remaining at the front lines of service to this Nation that continues to deliver each and every time it is called to war—any kind of war.

The B-52 is one of the platforms we have counted on during Operation Enduring Freedom. It can service multiple targets on one sortie, and has the endurance and flexibility to remain on station for extended periods with mixed weapons loads. The B-52 also carries the AGM-142 and the Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile, both long range precision weapons that hold an even greater variety of targets at risk. Finally, the B-52 is certified to carry Laser Guided Bombs, although it requires a fighter or a ground party to "spot the target" with laser energy to deliver this variety of PGM.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS

5. Senator LANDRIEU. General Franks, we have all witnessed and been truly impressed by the effectiveness of special operations forces working under your command. Yet, it is my understanding that there are no special operations units permanently assigned to your area of responsibility. When I met with General Tagney, the Deputy Commander in Chief of Special Operations Command (SOCOM), a few months ago, he stated that the jury was still out on whether the special operations forces structure is sufficient. In your estimation, is the current system—where SOCOM supports with available units—optimal? Or are you in favor of increasing the number of special operations forces and dedicating units to the CENTCOM area?

General FRANKS. Senator Landrieu, I am definitely in support of increasing the number of special operations forces oriented to our theater. Furthermore, I believe that there should be a special operations presence permanently assigned in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility.

General Charlie Holland, the Commander of the Special Operations Command, has done a spectacular job of ensuring the forces assigned to him are thoroughly trained to accomplish tasked missions. I applaud his efforts and personally thank him.

However, the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility is distant from the United States. Just the sheer time it takes to mobilize, transport, and off-load from aircraft once troops arrive in theater can cause delays upwards of 24–36 hours. While this may seem a relatively short amount of time, it can be significant when dealing with the threat in our region.

Additionally, in the war against terrorism the Department of Defense must work within an inter-agency environment to seek out individuals intent on harming Americans. The U.S. military must be prepared to operate in a preemptive manner to disrupt these actions in order to protect American interests everywhere.

Lastly, our friends and allies in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility have provided superb support to the United States efforts recently. By increasing the permanently assigned forces in the CENTCOM region, we send a signal that we are committed to the mutual defense of our allies.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BEN NELSON

DESTRUCTION OF UNDERGROUND OPERATING CENTERS IN AFGHANISTAN

6. Senator BEN NELSON. General Franks, to what extent have we destroyed underground operating centers and tunnels in Afghanistan? Are we certain that these facilities cannot be used again, possibly during peacekeeping operations?

General FRANKS. [Deleted]. We have by no means destroyed every underground facility in Afghanistan, given its centuries' old history of cave usage; however, we have identified and destroyed a great many underground facilities that had been used as Taliban/al Qaeda safe-havens and/or strongholds, thus denying the opportunity for their future use. We have a great deal of work remaining to be done in Afghanistan. We will continue to locate and destroy underground facilities in the months ahead.

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

7. Senator BEN NELSON. General Franks, how much longer do you predict we will be engaged in offensive operations before we begin the transition into peacekeeping operations?

General FRANKS. Senator, our offensive operations are event-driven vice time-driven so I would not venture a prediction on how much longer we will be engaged in offensive operations. As long as there are known or suspected pockets of al Qaeda in Afghanistan, we will continue to seek them out and kill or capture them.

[Deleted].

FISCAL YEAR 2003 DEFENSE BUDGET

8. Senator BEN NELSON. General Franks, as I reviewed the defense budget for next year and read General Myers' statements on the posture of our Department of Defense, I learned that our inventory of laser guided and precision guided munitions is low. In regards to the efficient use of these munitions, after we eliminate critical targets such as enemy anti-air defenses, are we employing less expensive conventional munitions in order to preserve our low density/high demand munitions?

General FRANKS. [Deleted].

9. Senator BEN NELSON. General Franks, I would like to know if there is anything, equipment, munitions, expertise, or any other type of support that we can provide your command in order to make our operation even more successful?

General FRANKS. Given our mission, ongoing operations, the need for continued security cooperation and the concerns stated above, our key requirements, as reflected in my integrated priority list, focus on deploying, building combat power, and executing combat operations. The diverse and volatile nature of the region requires military capabilities that are versatile as well as agile.

- *Strategic Lift*—One of the critical enablers in the execution of current operations. With few permanently stationed forces in the region, our power projection capability depends upon strategic lift and robust land- and sea-based prepositioned assets. Our ability to deploy forces and equipment quickly remains the linchpin for responding to contingencies in USCENTCOM's Area of Responsibility.

Continued procurement of the C-17, modernization of the C-5, and support of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet Program is critical to meeting major theater war deployment timelines. Our requirements for strategic and intra-theater airlift are addressed adequately in Mobility Requirements Study 05. We support expanding the C-17 aircraft buy, and funding for the C-5 Aircraft Reliability Enhancements and Re-engining Program.

The procurement of large, medium speed, roll-on/roll-off ships is on track and will significantly enhance our lift capability. Under the current procurement plan, we will meet USCENTCOM force and sustainment deployment timelines with these vessels and Ready Reserve Fleet assets by the end of fiscal year 2003.

- *Command, Control, Communications, and Computers*—Robust C⁴ is imperative for situational awareness and to ensure real-time command and control. We are developing a deployable command and control headquarters that will provide the necessary flexibility to direct operations throughout our Area of Responsibility.

The complex strategic environment in our area requires a reliable and secure command, control, communications, and computers infrastructure. Additionally, intelligence, operations, and support systems increasingly rely on assured communications bandwidth. We have made progress in enhancing our theater systems and have been successful in getting critical information directly to the warfighters; however, there is still work to be done.

We are concerned with the lack of available satellite bandwidth as the current military satellite infrastructure is saturated. The Predator and Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicles demand large bandwidths and currently use nearly 25 percent of that which is available from commercial satellites. As we look toward the future, we need a secure, joint theater infrastructure that takes advantage of fiber optic cable and commercial satellite services now available in the Gulf States, and must also consider approaches to support forces in the Central Asian States.

The Coalition Coordination Center, located at our Headquarters in Tampa, now supports national liaison teams from 27 nations. This poses an increasing demand on our infrastructure. We must factor in these requirements and ensure our ability to expand to meet coalition requirements in the future.

- *Full Dimensional Protection*—The goal of our force protection program is to protect our personnel, family members residing overseas, and infrastructure from acts of terrorism. Over the past year, several improvements have been made to our program. We have revised our Antiterrorism Operating Procedures, incorporated policy changes, and streamlined our terrorism threat assessment and force protection condition implementation process.

As part of this process improvement, our vulnerability assessment teams have taken a country-wide approach to identify and eliminate potential 'seams' and 'gaps' in our force protection coverage. We have expanded our assessments from a focus on the physical security of sites to a more comprehensive look at vulnerabilities and patterns that could be exploited by terrorists. These include travel routes, lodging sites, and air and seaports of debarkation. Our objective is to harden these areas and mitigate risk.

To combat the ever-changing terrorist threat, we must continue to take advantage of technological solutions to force protection challenges. Physical security systems are needed to improve our ability to screen personnel and vehicles and to detect the presence of explosives. Additionally, perimeter surveillance systems are needed to enhance our ability to detect intruders. Critical manpower increases are also required in order to provide our component commanders with the manning necessary to accomplish their antiterrorism responsibilities.

Since the attacks of 11 September 2001, USCENTCOM has challenged all previous assumptions concerning terrorism, as well as the methods for prevention of terrorist attacks. Our goal is to provide the right level of protection and response capabilities for all U.S. assets.

- *Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance*—This tiered-system approach enables our forces to react rapidly and decisively to changes on the battlefield. Predator and Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicles have been proven to be invaluable in providing long dwell surveillance, tracking, positive identification, and collateral and strike damage assessment. Global Hawk, for example, flew sorties approaching 30 hours in duration and imaged over 600 targets during a single mission over Afghanistan.

Our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance strategy is sound but is constrained by the scarcity of assets—both platforms and trained linguists and analysts. The necessity of maintaining 24-hour focus on disparate targets amplifies the effects of critical shortages in key surveillance platforms and crews. We are forced to choose between applying resources to competing high-value targets in different locations. Continued congressional support is essential to these vital intelligence programs, which are central to our ability to provide force protection and actionable intelligence to our combat forces.

- *Security Cooperation*—The importance of continued investment in security cooperation cannot be overstated. It is not a “one size fits all” program; it must be tailored to our interests in each country. We have designed our program to assure regional allies, friends, and partners of our long-term commitment. Because of the great diversity seen in this region, we make use of a wide range of funding options. Overseas humanitarian disaster and civic aid programs enable us to conduct demining and humanitarian assistance actions, which are vital tools for maintaining our influence in many of the economically challenged nations in the region. The Warsaw Initiative, Traditional CINC Activities, and Cooperative Threat Reduction funding enable participation in exercises, symposia, officer and noncommissioned officers exchanges, and small unit training.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff Exercise Program must continue to be funded robustly. This program tests our doctrine, command and control arrangements, and tactics during command post and field-level training to confirm the feasibility of our planning efforts. These exercises include participants and representatives from numerous nations as observers.

As noted earlier, IMET is a valuable cooperative education program that has paid the U.S. dividends for decades. Similarly, Foreign Military Financing continues to be a vital tool to enhance cooperative security and pursue U.S. interests in our region. We are advocates of this program for Afghanistan so that we can fund the very important work of helping that country build a viable, professional military, subordinate to legitimate civilian authority.

We will continue to pursue cooperative security opportunities throughout the region. The most effective way to do this is by putting U.S. boots on the ground, U.S. ships in ports, and U.S. aircraft in the skies alongside the forces of our regional partners.

- *Prepositioning and Forward Presence*—Prepositioning military assets in the region helps mitigate our time-distance challenge, ensures access, demonstrates our commitment to the region, and facilitates sustainment of deployed forces.

The Navy and Marine Corps Maritime Prepositioning Force program, comprised of Maritime Prepositioned Ship Squadrons 1, 2, and 3, maintains a high materiel readiness rate. When fully fielded the Maritime Prepositioning Force Enhancement Program will provide each squadron a fleet hospital, a Navy mobile construction battalion, an expeditionary airfield, and additional warfighting equipment. The Squadron-1 and -2 Enhancement ships are already on station.

The Army's prepositioning program is advancing on schedule with a goal of placing a heavy division of equipment in the region. The brigade set in Kuwait maintains high operational readiness and is exercised regularly. The prepositioned site in Qatar (Camp As Sallyah) houses the second brigade set and a division base set is estimated to be completed before the end of fiscal year 2003. Challenges in this area remain in reaching our end state objectives for equipment on hand, modernization, and filling our sustainment stockage levels. The afloat combat brigade, APS-3, is complete, and combat ready. A second afloat combat brigade will augment APS-3 and should be in place by August 2002. Current plans are to fill 83 percent of the equipment requirement in the near term. We support 100 percent fill of this requirement.

The Air Force Harvest Falcon bare-base materiel program is vital to USCENTCOM. These assets support the rapid generation of temporary bases and have been employed effectively to facilitate key bases in Operation Enduring Freedom. Failure to preposition these bare-base sets would result in further over tasking of critical strategic lift assets at the start of a conflict. Over the past decade, the demand for Harvest Falcon assets by all CINCs has been extremely keen. [Deleted]

- *Combat Systems and Combat Systems Support*—We depend on Combat Systems and Combat Systems Support to project power rapidly, maintain full spectrum information dominance, and prevent deterioration of equipment and capabilities. While various Service programs provide a wide variety of capabilities to our assigned forces, we have identified several systems of particular interest to the Command.

Operation Enduring Freedom demonstrated the effectiveness of precision guided munitions in improving target effects, lowering collateral damage, and allowing a single aircraft to attack multiple targets. Funding for these systems must remain a priority effort.

Amphibious lift is critical to execution of our presence mission, overcoming access challenges, and projecting power as part of USCENTCOM's contingency operations. The ability to shape the battlefield in high-threat environments requires a fully funded, next-generation Amphibious Transport Dock program.

We look to the Army for sustained funding and the fielding of additional AH-64D Apache Longbow Helicopters and for the Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles.

The capabilities inherent in the V-22 Osprey are invaluable to both Special Forces and conventional forces in the USCENTCOM theater.

IRAQI STRATEGIC THREAT

10. Senator BEN NELSON. General Franks, is Iraq, at this time, a strategic threat to the United States?

General FRANKS. Saddam Hussein's quest for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has been well documented and since inspectors have not been allowed in Iraq since 1998, Saddam Hussein has had time to rebuild his WMD capability [deleted].

NATURE OF IRAQI RESISTANCE

11. Senator BEN NELSON. General Franks, some have said that the formula we used in Afghanistan is a model that could transfer to Iraq. The consensus is lining up behind three possible steps the U.S. could take against Iraq: (1) arm the Iraqi resistance; (2) air strikes on key weapon of mass destruction sites; and (3) a full scale land invasion.

I am aware that over the last 10 years the Iraqi resistance has tried unsuccessfully (and without U.S. military support) to topple Saddam Hussein. Can you analyze the Iraqi resistance and compare their capability to that of the Northern or Eastern Alliances?

General FRANKS. There has been a great deal of speculation following the Gulf War that various Iraqi opposition groups would unite and overthrow the Saddam Hussein regime. We could compare and contrast the Iraqi opposition with the Northern and Eastern Alliances, but it may be more useful to examine the Saddam Hussein regime and how it has successfully kept opposition in check.

First, unlike Afghanistan, Iraq has a well-developed government and a substantial military. Saddam has been in power for over two decades. [Deleted] Second, despite UN sanctions, Saddam has comparatively more resources at his disposal than the Taliban had. [Deleted].

Although there are many groups in Iraq who want to overthrow Saddam, he has much greater power over these groups than the Taliban had over the Northern and Eastern Alliances.

REGIONAL SUPPORT FOR U.S. REMOVAL OF SADDAM HUSSEIN

12. Senator BEN NELSON. General Franks, the fear of breaking up the Arab coalition against global terrorism is cited, so far, as the chief reason why the U.S. may be leery of putting Saddam Hussein in the crosshairs. Much emphasis has been placed on a potential cease-fire in Israel and the Palestinian terrorists to continue Arab support for U.S. efforts against terrorism. What support would we have from Arab leaders in the region to remove Saddam Hussein from power once and for all?

General FRANKS. [Deleted].

IRAQI DIPLOMACY

13. Senator BEN NELSON. General Franks, what do you make of Iraq's recent overture towards diplomacy as mentioned in the *Washington Post* yesterday?

General FRANKS. Saddam's current round of diplomacy has been aptly call a "charm offensive." Since 11 September, and more recently since President Bush's inclusion of Iraq in the "axis of evil," Iraq has sought to bolster its diplomatic standing. But no one will be fooled at Saddam's attempt to seek friends in the region and throughout the world at a time when he is being scrutinized for his regime's wrongdoing.

Iraq's neighbors are sympathetic to the suffering of the Iraqi people under Saddam's regime. For that reason, and for commercial reasons, some of Iraq's neighbors have been cautiously receptive to improving ties with Iraq. [Deleted].

IRANIAN TRAINING AL QAEDA AND TALIBAN FIGHTERS

14. Senator BEN NELSON. General Franks, there are reports that there is Iranian influence in western Afghanistan, particularly in Herat and Mazar-e Sharif. Are the Iranians training pockets of al Qaeda and Taliban fighters? If so, have we targeted those areas? If not, why?

General FRANKS. [Deleted].

OSAMA BIN LADEN

15. Senator BEN NELSON. General Franks, yesterday *The Christian Science Monitor* reported that a former chief of Osama bin Laden is now saying that the terrorist has escaped into Iran. When our offensive began in Afghanistan, Iran stated that its border would be controlled and that fleeing al Qaeda and Taliban fighters would be denied entry into Iran. Is this statement consistent with what our intelligence sources have provided you?

General FRANKS. [Deleted].

16. Senator BEN NELSON. General Franks, to the best of your knowledge, is bin Laden alive?

General FRANKS. [Deleted].

17. Senator BEN NELSON. General Franks, what is the last known location we have for bin Laden?

General FRANKS. [Deleted].

18. Senator BEN NELSON. General Franks, does your intelligence indicate that Osama bin Laden is now in Iran?

General FRANKS. [Deleted].

19. Senator BEN NELSON. Is it possible that Osama bin Laden is in Iran?

General FRANKS. [Deleted].

IRANIAN STRATEGIC THREAT

20. Senator BEN NELSON. General Franks, is Iran a strategic threat to the United States?

General FRANKS. [Deleted].

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND

FORWARD DEPLOYED HEADQUARTERS

21. Senator THURMOND. General Franks, according to recent press reports both you and General Hailston, the Commander of the Marines in the Pacific, have established forward command posts in Southwest Asia to facilitate the operations in the region. I understand that there have been discussions of maintaining such command posts in the region permanently. What has prevented us from establishing a permanent forward CENTCOM headquarters in the region? What are your views on the matter?

General FRANKS. Senator Thurmond, at present all of the component headquarters of United States Central Command are in the Gulf region in support of our operations to combat terrorism. This includes Army Forces Central Command,

Naval Forces Central Command, Air Forces Central Command, Marine Forces Central Command, and Special Operations Command Central. Of these, only Naval Forces Central Command is permanently stationed in the region. We are making plans for Special Operations Command Central to have a relatively small forward headquarters in Qatar. The others will remain in the region as long as required to complete our mission, then will redeploy to their home bases. My headquarters, however, has thus far remained in Tampa. I have chosen to keep my headquarters in Tampa because of the unprecedented ability to capture the situational awareness needed to command and control operations. The technological advances of the past 10 years provide me and my staff with capabilities far beyond those that existed previously. Additionally, the time necessary to move a large, unified headquarters along with the coalition staff that is so integral to our operations made staying in Tampa, at least so far, the best choice. Every headquarters, however, must possess the capability to be remote, offset, or in the theater. With regard to establishing a Central Command Headquarters in the region, I am exploring that option. There are certain operational benefits to being in the region, but there are also implications which must be considered. The situation in the region continues to change and thus we must continue to evaluate our options.

RUSSIA'S ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN

22. Senator THURMOND. General Franks, what role is Russia playing in Afghanistan and what interaction have you had with Russian officials?

General FRANKS. The Russian involvement in Afghanistan has been largely in the humanitarian assistance arena. They have between 200 to 300 personnel in Afghanistan located primarily in the northeast region between Takhar and Kabul. They have an engineer unit involved in reopening the Salang tunnel. In November 2001 they opened a hospital in Kabul that treated over 5,200 patients before the Russians turned it over to the Afghans in, by their reporting, January 2002. Russian aid shipments have come through EMERCON, and to date have delivered tons of food stuffs; tons of medical supplies; 15,282 beds; 11,000 blankets; 1,200 heaters; and 780 tents. They also had a search and rescue detachment at Dushanbe, Tajikistan, which has since redeployed. [Deleted].

ROLE OF U.S. FORCES IN THE REPUBLICS

23. Senator THURMOND. General Franks, it is well known that we have hundreds of troops deployed to the former Soviet Republics bordering Afghanistan. What are their specific roles? What compensation is the United States paying for allowing our forces to operate out of the republics?

General FRANKS. The role of U.S. and coalition troops deployed to the "Stans" is in support of the campaign in Afghanistan. We have a base in Karshi-Khanabad in Uzbekistan that continues to function as an operational and logistics sustainment base for Operation Enduring Freedom. We hope to remain engaged at this base for the foreseeable future. In Manas, Kyrgyzstan we are engaged with the government to develop a coalition logistics hub for operations in Afghanistan. Manas also has potential for use in the future for contingency forward basing.

Kyrgyz Republic: [Deleted]

Uzbekistan: [Deleted]

Turkmenistan: [Deleted]

Tajikistan: [Deleted]

Kazakhstan: [Deleted]

RESERVE COMPONENTS

24. Senator THURMOND. General Franks, the fight against terrorism, both at home and overseas, has again demonstrated our reliance on the Reserve components. I know you agree with me that without the support of our citizen soldiers, the battle against the Taliban would have been longer. Based on your experience with the Reserve components units deployed in your theater, what improvements should be made regarding their training and equipment?

General FRANKS. Senator Thurmond, you are right on target highlighting the magnificent contribution our Reserve men and women have made to this operation. The Reserve Forces and individual augmentees we have received fill critical roles. Their training should continue to be focused on maintaining the same standards their active duty counterparts train to and their equipment should be of the same

quality as what the active force trains with. I would have to defer to the Service Chiefs, for how they envision training and equipping the Reserves as an integral part of the Total Force.

NO-FLY ZONES

25. Senator THURMOND. General Franks, although we are all focused on Afghanistan, we must not forget that our forces are still engaged in maintaining the no-fly zones over Iraq. Although the news that our forces bombed an Iraqi radar site or a missile site periodically reminds us of this mission, the danger and importance of this mission are fading from the Nation's memory. What is the scope of the current effort to enforce the no-fly zone, and how has the effort against the Taliban impacted this mission? What allies are actively contributing forces to this effort?

General FRANKS. The scope and mission of our Operation Southern Watch (OSW) has not changed because of Afghanistan. The Combined Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC) has worked diligently to ensure enforcement of the southern no-fly zone in Iraq. [Deleted] We are looking at new and better ways to maintain our vigilance without depleting resources.

MILITARY COOPERATION WITH IRAN

26. Senator THURMOND. General Franks, President Bush has identified Iran as one of the so-called axis of evil states. Although I agree with the President that Iran has a history of support for terrorism, I have read articles in which there are implications that Iran supported our effort in Afghanistan. At the CENTCOM level, have you had any contact with Iranian military or civilian leadership? What, if any, interaction was there between the coalition and Iran in defeating the Taliban?

General FRANKS. [Deleted].

FORCE STRUCTURE

27. Senator THURMOND. General Franks, no doubt the strikes against terrorism have stressed our personnel, equipment, and resources. Although you have successfully carried out the mission, I am confident that the task would have been easier with better and more resources. What specific type of military specialty skills and equipment were not available to you because of shortfalls in the inventory?

General FRANKS. I am extremely proud of the efforts and achievements of our forces in this operation. All the services have readily provided everything, from troops to equipment, I have asked for. Because of this, I have not felt constrained in the execution of my mission.

There are items that, if available in greater quantities, would have given me greater operational freedom. We do need more strength in our strategic lift capability. For Operation Enduring Freedom we have flown the C-17s in more than 1,500 strategic lifts, have relied on the C-5 for almost 600 strategic lifts, and have also flown more than 3,000 C-130 sorties inside the theater. Our ability to move quickly and in an agile way into a theater of operations is critical to mission success and so I support any effort to increase our mobility and strategic lift capability.

Additionally, our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance strategy is sound but is constrained by the scarcity of assets—both platforms and trained linguists and analysts. The necessity of maintaining 24-hour focus on disparate targets amplifies the effects of critical shortages in key surveillance platforms and crews. We are forced to choose between applying resources to competing high-value targets in different locations. Continued congressional support is essential to these vital intelligence programs, which are central to our ability to provide force protection and actionable intelligence to our combat forces.

CIVIL AFFAIRS

28. Senator THURMOND. General Franks, the Marine Corps Capstone Concept is Expeditionary Maneuver from the Sea. The Corps also talks about scalability, the ability to tailor their Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTF) to meet the mission. The Marine Expeditionary Unit Special Operations Capable (MEUSOC), which you employed in Afghanistan with great success, is advertised as a presence and engagement force which promotes peace and stability. In your estimate does the MEUSOC have the ability to plan and conduct civil military operations and deploy with organic Civil Affairs assets, or is it necessary for them to reach back for this capability

or link to other U.S. Forces such as U.S. Special Operations Command assets in theater?

General FRANKS. The MEUSOC does not have organic civil affairs assets to plan and conduct civil-military operations (CMO). If CMO planning is necessary, the MEUSOC requests civil affairs support. A Marine Corps civil affairs group (CAG) normally provides this support. The Marine Corps has two CAGs, both are in the Reserve component. U.S. Army civil affairs forces can also provide this support with a civil affairs battalion substituting for a CAG. The U.S. Army currently has one active component civil affairs battalion and 25 Reserve component battalions.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BOB SMITH

LINGUISTS

29. Senator SMITH. General Franks, I have seen press accounts indicating that we did not have sufficient numbers of linguists trained in the languages spoken in Afghanistan, such as Dari and Pashto, to communicate with the locals as quickly as we would have liked. Did you have enough foreign language speakers in the appropriate language skills to provide the essential link between your forces and the native population? Would you have liked to have more, and do we need more language training programs?

General FRANKS. [Deleted].

NIGHT VISION CAPABILITIES

30. Senator SMITH. General Franks, it has been reported in the press that the Marine Corps has assessed that they need improvement in their night target designation capability. Has this shortfall been an obstacle to planning operations, and would it be beneficial for you to have improved night vision capabilities?

General FRANKS. Senator Smith, from my perspective, the Marine Corps has done a magnificent job in Afghanistan. However, the Commandant of the Marine Corps obviously desires the best equipment for our marines, and I would defer any questions as to shortfalls to him.

INTELLIGENCE GATHERING IN AFGHANISTAN

31. Senator SMITH. General Franks, clandestine direct-action operations, particularly those aimed at capturing or killing specific individuals or groups, depend on having timely, high-quality intelligence about the targets in question. Are U.S. intelligence-gathering capabilities against targets in Afghanistan sufficient to provide special operations forces with high quality intelligence on a timely basis?

General FRANKS. Your question of "sufficiency" of intelligence gathering to support special operations forces (SOF) operations "on a timely basis" is best answered in light of the operational environment in Afghanistan. The Intelligence Community overall has been very responsive to the unique and often demanding needs of the SOF for mission planning and execution. [Deleted]

We may never have all of the intelligence fidelity we want, but we must have a robust "base-force" of HUMINT/SIGINT/IMINT capability from which to draw.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RICK SANTORUM

INTERIM BRIGADE COMBAT TEAMS IN AFGHANISTAN

32. Senator SANTORUM. General Franks, the Army is already forming two Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs), the 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division (Medium) and 1st Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division (Light), at Fort Lewis, Washington. Yet when it came time this past November to insert ground forces into Afghanistan, it was the Marines that were tasked the responsibility of taking control of a base near Kandahar. Some have commented that these Marine forces combine more tactical maneuver capability and more firepower to sustain themselves than the Army's comparable rapid-deployment forces. Why were the two IBCTs—currently using surrogate equipment similar to the Marines Corps' equipment—not deployed to Afghanistan? Since we have heard that "transformation" is more than just new equipment, wouldn't a deployment to Afghanistan offer the perfect opportunity to demonstrate the training, tactics, and doctrine that are inherent to the IBCTs?

General FRANKS. That is a very good question, but to answer it properly I would like to focus on those weeks immediately after September 11. During that time we were aggressively seeking country clearances for over-flight and basing of our forces in the area of operations. We were also rapidly flowing special operations and air forces, and their supporting equipment into theater. Movement of these forces required a Herculean strategic airlift effort. The utility of the Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable), already forward deployed aboard ships and, thus, not affected by country clearances, made them a force of choice. Of equal importance, the Marine Expeditionary Units have their own inherent logistic support. The fact that the Navy and Marine Team could quickly sail into position and assume a multitude of missions meant that there was no immediate need to deploy an IBCT like unit. Depending on geographic considerations the IBCT may well be the force of choice for future operations.

PRECISION MUNITIONS

33. Senator SANTORUM. General Franks, as we saw with the air war in Kosovo, the services have increasingly relied heavily on the use of preferred or precision munitions in the execution of military operations. Reports are that 10,000 of the 18,000 munitions used in the conflict in Afghanistan have been precision munitions. Do we currently have an adequate inventory of precision munitions to press the war on terrorism to another theater and still conduct military operations in Afghanistan?

General FRANKS. Senator Santorum, many of the precision munitions used in Afghanistan were Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs). The high demand for these relatively inexpensive but very effective weapons will require us to ensure adequate inventory is maintained. [Deleted].

PRECISION MUNITIONS

34. Senator SANTORUM. General Franks, with respect to laser-guided bombs (LGBs), would the Department prefer to procure these munitions on a sole-source or competitive basis?

General FRANKS. [Deleted].

ROLE OF PAKISTANI INTELLIGENCE

35. Senator SANTORUM. General Franks, there is evidence linking the Taliban with elements of Pakistan's intelligence service, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID). The ISID is tasked with the collection of foreign and domestic intelligence; coordination of intelligence functions of the three military services; surveillance over its cadre, foreigners, the media, politically active segments of Pakistani society, diplomats of other countries accredited to Pakistan and Pakistani diplomats serving outside the country; the interception and monitoring of communications; and the conduct of covert offensive operations. Has Pakistan's ISID been helpful in providing timely and accurate information?

General FRANKS. [Deleted].

PAKISTAN'S INTER-SERVICES INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE

36. Senator SANTORUM. General Franks, what changes has General Pervez Musharraf taken with respect to leadership within the ISI? Has the ISI demonstrated a bias in favor of the Taliban?

General FRANKS. [Deleted].

CENTRAL COMMAND AND CYBER SAFEGUARDS

37. Senator SANTORUM. General Franks, in response to a question raised by Senator Pat Roberts of Kansas, you noted that Operation Enduring Freedom was being coordinated from U.S. Central Command headquarters at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida as opposed to in theater. In your response to Senator Roberts, you indicated that technological advances since the Persian Gulf War had enabled U.S. Central Command to accomplish this task. Do you have adequate safeguards and security in place to protect against a cyber-attack or cyber-intrusion made by a hostile or malicious entity?

General FRANKS. Command and Control of Operation Enduring Freedom is primarily conducted over secure Department of Defense networks that use National Se-

curity Agency approved encryption for communications. We have also deployed intrusion detection systems at every classified and unclassified connection to the Defense Information Systems Network to actively block hostile activity. Additionally, U.S. Central Command has updated its information assurance policies to defend against emerging technologies and more sophisticated hacker attacks. Standard firewall and router configurations have been implemented to reduce exposure of U.S. Central Command's networks to unauthorized users. Assessments are performed both remotely and on site using automated tools to detect and correct known vulnerabilities. We have seen an increase in probing and intrusion attempts over the last 6 months but our implemented defense mechanisms have prevented unauthorized access.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR WAYNE ALLARD

SPACE SYSTEMS IN AFGHANISTAN

38. Senator ALLARD. General Franks, the early budget materials we've had an opportunity to review suggest that space-based capabilities are receiving greater priority than they have in the past. What is your view on the role that military and commercial space systems have played in the Afghan campaign, the contributions they have made, and any shortfalls you may have identified?

General FRANKS. Senator Allard, with regard to U.S. military satellites, we have taken full advantage of all of our space systems and maximized their contributions to combat operations: [deleted].

[Whereupon, at 12:06 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

WEDNESDAY, JULY 31, 2002

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:05 p.m. in room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Cleland, Landrieu, Reed, E. Benjamin Nelson, Carnahan, Dayton, Warner, McCain, Inhofe, Roberts, Allard, Sessions, Collins, and Bunning.

Committee staff members present: David S. Lyles, staff director; Christine E. Cowart, chief clerk; Gabriella Eisen, nominations clerk; Gary J. Howard, systems administrator; and Bridget M. Whalan, special assistant.

Majority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, counsel; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; and Michael J. McCord, professional staff member.

Minority staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, Republican staff director; Charles W. Alsup, professional staff member; L. David Cherington, minority counsel; George W. Lauffer, professional staff member; Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional staff member; Joseph T. Sixeas, professional staff member; Scott W. Stucky, minority counsel; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.

Staff assistants present: Daniel K. Goldsmith, Andrew Kent, and Nicholas W. West.

Committee members' assistants present: Barry Gene (B.G.) Wright, assistant to Senator Byrd; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; William K. Sutey, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Neal Orringer, assistant to Senator Carnahan; Benjamin L. Cassidy, assistant to Senator Warner; Dan Twining, assistant to Senator McCain; John A. Bonsell, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Robert Alan McCurry, assistant to Senator Roberts; Douglas Flanders and Lance Landry, assistants to Senator Allard; Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator Sessions; Michael Bopp, assistant to Senator Collins; and Derek Maurer, assistant to Senator Bunning.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman LEVIN. Good afternoon, everybody. Our committee meets this afternoon to receive testimony from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and from General Tommy Franks, Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command. The subject is Operation Enduring Freedom, the campaign against the al Qaeda terrorists and the Taliban regime that harbored them. We welcome both of our witnesses to the committee this afternoon. We thank you again for your great service to our Nation.

General Franks testified before the committee on February 7, 4 months after the commencement of Operation Enduring Freedom. We are now more than 9 months into the operation and significant changes have taken place on the ground in Afghanistan. U.S. and coalition military successes have created a situation in which much good has taken place, both for the fight against terrorism and for the people of Afghanistan. The Taliban has been removed from power. Al Qaeda has lost its safe haven. The U.N.-authorized International Security Assistance Force has brought a more secure environment to Kabul and enabled the meeting there of the emergency Loya Jirga in June, which elected President Karzai and a Transitional Authority to govern Afghanistan.

Over 1 million refugees and hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons have returned. Over 3 million children have returned to primary school. A poppy eradication program is underway with substantial assistance from Great Britain. A nationwide vaccination campaign has been launched.

U.S. and French soldiers have complementary training programs for an Afghan army and the first ethnically mixed class of 350 enlisted men and 36 officers graduated last week. The Germans are training an Afghan police force.

Despite the battlefield successes and in some cases because of them, numerous challenges and problems remain. Remaining Taliban and al Qaeda forces have learned to avoid massing their forces and now operate in smaller guerrilla-like groups that are harder to track and defeat. They also avoid open areas and operate out of and intermingle with civilians in towns and villages.

Security outside of Kabul and its environs is lacking, with factional fighting between forces loyal to various warlords and banditry in rural areas taking their toll on civilians and aid agencies. The absence of central government control from these areas is discouraging international donors from making badly needed investments. Promised aid from the international community is slow to arrive and little has been pledged for reconstruction.

Regional warlords are refusing to send customs and taxes that they collect to Kabul. The Afghan Vice President for transitional assistance has been assassinated and President Karzai has dismissed his Afghan bodyguards and replaced them with American soldiers. A severe drought continues and, with refugees returning in record numbers, a humanitarian crisis may be looming this coming winter.

Finally, there have been several instances in which U.S. military action has mistakenly resulted in civilian casualties. Various polls and anecdotal evidence point to a resultant loss of Afghan public

support for U.S. military efforts in Afghanistan and an accompanying loss of confidence in the government of President Karzai.

This background raises a number of issues that I hope we will be able to explore this afternoon. For example, should we heed the advice of U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, who believes that “a limited expansion of the International Security Assistance Force to areas outside of Kabul would make a huge contribution to the consolidation of peace?”

Should U.S. forces in Afghanistan make a special effort to support the government of President Karzai and assist it in spreading its control throughout the country?

Should a method be found, perhaps through the Agency for International Development, to provide development assistance to those communities that have mistakenly suffered casualties from U.S. or coalition military action?

We all look forward to the testimony of our witnesses this afternoon as we seek to explore these issues and other issues relating to the road ahead in Afghanistan. We will have a closed session immediately following this session in our main hearing room, Russell 222. Before we hear, of course, from our witnesses, I will turn to Senator Warner for any comments that he may wish to make.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming these witnesses.

As you recall, Mr. Chairman, on July 9 of this year, I wrote a formal letter to you requesting that this committee have this hearing we are now holding today prior to our August recess. I ask unanimous consent that my letter be made a part of the record.

Chairman LEVIN. It will be made part of the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

July 9, 2002

Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:


Nine months ago, our nation commenced military operations in Afghanistan. The intervening months have produced remarkable battlefield successes, validation of many decisions made by the Committee over the years, and an opportunity for a future peace. The Afghans recently completed their "Loya Jirga" which has selected a transition government, heralding a new phase in their evolution to democracy.

However, along with battlefield success have come legitimate questions about past, present and future military operations. Further, what is the current assessment of our nation's long term interests in Afghanistan? The recent assassination of Vice President Abdul Qadir points out the frailty of this fledgling government and the continuing instability in this region.

I urge you to schedule an oversight hearing, before the August recess, to review the military missions that have been conducted thus far as part of Operation Enduring Freedom, and the missions that remain, including the future role, if any, of U.S. forces in international security and peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan. While the Administration has conducted periodic briefings for members of Congress, the Committee has not held a formal hearing on military operations in Afghanistan since February of this year. As our commitment to Afghanistan and the region continues and evolves, I feel it is vital that we continue the process of collecting the detailed information we need to exercise our responsibilities.

With kind regards, I am

Sincerely,



John Warner
Ranking Member

Senator WARNER. It has been a number of months, 6 in total, since the committee has conducted a hearing on Operation Enduring Freedom and operations in and around the AOR of Afghanistan. Almost 10 months have passed since our U.S. troops and coalition partners began military operations against the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan. I, for one, remain amazed at our initial successes in Afghanistan. It is a great credit to the leadership given by our President, by our Secretary of Defense, by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and yourself, General, and, most particularly, the men and women of the Armed Forces that carried out your orders.

The American people are very proud of what has been done and there is justification for that pride. It has been earned through

hard work and indeed tragic losses of life and limb. Our thoughts and our prayers are with the families of those who have suffered, as always has been, the brunt of warfare.

Mr. Secretary, you were quite prophetic when you warned us early that despite the initial successes, this war was far from over. Afghanistan remains a very dangerous place. We see the manifestation of that warning almost every day. As active military operations have become less frequent and peacekeeping and nation building efforts have moved to the forefront, it becomes more important than ever for Congress and the American people to fully understand the military missions and diplomatic tasks that remain to be done.

Again, it is a tribute to the President, to all of you, and our men and women in uniform that so much has been accomplished in such a short period. The Taliban regime has been defeated and dismantled. The al Qaeda terrorist network in Afghanistan has been effectively disrupted and its remaining elements are on the run. Yet today, we receive reports that there is some coalescing of those forces and possibly a designation of new leaders. I hope you will touch on that point. A level of peace and security is being established that allows humanitarian aid, as the Chairman said, to flow.

By any measure, these operations have been successful. However, we must be mindful that much remains to be done. Pockets of the Taliban and the al Qaeda resistance continue to pose targets and must be rooted out. That is tedious, dangerous, and risky work for the U.S. and our allied forces.

Our allied forces have played a major role in this war, and the coalition has been very successful. However, warlords continue to menace the countryside outside of Kabul. I still call them warlords. Mr. Secretary, you have another name for them that you use in your formal statement. But as yet, they are not fully committed to the concepts of central government and democracy, and that poses a challenge.

Afghanistan, yes, is now on a path toward democracy with the beginnings of a central government. But what military missions remain for the United States and the coalition troops? Our coalition partners, particularly the Turks, are leading an International Security Assistance Force to help maintain order and security in and around Kabul. The mandate for this force will expire in December of this year. What is the future role and scope of this force and, most particularly, U.S. responsibilities?

Our President has committed to help Afghanistan organize and train a national police force and an army to ensure internal stability and security. That is a good and sound decision. But what is the status of this endeavor? What role are our coalition partners playing to share the burdens?

Al Qaeda appears to be on the run from Afghanistan, but other nations in the region have harbored or condoned similar activities in the past. What is the next step in this global war on terrorism?

The attacks of September 11 introduced this Nation to a new era and a new kind of conflict, not against nations with standing Armed Forces, but against a worldwide network of terrorists who do not observe the commonly accepted laws and conventions of the civilized world. Unconventional war, asymmetric war, has become

the norm. This new era demands capabilities that can defend, defeat, and deter both expected and unexpected threats.

All of us have learned many lessons from this conflict. General Franks, we look forward to you to talk specifically about the lessons learned for today and tomorrow's military.

Secretary Rumsfeld and President Bush have made it clear that transforming our forces to defend America from current and emerging threats is their highest priority. This committee has worked with you on that. We have a bill in conference now which goes a long way to achieve many of those goals. Clearly, however, we must continue to learn from these experiences and build on our capabilities that have served us as well in this operation.

As our Nation rebuilds and moves forward from that tragic day of September 11, it will be remembered as a unifying moment. Our Nation is united as I perceive it today in purpose and determination as seldom before in our history, perhaps not as strongly as since the closing days of World War II. We are behind the President, and we are behind the soldiers, the sailors, the airmen, and the marines in the front lines.

As the military effort evolves, we in Congress will do everything we can to provide our Armed Forces the resources and capabilities they need to win this war and to continue to wage the fight on terrorism wherever it is.

I thank you both for coming today and I look forward to hearing your testimony.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Warner.

Before we turn to Secretary Rumsfeld for his opening statement, at this time, I insert for the record, without objection, the prepared statement of Senator Thurmond. Also at this time, the committee will take a brief recess and will reconvene shortly.

[The prepared statement of Senator Thurmond follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND

Mr. Chairman, I want to express my appreciation to you and to Senator Warner, our Ranking Member, for scheduling this hearing on Operation Enduring Freedom. Although the Armed Services Committee has received numerous closed briefings on these operations, this is the first hearing totally dedicated to our activities in Afghanistan. I believe it is important that we air this matter in a public forum and that the American people have the opportunity to hear from the most senior officials in the Department of Defense in a forum other than the daily press briefings.

Our Nation is blessed to have the most professional soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines in the world. They have displayed that professionalism during the past months under the most arduous conditions and with great sacrifice. In that regard, I again want to express my condolences to the families and friends of the soldiers, sailors, and airmen who have been killed or wounded in the war against the terrorist forces in Afghanistan and the Philippines. I want them all to know how proud I am of their service and sacrifice.

Mr. Chairman, as President Bush told the Nation, the war against terrorism will be long and challenging. It will be fought by small special units and out of the glare of the headlines. The past months have lived up to that prediction. After the first important victories, our forces are now hunting down the terrorist forces on a "one by one" basis, a process that is trying some of our countrymen's patience. I anticipate that the hunt for the terrorist will take longer than any of us anticipated and we may not have the absolute victory that we all seek. Although defeating terrorism must be our ultimate goal, concurrently we must provide an environment in Afghanistan that will permit this war torn nation to rebuild its political and economic base. If we can dedicate the resources and time to rebuild Bosnia and Kosovo, we must be willing to do the same for Afghanistan. I hope that both Secretary Rumsfeld and General Franks will focus on this issue during their testimony. We have sacrificed

too many lives and resources in Afghanistan to let the country and its people revert to chaos and anarchy.

Secretary Rumsfeld and General Franks, I look forward to your testimony and want to express my appreciation for the job you both are doing in leading our forces in this war against terrorism.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Whereupon, at 3:12 p.m., the hearing recessed and the committee proceeded to other business; the hearing reconvened at 3:20 p.m.]

Chairman LEVIN. Mr. Secretary, we turn to you.

STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD H. RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Secretary RUMSFELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I thank you for this opportunity to update the committee on our progress in the war on terrorism. Certainly since September 11, when you and Senator Warner arrived at the Pentagon, this committee has given its full support to the global war on terror, for which we express our appreciation.

I am very pleased to be here with the combatant commander of the U.S. Central Command, General Tommy Franks. He is an outstanding soldier, an able leader, and is doing a superb job for our country.

General Franks and I had the pleasure of spending some portion of this morning with another outstanding officer who is sitting behind General Franks, who was also front and center in Afghanistan for a good period. His name is Colonel John Mulholland, United States Army, the Fifth Special Forces Group. He has been in Washington to brief on lessons learned from the activities in which he was involved in Afghanistan and is currently stationed back in his home base at Fort Campbell, Kentucky.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to make some brief remarks and then have my full remarks put in the record.

Chairman LEVIN. They will be made part of the record.

Secretary RUMSFELD. While we have made good progress, as each of you has indicated, in a relatively short period of time, it is also true that this war is far from over. We face very determined adversaries. They have demonstrated ingenuity, a callous disregard for innocent human life, and victory will not come easily or quickly. It will require patience of the American people at home and the courage of our service men and women abroad. Fortunately, patience and courage are virtues that our Nation has in abundance, and I have no doubt that we will prevail.

Last fall when President Bush announced the start of the war on terrorism, he made clear his determination that terrorists that threaten us will find no safe haven, no sanctuary, and that their state sponsors will be held accountable and made to understand that there is a price to be paid for financing, harboring, and otherwise supporting terrorists. He issued a worldwide call to arms, inviting all freedom-loving nations to join in this fight.

Mr. Chairman, in the intervening months, the world has responded to the President's call. The global coalition that President Bush and Secretary Powell assembled comprises today some 70 countries. Each is making important contributions to the global war on terror. We are now roughly 9 months into the war, still

closer to the beginning than the end. But while much difficult work remains before us, it is worth taking a moment to reflect and take stock on just how much U.S. and coalition forces have accomplished thus far in reversing the tide of terrorism.

At this time last year, Afghanistan was a pariah state. The Taliban regime was in power and brutally repressing the Afghan people. Afghanistan was a sanctuary for thousands of foreign terrorists who had free range to train, plan, organize, and finance attacks on innocent civilians across the globe. A humanitarian crisis of considerable proportions loomed. Assistance was disrupted, famine was pervasive, and refugees were fleeing their country by literally hundreds of thousands.

Consider just some of the human rights reports which detailed conditions in Afghanistan before the arrival of coalition forces. Amnesty International's 2001 Human Rights Report declared that Afghans suffered pervasive human rights abuses, including arbitrary detention and torture. The Taliban continued to impose harsh restrictions on personal conduct and behavior as a means of enforcing their particular interpretation of Islamic law. Young women living in areas captured by the Taliban were reportedly abducted by guards and taken against their will to Taliban commanders.

Human Rights Watch's report of 2001 described a situation where Taliban forces subjected local civilians to a ruthless and systematic policy of collective punishment. There was systematic discrimination against women. Violations of a dress code could result in public beatings and lashings by the religious police, who wield leather batons reinforced with metal studs.

Women were not permitted to work outside the home except in health care, and girls over 8 years old were not permitted to attend school. All of this was enforced by the so-called Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice.

Mr. Chairman, what a difference a year makes. Today, thanks to the coalition efforts and the remarkable courage of our men and women in uniform, the Taliban have been driven from power, al Qaeda is on the run, and Afghanistan is no longer a base for terrorist operations or a breeding ground for radical Islamic militancy. The beatings by religious police and executions in soccer stadiums have stopped. The humanitarian crisis has been averted, international workers are no longer held hostage, aid is once again flowing, and the Afghan people have been liberated.

Through the recent Loya Jirga process, the Afghan people have exercised their right of self-determination. A new president has been selected, a new cabinet has been sworn in, and a transitional government representative of the people has been established to lead the nation for the next 2 years until a constitutional Loya Jirga is held.

We are working with the new Afghan government to lay the foundations for longer term stability and to reverse the conditions that allowed terrorist regimes to take root in the first place. The U.S. and others are helping to train a new Afghan National Army, a force committed not to one group or one faction, but to the defense of the entire nation, which we hope will allow Afghans to take responsibility for their own security rather than relying on foreign forces.

Last week, the first battalion of more than 300 soldiers graduated and there are an additional 600 Afghan soldiers being trained in two battalions.

We also have helped avert a humanitarian catastrophe. The U.S. and coalition partners have delivered some 500,000 metric tons of food since the start of the war—enough to feed almost 7 million needy Afghans. Thanks to those efforts, the grim predictions of starvation last winter did not come to pass.

U.S. military-civil affairs teams have dug wells, built hospitals, repaired roads, bridges, and irrigation canals. They have rebuilt 49 schools in 8 different regions. Thanks to those efforts, some 30,000 boys and girls—the hope and future of the country—are back in school. One civil affairs team has even introduced Afghan children to Little League baseball. Last Friday, they held their first game.

De-mining teams from Norway, Britain, Poland, and Jordan have helped clear land mines from hundreds of thousands of square meters of terrain. Jordan built a hospital in Mazar-e Sharif that has now treated more than 92,000 patients, including 22,000 children. Spain and Korea have also built hospitals. Japan has pledged \$500 million to rehabilitate Afghanistan. Russia has cleared out and rebuilt the Salang Tunnel, the main artery linking Kabul with the north, allowing transportation of thousands of tons of food and medicine and supplies.

With the cooperation of over 80 countries across the globe, some 2,400 individuals around the world have been detained and interrogated, and over 500 enemy combatants are currently under DOD control. I think the number currently is something like 650. They are being interrogated and they are yielding information that is helping to prevent further violence and bloodshed.

For example, with the help of our Pakistani allies, we have captured a senior al Qaeda leader who in turn provided information that led to the capture of still other senior al Qaeda leaders. For every terrorist plot we discover and every terrorist cell that is disrupted, there are dozens of others in the works. Al Qaeda operated not only in Afghanistan, but in more than 60 countries, including the U.S. They have trained literally thousands of terrorists who are now at large across the globe.

Moreover, al Qaeda is not the only global network, and other terrorist networks have growing relationships with terrorist states that harbor and finance them, and may one day share weapons of mass destruction with them.

Our goal in Afghanistan is to ensure that that country does not again become a training ground for terrorists. That work is, of course, not complete. Taliban and al Qaeda fugitives are still at large. Some are in Afghanistan. Others are just across the borders, waiting for an opportunity to return. They continue to pose a threat.

These are real challenges, but the security situation, while not ideal, is significantly improved from what we found on our arrival 9 months ago. The best measure of progress is the flow of people. Since January, hundreds of thousands of Afghan refugees and internally displaced persons have returned to their homes. That is a ringing vote of confidence in the progress that is being made in Afghanistan. These people are voting with their feet. They are con-

cluding that life is better in Afghanistan than it was where they were, and I suspect that they are right.

By making clear from the beginning that this was not a war against Islam, by keeping our footprint modest, by partnering with Afghan forces that oppose the Taliban and al Qaeda, and by demonstrating our concern for the welfare of the Afghan people through the delivery of humanitarian relief from the very first days of the war, we showed the Afghan people that we were coming as a force of liberation, not a force of occupation. In most of the country, coalition forces have been welcomed as liberators.

Understandably, our military mission has changed and evolved. Some forces are now rotating out of Afghanistan. This should not be taken as a sign that the effort in Afghanistan is wrapping up. It is not. To the contrary, in recent weeks, Turkey has increased its Afghan presence by sending over 1,300 troops to Kabul to assume leadership of the International Security Assistance Force. Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands will soon deploy F-16 fighters to Kyrgystan—that is Kyrgystan—which it was misquoted the other day and caused a little stir in Kurdistan—and they are going to be there for air operations.

Romania has deployed an infantry battalion to Afghanistan and has offered an infantry mountain company, a nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons response company, and four MiG-21 fighters. Slovakia will soon deploy an engineering unit. Special operations forces from Canada, Germany, Australia, and other nations continue to work with U.S. Special Forces teams on the ground, combing through caves searching for Taliban and al Qaeda fugitives, and gathering critical intelligence information. They are also creating a presence with the regional political leaders, or warlords as some people call them, which is contributing to a considerably more stable situation in that country because of their presence.

Moreover, our hunt for terrorist networks is not limited to Afghanistan. The war on terrorism is a global campaign against a global adversary—indeed, adversaries, plural. We learned on September 11 that in a world of international finance, communication, and transportation, even relatively isolated individuals and organizations can have global reach and the ability to bring unprecedented destruction on innocent civilians.

The challenge for us is to find a way to live in that 21st century world as free people. Let there be no doubt we can do so, but it requires new ways of thinking, new ways of fighting, and new strategies for defending our people and our way of life.

The war on terrorism began in Afghanistan, to be sure, but it will not end there. It will not end until terrorist networks have been rooted out. It will not end until the state sponsors of terror are made to understand that aiding, abetting, and harboring terrorists has deadly consequences for those who do so. It will not end until those developing nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons end their threats to innocent men, women, and children. It will not end until our people and the people of the world's free nations can once again live in peace, free from fear.

Mr. Chairman, that completes my statement. I would like to submit my written statement and these maps for the record.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Rumsfeld follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. DONALD H. RUMSFELD

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. I apologize for the distraction of having to hold my hand in the air, but the surgeon tells me that I need to keep it above my heart for several more weeks.

Thank you for this opportunity to update the committee on our progress in the war on terror.

While we have made good progress in a relatively short period of time, let there be no doubt: this war is far from over. The road ahead will be difficult and dangerous. We face determined adversaries. They have demonstrated ingenuity and a callous disregard for innocent human life. Victory will not come easily or quickly—it will require patience from Americans at home, and the courage of our service men and women abroad. Fortunately, patience and courage are virtues our Nation has in abundance. I have no doubt that we will prevail.

Last fall, when President Bush announced the start of the war on terrorism, he declared war not just on the perpetrators of the deadly attacks of September 11, but against all terrorists of global reach, their organizations and sponsors.

He made clear his determination that terrorists that threaten us will find no safe haven, no sanctuary, anywhere—and that their state sponsors will be held accountable and made to understand there is a heavy price to be paid for financing, harboring, or otherwise supporting terrorists. He issued a worldwide call to arms, inviting all freedom-loving nations to join us in this fight.

Mr. Chairman, in the intervening months, the world has responded to the President's call. The global coalition President Bush assembled comprises some 70 nations. They are helping in many different ways. Most are sharing intelligence. Many are seizing terrorist assets or breaking up terrorist cells on their territory. Others are providing airlift, basing, over-flight and refueling, or are contributing air, sea and ground forces, combat air patrols, mine clearing, and special operations. Some are helping quietly, others openly. But each is making important contributions to the global war on terror.

We are now roughly 9 months into this war, still closer to the beginning than to the end. But while much difficult work remains before us, it is worth taking a moment to reflect and take stock of just how much U.S. and coalition forces have accomplished thus far in reversing the tide of terrorism.

At this time last year, Afghanistan was a pariah state. The Taliban regime was in power and brutally repressed the Afghan people. The country was a sanctuary for thousands of foreign terrorists, who had free range to train, plan and organize attacks on innocent civilians across the globe. There was harsh repressive rule. The economy and banking sector were in a state of collapse, and the country was financially dependent on terrorist networks and overseas Islamic extremist elements. A humanitarian crisis of considerable proportions loomed. Humanitarian assistance was disrupted, famine was pervasive, and refugees were fleeing the country by the hundreds of thousands.

Consider just some of the human rights reports which detailed conditions in Afghanistan before the arrival of coalition forces:

According to the State Department's February 2001 Human Rights Report, "The Taliban continued to commit numerous, serious and systemic abuses. Citizens were unable to change their government or choose their leaders peacefully. The Taliban carried out summary justice . . . and . . . were responsible for political and other extra-judicial killings, including targeted killings, summary executions, and deaths in custody. . . . Women and girls were subjected to rape, kidnapping, and forced marriage."

Amnesty International's 2001 Human Rights Report declared that Afghans suffered pervasive "human rights abuses, including arbitrary detention and torture. . . . The Taliban continued to impose harsh restrictions on personal conduct and behavior as a means of enforcing their particular interpretation of Islamic law. . . . Young women living in areas captured by the Taliban . . . were reportedly abducted by guards and taken against their will as 'wives' for Taliban commanders."

Human Rights Watch's report for 2001 described a situation where "Taliban forces subjected local civilians to a ruthless and systematic policy of collective punishment. Summary executions, the deliberate destruction of homes, and confiscation of farmland were recurrent practices in these campaigns." There was "systematic discrimination against women. . . . Violations of the dress code . . . could result in public beatings and lashing by the Religious Police, who wielded leather batons reinforced with metal studs. Women were not permitted to work outside the home except in the area of health care, and girls over 8 years old were not permitted to attend school. The decrees contributed to an illiteracy level for women of over 90 percent."

All of this enforced by the so-called Minister for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice.

Human Right Watch also reported widespread “harassment of international aid agency staff,” who were in some cases taken hostage. According to the State Department report, in August 2001 “the Taliban arrested eight foreign aid workers affiliated with an NGO on charges of proselytizing. An estimated 48 Afghan employees of the NGO also were arrested and reportedly also charged with apostasy. . . . The Taliban reportedly stated that 59 children who had been taught by the arrested workers were sent to a correctional facility.”

Mr. Chairman, what a difference a year makes.

Today, thanks to coalition efforts—and the remarkable courage of our men and women in uniform—the Taliban have been driven from power, al Qaeda is on the run, Afghanistan is no longer a base of global terrorist operations or a breeding ground for radical Islamic militancy, the beatings by religious police and executions in soccer stadiums have stopped, the humanitarian crisis has been averted, international workers are no longer held hostage, aid is once again flowing, and the Afghan people have been liberated. Afghanistan is a free nation, where aid workers can provide humanitarian aid, girls can study, women can work, the people can choose their leaders peacefully and refugees can return.

Through the recent Loya Jirga process, the Afghan people have exercised their right of self-determination. More than 1,500 delegates from all 32 provinces and all ethnic backgrounds came together under one roof to chart their nation’s political future. A new president has been selected, a new cabinet has been sworn in, a transitional government representative of the Afghan people has been established to lead the nation for the next 2 years until a constitutional Loya Jirga is held.

The new Afghan government is still in its early stages, and it doesn’t yet have the institutions of government to direct, such as internal security, tax collection and the like. But it has begun the process of working to develop the banking sector, tax laws, and a new currency. New trade and commercial investment policies are also being put in place, with the aim of building foreign investor confidence. A corps of civil servants is being established, with pay under U.N. supervision, and ministries are beginning to function. The judicial system is being reformed, so that rule of law can take root. A growing civil society is emerging, with open political discourse and an emerging free press. We’re fortunate that their leadership is taking seriously the challenge of self-government.

With self-government must eventually come self-sufficiency—and that self-sufficiency must, over time, also extend to security. That is why we are working with the new Afghan government to lay the foundations for longer-term stability and to reverse the conditions that allowed terrorist regimes to take root in the first place. The U.S. and others are helping to train a new Afghan National Army—a force committed not to one group or faction but to the defense of the entire nation, which we hope will allow Afghans to take responsibility for their own security rather than relying on foreign forces. Last week, the 1st Battalion of more than 300 soldiers graduated, and there are an additional 600 Afghan soldiers being trained in two battalions. In all, we expect to train 18 battalions—over 10,000 soldiers—by the end of 2003. We are also “training the trainers” so that the process can eventually become self-sustaining. Already some 38 countries have offered weapons, equipment, funds or support for this effort.

We have also helped to avert a humanitarian catastrophe in Afghanistan. The U.S. and coalition partners have delivered over 500,000 metric tons of food since the start of the war—enough to feed almost 7 million needy Afghans. Thanks to those efforts, the grim predictions of starvation last winter did not come to pass. Today, the United States is providing over \$450 million in humanitarian assistance for the Afghan people.

The Department of Defense has allotted \$10 million to dozens of humanitarian projects throughout Afghanistan. U.S. military civil affairs teams have dug wells, built hospitals, and repaired roads, bridges and irrigation canals. We have rebuilt 49 schools in eight different regions. Thanks to those efforts, some 30,000 boys and girls—the hope and future of Afghanistan—are back in school. One civil affairs team has even introduced Afghan kids to Little League baseball. They organized two teams, which have been practicing twice a week for the past several weeks using donated baseball supplies. Last Friday, they held Afghanistan’s first Little League game.

It must be emphasized that coalition partners are making important contributions. De-mining teams from Norway, Britain, Poland and Jordan have helped clear land mines from hundreds of thousands of square meters of terrain, although there are still an enormous number of land mines in that country. Jordan built a hospital in Mazar-e Sharif that has now treated more than 92,000 patients, including 22,000

children. Spain and Korea have also built hospitals, and Japan has pledged \$500 million to rehabilitate Afghanistan. Russia has cleared out and rebuilt the Salang Tunnel, the main artery linking Kabul with the North, allowing transportation of thousands of tons of food, medicine and supplies.

With the cooperation of over 90 countries, some 2,400 individuals around the world have been detained and interviewed, and over 500 enemy combatants are currently under DOD control. They are being interrogated, and are yielding information that is helping to prevent further violence and bloodshed.

For example, with the help of our Pakistani allies, we captured a senior al Qaeda leader, Abu Zubaydah, who in turn provided information that led to the capture of others such as Jose Padilla—an American al Qaeda operative.

Al Qaeda forces left behind valuable intelligence information—computer hard drives, diskettes, laptops, videos, notebooks with information—that has given us insight into their capabilities, how they operate, and in some cases actionable intelligence about planned terrorist operations. For example, videotapes found in an al Qaeda safe house in Afghanistan revealed detailed plans of a plot to strike U.S. targets in Singapore. Working with Singapore authorities, that al Qaeda cell was broken up and their planned attack disrupted.

These successes must not lull us into complacency. For every terrorist plot we discover and every terrorist cell we disrupt, there are dozens of others in the works. Al Qaeda operates not only in Afghanistan, but in more than 60 countries including the U.S. Undoubtedly, coalition efforts have made recruitment harder, planning harder, and moving between countries harder. But they have trained literally thousands of terrorists who are now at large across the globe. These “sleeper” cells undoubtedly have plans for further attacks. They had raised a good deal of money, and they still have financial backers giving them money.

Moreover, al Qaeda is not the only global terrorist network. Terrorist networks have growing relationships with terrorist states that harbor and finance them—and may one day share weapons of mass destruction with them. What this means is that Afghanistan is only the first stage in a long, difficult, and dangerous war on terrorism.

Our goal in Afghanistan is to ensure that that country does not, again, become a terrorist training ground. That work is, of course, by no means complete. Taliban and al Qaeda fugitives are still at large—some are in Afghanistan, others fled across the borders waiting for the opportunity to return. They continue to pose a threat. In recent weeks, coalition forces have come under attack again in Kandahar and Oruzgan, and Pakistani forces have engaged al Qaeda in a number of firefights, reminders of the dangers that continue to exist.

Moreover, there are still ethnic tensions within Afghanistan, and Afghanistan is still highly dependent on foreign assistance—both financial aid and humanitarian relief. The country lacks agricultural self-sufficiency, there are periodic outbreaks of cholera and dysentery, and a high infant mortality rate due to poor hygiene and inadequate medical services.

These are real challenges. But two things should be clear: One, Afghanistan is clearly a much better place to live today than it was a year ago. Two, the United States and its international partners are making a maximum effort to assist Afghanistan's new government in economic, humanitarian, security, and other fields.

Afghan leaders coming to Washington all attest that the security picture in the country is sound. The Taliban have so far failed to mount their often-predicted spring offensive. Despite numerous threats, the Loya Jirga convened with no serious security incidents. Conflicts among regional commanders have been dampened—often by discreet U.S. influence exerted by our personnel. The security situation, while not ideal, is significantly improved from what we found on our arrival 9 months ago, when the Taliban controlled and oppressed 90 percent of the country.

The best measure of progress is the flow of people. Before the war began, thousands upon thousands of refugees and internally displaced persons had fled their homes to escape Taliban repression. Since January, hundreds of thousands of Afghan refugees and internally displaced persons have returned to their homes. The Afghan people are voting with their feet. They're coming back to their homes. That is a ringing vote of confidence in the progress that's being made in Afghanistan.

With the removal of the Taliban regime, and the efforts to break up large pockets of al Qaeda as they tried to regroup, coalition efforts in Afghanistan are now focused mostly on smaller operations—cave-by-cave searches, sweeps for arms, intelligence, and smaller pockets of terrorists as they have dispersed. Indeed, the humanitarian effort I have described has been of invaluable assistance to us in these operations.

By making clear from the beginning that this was not a war against Islam, by keeping our footprint modest and partnering with Afghan forces that opposed the Taliban and al Qaeda, and by demonstrating our concern for the welfare of the Af-

ghan people through the delivery of humanitarian relief from the first days of the war, we showed the Afghan people that we were coming as a force of liberation, not a force of occupation.

In fact, out of 32 provinces in Afghanistan, our forces have experienced harassment attacks in only a few provinces—in the former Taliban strongholds of southern and eastern Afghanistan. In most of the country coalition forces have been welcomed as liberators.

That, in turn, has paid dividends in the hunt for Taliban and al Qaeda. For example, we have been finding additional caches of weapons several times a week, not because we're clever or stumbled on them, but because local Afghans have come to us and told us where those caches are located. They are leading U.S. Special Forces and military personnel to those caches, so that they can be gathered up and either destroyed or provided to the new Afghan National Army. This too is a vote of confidence in coalition efforts.

Understandably, as our military mission has changed and evolved, some forces are now rotating out of Afghanistan, including from the U.K. and Canada—even as they continue to play a critical role elsewhere in the world. This should not be taken as a sign that the effort in Afghanistan is wrapping up. To the contrary, in recent weeks:

- Turkey has increased its Afghan presence, sending over 1,300 troops to Kabul to assume leadership of the International Security Assistance Force.
- Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands will soon deploy F-16 fighters to Kyrgyzstan for air operations over Afghanistan.
- Romania has deployed an infantry battalion to Afghanistan and has offered an infantry mountain company, a nuclear, biological and chemical response company and four MiG-21 fighters, and Slovakia will soon deploy an engineering unit.
- Special Operation forces from Canada, Germany, Australia and other nations continue to work with U.S. Special Forces teams on the ground, combing through the caves, searching for Taliban and al Qaeda fugitives, gathering critical intelligence information.

Moreover, our hunt for terrorist networks is not limited to Afghanistan. At this moment, planes and ships from Australia, Bahrain, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, the U.K. and others patrol the seas and skies in distant corners of the globe, conducting aerial surveillance, leadership interdiction and maritime interception operations. France and Italy have both deployed their carrier battle groups to support Operation Enduring Freedom. Germany has taken a leadership role with surface naval forces operating around the Horn of Africa. Intelligence and law enforcement agencies from dozens of countries are helping to seize terrorist assets, freeze their bank accounts, close front companies, and disrupt terrorist cells as they plan future attacks. Significant arrests have been made on many continents, from Europe to Southeast Asia.

The war on terrorism is a global campaign against a global adversary. We learned on September 11 that in a world of international finance, communications, and transportation, even relatively isolated individuals or organizations can have global reach—and the ability to cause unprecedented destruction on innocent civilians.

The challenge for us is to find a way to live in that 21st century world as free people. Let there be no doubt: we can do so. But it requires new ways of thinking, new ways of fighting, and new strategies for defending our people and our way of life.

In the war on terror, an enormous advantage accrues to the attacker. A terrorist can strike at any place, at any time, using any conceivable technique. It is physically impossible to defend our people in every place, at every time, against every conceivable technique. So the only way to deal with that threat is to take the war to the terrorists—to go after them where they are, and kill them, capture them or otherwise disrupt them. As the President has said, “the first and best way to secure America’s homeland is to attack the enemy where he hides and plans.” This is what we have done, and are doing.

The war on terrorism began in Afghanistan, to be sure, but it will not end there. It will not end until terrorist networks have been rooted out, wherever they exist. It will not end until the state sponsors of terror are made to understand that aiding, abetting and harboring terrorists has deadly consequences for those that try it. It will not end until those developing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons end their threat to innocent men, women and children.

It will not end until our people—and the people of the world’s free nations—can once again live in peace and free from fear.

Mr. Chairman, I will be happy to take your questions.



Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
General Franks.

**STATEMENT OF GEN. TOMMY R. FRANKS, USA, COMMANDER
IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND**

General FRANKS. Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, and members of the committee: I am honored to be here today with Secretary Rumsfeld. I would ask that my statement be entered into the record and I will provide brief verbal remarks.

Chairman LEVIN. It will be made part of the record.

General FRANKS. I am honored to be here before the committee today. I have in fact looked forward to this session as an opportunity to highlight the extraordinary achievements by more than 71,000 U.S. and coalition troops currently under my command. In fact, that coalition is carrying the fight to the enemy as described by the Secretary. Their courage, tenacity, and professionalism inspire me every day and are certainly a source of great pride to the American people.

When I last appeared before the committee on February 7 of this year, I told you that our successes represented but first steps in what would certainly be a long campaign, and that remains the case. Our focus was on removing the Taliban from power and destroying the al Qaeda network within Afghanistan. Now the Taliban has, in fact, been destroyed in Afghanistan, and we continue to locate and engage remaining pockets of terrorists and their supporters to improve security and stability of the emerging Afghan nation.

Over the past 6 months, Mr. Chairman, the coalition has grown steadily from 50 nations to, as the Secretary said, 70 nations today. 40 of our coalition partners are currently engaged in and around Afghanistan in support of our operations and 24 nations have forces located inside Afghanistan as we speak.

Successes up to this point are attributable to the will of this country and to each of the coalition members—a will which I believe has been grossly underestimated by the terrorist organizations which threaten us still. The Taliban, as I mentioned, is gone. Al Qaeda's senior leadership is in disarray. Many of their planners, travel facilitators, and logisticians are now dead or captured. Their training facilities in Afghanistan were destroyed. Command and control capabilities were disrupted and their remaining leaders are, as the Secretary said, on the run.

However, al Qaeda has not lost its will to conceive, to plan, and to execute terrorist operations worldwide. It is the relentless pressure provided by our military, the militaries of the coalition, and financial and diplomatic efforts over the past 10 months that have prevented al Qaeda from sustaining its pre-September 11 capacity.

In the month of March, U.S. and coalition, as well as Afghan military forces, conducted the largest combat operation to date in Afghanistan. That was Operation Anaconda. It resulted in the elimination of the Shahi-Khot and Chumarra Valleys as sanctuaries for concentrations of al Qaeda. Operation Anaconda was a major success. A significant enemy pocket was destroyed, and notice was served by that operation that terrorists would have no safe harbor in Afghanistan.

Our efforts are now aimed at an operation we call Mountain Lion. More than 300 weapon and ammunition caches have been located and destroyed since January 1 this year during that oper-

ation. An exceptionally encouraging trend is that over the past 2 months, 159 of those caches were identified to us by local Afghan people in the country.

As we led up to June's Loya Jirga, as described by the Secretary, we made the decision to put a combined joint task force, which we call CJTF-180, forward in Afghanistan commanded by a three-star, a lieutenant general. This task force gives us a single joint command responsible to me and to the Secretary for all military functions in the country. It establishes a full-time senior presence. That commander on the ground developed very close personal and professional relationships with Afghan military and political leaders, as well as senior members of the Afghan transitional authority.

As the Secretary mentioned, we are now training the Afghan National Army. On the 23rd of this month, the first battalion of our 300 graduated soldiers. It was multi-ethnic. It was the first battalion of its type in that country and, interestingly, it was flanked on either side by two additional battalions currently in training. For the first time in decades, the beginnings of a professional, representative military force are striving to form themselves to serve the people of Afghanistan.

Another vital factor contributing to stability within Afghanistan has been and remains the International Security Assistance Force. This force, initially headed by the United Kingdom and now by Turkey, served to provide an environment within Kabul wherein the Loya Jirga process could not only take root, but could provide for the first elections held inside Afghanistan in a long time. The contributions of this International Security Assistance Force have been—and they will continue to be—important to the Afghan people during the current period of transition.

With the establishment of the most secure environment Afghanistan has seen in more than 20 years, we were able to effectively begin civil-military operations. Since March our combined military task force that works with civil affairs operations has deployed teams throughout Afghanistan and worked with literally hundreds of non-governmental organizations as they do the work, as they provide the humanitarian materials, help provide the education system, repair agricultural infrastructure, and provide water to the people. They have identified 89 major humanitarian projects, 43 of which have been completed.

As the Secretary says, what we have seen is that more than 600,000 internally displaced persons and more than 1.3 million refugees have returned to their homes. People vote with their feet.

While the return of this many Afghans to their homes will certainly stress the infrastructure as it has been destroyed in that country over the last 20-plus years, it represents something else. It represents the desire of the people of that country to reclaim their heritage and build for the future.

Now, we intend to capitalize on the successes that I have described up to this point. In order to do that, our efforts are going to remain focused on the eradication of the terrorist networks that exist within Afghanistan, the charter given to us by the Secretary and by our President.

The reason that we continue to do that is because one part of our effort is designed to be sure that we do not permit an environment

to be created where terrorism can be reintroduced into Afghanistan. With that in mind, U.S. and coalition forces have screened more than 7,500 people detained inside Afghanistan. More than 3,500 interrogations have been conducted on 2,200 individuals.

The Secretary mentioned the number of detainees that we currently hold. I would also mention that those detainees represent 44 different nations. 16,000 documents were screened. 12,000 of those were added to our database. Recruitment methods for al Qaeda were identified. Suspected members were taken care of as described by the Secretary. Weapons caches throughout Afghanistan were located.

Now, having said that and having described our success given the list that I just described, we recognize that the Afghan battlefield remains a very complex and a very dangerous place. In some areas, small numbers of remaining enemy troops have blended in with sympathetic segments of the civilian population. Tribal and ethnic and cultural conflicts, driven in some cases by traditional rivalries going back a long time, continue to lead to factional clashes, and these incidents threaten stability and provide challenges to our coalition forces who are doing the hard work.

Distinguishing between friend and foe remains a very difficult task in such a complex environment. We will continue to refine our tactics, our techniques, our procedures, and our approaches as we move forward. As I said, we have a lot of awfully hard work left to do to finish the enemy in Afghanistan.

As I close, I would like to make clear that we all recognize that we have a great deal of work left to do. While U.S. and coalition forces have done a lot in the past 10 months, the potential for terrorist attacks and for setbacks inside Afghanistan remains very real. Afghanistan is rising from oppression of the Taliban into an independent, democratic nation. I am optimistic about that future, but I am also pragmatic.

I am very proud of each and every one of the men and women who serve this country and the coalition countries represented in our efforts. They serve selflessly and tirelessly in the execution of the mission regardless of the uniform of their service or the nation from which they come. As we speak today, they are hard at work inside Afghanistan. Inside that dangerous environment, they are performing remarkably.

Mr. Chairman, I thank Congress and the American people for the tremendous support that you have given our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and the coalition I have described. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Franks follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN. TOMMY R. FRANKS, USA

Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, and members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you today. I have looked forward to this session as an opportunity to highlight the extraordinary achievements of the 71,000 U.S. and coalition troops I am privileged to command. The servicemen and women of Central Command and the coalition are carrying the fight to the enemy. Their record of courage, tenacity, and professionalism inspires me every day, and is a source of great pride for the American people.

I would like to begin by recognizing the coalition nations whose contributions of forces, equipment, and economic support to the Central Region signal worldwide determination to eradicate terrorism. Of course, our success to date would not have

been possible without the determination and will of the Afghan people who are beginning to experience the blessings of democracy and freedom.

When I last appeared before the committee on February 7, 2002, I told you our successes to date represented the first steps in what would be a long campaign to defeat terrorism. Our focus was on removing the Taliban from power and destroying the al Qaeda network within Afghanistan. Now that the Taliban has been destroyed, we continue to locate and engage remaining pockets of terrorists and their supporters to improve the security and stability of the emerging Afghan nation.

Over the past 6 months, the coalition has grown steadily from 50 nations in February to 70 today; 37 coalition nations are represented at our headquarters in Tampa and in the Central Region, and 15 nations have forces in Afghanistan.

Operational success to this point is directly attributable to the will of our country and each coalition member—a will which I believe has been grossly underestimated by the terrorist organizations which threaten us. The Taliban has been removed from power. Al Qaeda senior leadership is in disarray. Many of their planners, travel facilitators, and logisticians are now dead or captured. Their training facilities in Afghanistan have been destroyed, command and control capabilities have been disrupted, and their remaining leaders are on the run. However, al Qaeda has not lost its will to conceive, plan and execute terrorist operations world-wide. It is the relentless pressure of military, financial, and diplomatic efforts over the last 10 months that have prevented the al Qaeda from sustaining its pre-September 11 capacity.

Our coalition partners will remain key to our operations. Their contributions have included ground, air, naval, and special operations forces along with logistics support, humanitarian assistance, and basing. We are continuing to cycle these forces in and out as coalition countries remain committed to our efforts. For example, a Romanian infantry battalion recently replaced the Canadian light infantry and began combat operations a little over a week ago.

Since February, U.S. and coalition air forces have flown more than 36,000 sorties in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. Twenty-one thousand of these sorties were flown over Afghanistan with more than 6,000 being strike sorties. Coalition air forces have provided fighter and attack aircraft to support ground operations, tanker and surveillance aircraft, and vital inter- and intra-theater airlift.

Neighboring countries, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, have provided critical basing for coalition aircraft. Uzbekistan continues to facilitate the safe flow of humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people across the Friendship Bridge, while Kyrgyzstan hosts a coalition air hub and supports the use of its road and rail infrastructure for humanitarian assistance shipments into Afghanistan. This is testament to the relationships and military-to-military contacts we have built over the years, but more so a testament to the will of these countries to eradicate terrorism.

It doesn't end there. Naval forces from the United States and 11 coalition countries continue to support ground operations and conduct leadership interdiction operations. We have queried more than 16,000 vessels and boarded approximately 200 since November 2001. France alone has deployed fully one-quarter of its fleet in direct support of Operation Enduring Freedom. Terrorists cannot hide. We will find them regardless of the methods or environments they use to spread and support their networks. We continue to use every legal means to eliminate their operations.

Other examples of invaluable coalition contributions include Norway providing 21 hardened vehicles valued at \$2.1 million for our special operations forces; the Czech Republic deploying a consequence management team to Kuwait; and Spain sending helicopters to Kyrgyzstan. Germany is leading the training of Afghan police forces and Italy is engaged in rebuilding the judiciary.

Coalition forces have also provided equipment and personnel to clear mines in Afghanistan. British, Jordanian, Norwegian, and Polish engineers have accomplished the dangerous work of methodically clearing in excess of 1.7 million square meters of terrain. Among the many countries that stand with us, Pakistan deserves special mention because its cooperation and support have been critical to our success. U.S. and coalition aircraft have been granted use of Pakistani airspace and authority for the movement of logistics by sea and land routes. Pakistan Army operations in the Northwest Frontier Provinces, in coordination with coalition operations along the Afghan border, have maintained the pressure on al Qaeda. These operations have not been without cost to the people of Pakistan. While the Pakistan Army has killed and captured hundreds of former Taliban and al Qaeda fighters, they have had a number of their own troops killed by terrorist forces. Pakistan and its leadership continue to evidence exceptional resolve.

Two recent examples of successful combined operations, resulting in the detention of four suspected al Qaeda members, exemplify the success of forces acting together. On July 13, and 17, as the result of intercepts received by navy vessels and aircraft

from Canada, France, Italy and the Netherlands, two boats were targeted, intercepted, and boarded in the Gulf of Oman. On each boat, two men matching descriptions contained in our terrorist database were captured and transported to our detainee facility in Bagram.

In the month of March, U.S., coalition, and Afghan military forces conducted the largest combat operation in Afghanistan to date—Operation Anaconda. It resulted in the elimination of the Shahi-Khot and Chumarra Valleys as sanctuaries for concentrations of al Qaeda and Taliban. Operation Anaconda was a major success; a significant enemy pocket was destroyed, and notice was served to terrorists that there would be no safe harbor in Afghanistan.

United States and coalition conventional and special operations forces are currently conducting Operation Mountain Lion. More than 300 weapon and ammunition caches have been located and destroyed since January 1, 2002. An exceptionally encouraging trend is that 159 of these caches were identified to coalition forces by local Afghans in just the past 60 days. Our operations demonstrate to terrorists and terrorist sympathizers that they have nowhere to hide. We will continue Operation Mountain Lion to root out remaining terrorists as long as it takes.

As we led up to the June Loya Jirga, the XVIII Airborne Corps was designated Combined Joint Task Force 180 (CJTF-180) and was deployed to Afghanistan. This task force gives us a single joint command responsible for military functions in the country, and establishes full-time, senior command presence forward on the ground. Through routine and frequent contact, the commander has developed close professional relationships with Afghan military and political leaders and senior members of the Afghan Transitional Authority.

We are now also training the Afghan National Army and Border Security Forces. On July 23, the first U.S.-trained, multi-ethnic Afghan battalion stood proudly on the graduation parade field flanked on either side by two more battalions currently in training, one being trained by our French Partners. For the first time in decades, we see the beginnings of a professional, representative military force ready to serve the people of Afghanistan.

While this in itself represents a remarkable achievement, building the Afghan National Army will require a long-term commitment, focusing on the establishment of the Central Kabul Corps over the next 2 years. In concert with the central government, we are developing a master plan to map the way ahead for a trained, supportable national army, responsive to the central government and capable of securing Afghan borders and stabilizing the interior.

Another vital factor contributing to the stability of Afghanistan is the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul. This force, initially led by the United Kingdom, and now by Turkey, served as guarantor of an environment in which the Loya Jirga was safely conducted. This historic event occurred without significant incident, and on June 19, the first “election” in Afghanistan since 1963 was concluded. The contributions of ISAF have been, and will continue to be, important to the Afghan people during the current period of transition.

Choosing Hamid Karzai as President and confirming his selection of cabinet ministers, the Loya Jirga was comprised of women, nomads, internally displaced persons, refugees, Islamic clerics, professionals, and all major ethnic and tribal groups. Selecting the transitional government, however, was only a first step. Afghanistan will require continuing robust international assistance to build an enhanced security environment in which the Afghan government can mature.

With the establishment of the most secure environment Afghanistan has experienced in more than 20 years, we are now able to effectively conduct civil-military operations and provide humanitarian assistance across most of the country. Since March, our Combined Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF) has deployed teams throughout Afghanistan and has coordinated with literally hundreds of governmental agencies and non-governmental organizations to deliver humanitarian materials, help revive the education system, repair agricultural infrastructure, and provide potable drinking water. We have identified 89 humanitarian projects, including reconstruction of 49 schools, 15 medical facilities, and 12 drinking-water wells. To date, 43 of these projects have been completed at a cost of \$4.5 million. Many of these efforts have helped facilitate the return of 614,000 internally displaced persons and 1.3 million refugees to their homes. As Secretary Rumsfeld has said on numerous occasions, “people vote with their feet.” While the return of so many Afghans to their homes will certainly stress existing infrastructure, it represents the desire of the people to reclaim their heritage and build for the future. The coalition continues to help. Jordanian, Korean and Spanish field hospitals have treated more than 100,000 Afghan civilians, the majority of whom have been women and children. Such efforts give the Afghan people hope, and help provide an environment in which that hope can flourish.

We intend to capitalize upon achievements to date. Focusing our efforts on completing the eradication of terrorist groups is the key to preventing their return. The key to eradication of the enemy is the exploitation of captured persons and documents in Afghanistan, at Guantanamo Bay, and within the U.S. To date, such efforts have led to the arrests of individuals in Algeria, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Kenya, France, Singapore, Somalia, and the United Kingdom. Intelligence derived from these arrests has been useful in preventing terrorist operations in Afghanistan, Pakistan, France, Turkey, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia.

The scale of our human intelligence effort has been extraordinary. Let me cite a few examples.

- U.S. and coalition forces have screened more than 7,500 detainees in Afghanistan.
- More than 3,500 interrogations have been conducted on 2,200 individuals.
- These interrogations have led to the detention at Guantanamo Bay of 500-plus terrorists from 44 different countries.
- 16,000 documents have been screened and 12,000 added to a database.
- Recruitment methods for al Qaeda have been documented.
- Suspected al Qaeda members have been positively identified.
- Weapons caches throughout Afghanistan have been located.
- Plots to blow up U.S. air bases in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, and the U.S. Embassy in Yemen have been disrupted.
- Methods of al Qaeda financing have been detected.

While we remain optimistic given coalition successes, the Afghanistan battlefield remains dangerous and complex. In some areas, small numbers of remaining enemy have blended in with sympathetic segments of the civilian population. Tribal, ethnic and cultural conflicts, driven in some cases by traditional rivalries, lead to factional clashes, and these incidents threaten stability and present challenges to coalition forces. Distinguishing between friend and foe remains a difficult task. We will continue to refine our tactics, techniques, and procedures to address the Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) problem.

As in past wars, combat operations are imperfect, even in this age of technology and precision. Distinguishing between friend and foe is but one example of this fact. War entails risk to friendly forces and civilians who are located in or near an area of conflict. During Operation Enduring Freedom, we have taken extensive measures in an effort to ensure the accuracy and precision of our fires. Nevertheless, we have seen military and civilian casualties. We have investigated a number of reports of "friendly fire." In each case, commanders at every level have worked to determine the facts, locations, and sequence of the events associated with the report. When casualties are found to have occurred, we have applied lessons learned to improve our techniques and procedures. When civilians have been killed or injured, we have worked with local leaders to express regret for the loss of life and to inform them about our mission. The incident near Deh Rawod on the first of July provides an example of our approach to reports of civilian casualties. We know civilians were killed and injured in this operation based upon preliminary inquiry conducted immediately following the incident. We also know that aircraft in the area reported ground fire during the operation. Based upon these facts, an investigation was initiated on July 14, and is ongoing to build a more complete understanding of the facts and circumstances surrounding the incident. When that investigation is complete, we will apply any lessons learned. In the meantime, a coalition team has been positioned in Deh Rawod in coordination with local government officials. This team provides an opportunity to increase local understanding of our operations and enhance the willingness of NGOs to begin work in the area.

In my testimony in February, I described several emerging observations that give us insight to ongoing and future military operations. Following are several of the more important of these observations:

- Strategic airlift remains key current and future military operations. We are on a glidepath to expand our strategic airlift capabilities, and must remain committed to the task.
- The use of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) continues to be a key force multiplier, increasing the likelihood of successful target engagement, reducing the number of aircraft sorties required to destroy a target, limiting collateral damage, and enabling the commander on the ground to more effectively engage targets. Forces in Afghanistan have expended more than 12,000 PGMs, approximately 50 percent of the total munitions expended. The committee's continuing support of these programs is appreciated.
- Anti-personnel and anti-tank mines continue to pose a significant threat to U.S. and coalition forces and the Afghan people, and must be cleared.

We estimate that more than 3 million mines are spread throughout Afghanistan. Service efforts to improve our mine clearing capability remain important to current and future readiness.

- An area in which modern warfare has forever been transformed is that of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). Platforms such as Predator and Global Hawk have provided real-time intelligence, enhanced situational awareness, and facilitated command and control at all levels. These assets have proven the value of unmanned aerial systems and we must continue to build upon this growing capability.

In closing, I want to make clear that our work in Afghanistan is not finished. While U.S. and coalition forces have accomplished much over the past 10 months, the potential for terrorist acts and setbacks remains very real. Afghanistan is rising from the oppression of the Taliban into an independent, democratic nation. I am optimistic about the future, but much work remains to be done.

September 11 changed America forever. The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, Pennsylvania, and the Pentagon united us and our coalition partners in a mission to eliminate global terrorism. Central Command remains committed to that mission.

I am very proud of each and every one of the men and women who continue to serve selflessly and tirelessly in the execution of our mission regardless of the uniform of service they wear or the nation from which they come. I thank Congress and the American people for the tremendous support you have given them.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, General.

We will have one round of 6-minute questioning. There are so many of us here today that we had better limit it to that so we will have time to go into our closed session. We will proceed on the early bird basis as usual.

General Franks, let me start with you. You noted in your prepared statement that the building of the Afghan National Army will require a long-term commitment. I understand the goal is to train a 60,000-man force. At the current rate, I believe that that would take almost 8 years to meet that goal. Are those figures correct, and do you have an assessment as to how long U.S. and coalition forces will be required to remain in Afghanistan?

General FRANKS. Mr. Chairman, the way we are approaching that right now, I believe that we will probably by the end of December of this year produce 3,000 to 4,000 trained members of the Afghan National Army. By about this time next summer, we expect that number to be in the vicinity of 8,000. By the end of 2003, I believe somewhere around 13,000 in the Afghan National Army.

Now, with respect to how long we will continue to conduct that training effort is certainly a decision for the Secretary and at the policy level. My suspicion is that we will begin to look at approaches to provide that training which may give relief to our uniformed people, who are conducting that training now, a policy decision to be made in the future.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

Secretary Rumsfeld, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan has recommended the expansion of the International Security Assistance Force outside of Kabul. I think he has made that recommendation before. He says that it would make a huge contribution to the consolidation of peace. Would you support the limited expansion of that International Security Assistance Force? Would you be willing to urge other nations to provide the troops to make that happen, and would you be willing for U.S. troops to participate in that force as a way to attract other nations to contribute troops to it?

Secretary RUMSFELD. My view, and the view of the administration all along, has been that the International Security Assistance

Force is a good thing, and to the extent countries are interested in expanding it, as the Secretary General of the United Nations has indicated he favors, would certainly be a useful thing.

The problem is that no countries are stepping forward to do that. We have had a good deal of difficulty, first of all, recruiting the original group of countries to serve in the International Security Assistance Force. Then as those countries have rotated out, including the U.K. now, we have had to help recruit Turkey to come in and take the leadership. Turkey leaves at the end of this year and we are going to have to recruit a new successor for that.

Our task, as we saw it, is best characterized by General Franks' efforts, to go after the al Qaeda and the Taliban and our support of the ISAF with logistics, intelligence, and communications and quick reaction support, if necessary. As General Franks also indicated, our task is to help train the Afghanistan National Army and raise money for it.

We feel that our plate is pretty full and it would be an inappropriate use of our forces to employ them as additional International Security Assistance Force troops. We feel that trying to stop terrorists from committing additional terrorist acts is our first priority; our second priority is to support the existing ISAF; and our third priority is to train an Afghan National Army.

If people step forward, terrific.

Chairman LEVIN. If people step forward?

Secretary RUMSFELD. If other countries want to step forward and volunteer their forces to expand the ISAF. The problem is the only people that have been recommending it have been people who do not have troops.

Chairman LEVIN. General, let me ask you this question about the July 1 incident, the so-called wedding incident. What can you tell us about the circumstances surrounding that incident, in which up to 54 Afghan civilians were killed? Very specifically, can you tell us whether or not the investigation, which I gather is ongoing, has corroborated a claim that the aircraft were fired on from the ground?

General FRANKS. Mr. Chairman, I have looked at the gun tapes from those aircraft. The Secretary has looked at a part of those gun tapes. What I would say at this point is that the initial assessment I asked our ground commander over there, General McNeil, who told us that we should do an investigation and determine as best we can, all the facts and circumstances surrounding that, along with the context within which that event took place.

That investigation is, in fact, under way right now. Statements are being taken as a part of that investigation. I will say that there were points of intelligence that led us to the area. When we put our forces into the area, and as I think the Secretary has said on a previous occasion, we had them not only in the air, but we had people on the ground observing these operations as we were conducting a sweep through this area.

Now, there is no question that there was ground to air fire. There is no question, Mr. Chairman. Now, I have read much about whether or not this is air defense or whether this is celebratory fire from the wedding. Sir, the purpose of the investigation is to make

those determinations. So, sir, that is where we stand right now on that incident.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

Just to conclude that, on the tapes that you saw, was there evidence on those tapes of ground fire against those planes?

General FRANKS. Sir, there was evidence on the tapes of ground fire, yes.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you.

General, reading your testimony back, you say: "In closing, I want to make clear that our work in Afghanistan is not yet finished." Describe to us as best you can "finished." When, in your judgment, will you be finished in your mission?

General FRANKS. Senator Warner, we entered into this with what I believe was a blessing. When the President of the United States and the Secretary of Defense described a mission that says remove the Taliban from effective control of the country of Afghanistan, it is a discreet mission and I am satisfied with that.

The second part of that mission was to destroy the al Qaeda network as well as the tentacle pieces of that network, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan that existed within Afghanistan, which if linked together represented a global threat. The Secretary and I have described that we have work left to do in that regard. In my view, there are no large pockets such as the Tora Bora pocket or the Anaconda pocket in place in Afghanistan right now.

Sir, I am not sure how long it will take us to work our way through each and every piece of the geography of this terribly compartmented country to assure ourselves, my bosses and me, that the work has been completed.

Sir, the third part of our effort there is to provide as best we can for the creation of a secure and stable environment within which a democratic government can mature in the country of Afghanistan. There are a lot of different approaches, a lot of different possibilities to that, Senator Warner.

But the military piece of it that I have in my mission is to prevent the reintroduction of terrorism into Afghanistan such as we found it post-September 11 of last year.

You asked me a question, sir, that was very short. I have given you a long answer. I do not know how long it will take us to work through each of the pieces of that very military mission. I believe the force structure we have in place today gives us an opportunity to do the work which the President and the Secretary have asked our military to do. So, we are just continuing with that until we see ourselves able to put a check beside each component of the mission.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Secretary, do you want to add to that definition of "finished"?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Yes, sir, just to add a couple of thoughts. I think the way to think about the task to achieve what General Franks indicated is the goal, in that it requires that we look at security at several different levels. There is the security of the people that were elected by the Loya Jirga. It is important that the government survive and do its job. There is security in the major cities

and the ability of humanitarian workers to provide for the needs of people. There is the problem of border security. They need border guards. There is the problem of police; they need police.

There is the task we mentioned of dealing with the al Qaeda and the Taliban to see that they do not come back and attempt to reassert themselves. There are potential conflicts between factions within the country. There are drug lords and people involved in drug trafficking. There is also crime, normal crime.

The goal, needless to say, is to have the Afghan government assume all of these responsibilities. My suspicion is that they will do so at a different pace. Clearly they do not have the ability to go after the al Qaeda and the Taliban at the present time without the cooperation of the coalition forces. But they do have the beginnings of some capability to start dealing with certain other aspects of it. The answer to the question is how fast can the civil side step up and take over some of those responsibilities and how soon the national army can begin to take over some of their responsibilities.

Senator WARNER. You have been very candid in describing those tasks and in saying that you are having difficulty recruiting someone to take over the responsibility, say when the Turks finish their term. All of that indicates to this Senator that we best tell the American people that we are going to be there for a long time.

Secretary RUMSFELD. My goal is to have the Afghan government be successful and systematically, incrementally begin to develop the kinds of institutions of government that they need to take over these responsibilities. It is a difficult task, but we have a lot of coalition countries trying to help. I think that the work is well under way.

Senator WARNER. As mentioned by the General, one of the missions was to destroy al Qaeda the network. There have been reports that al Qaeda has begun to reconstitute itself, that it has found safe havens in adjoining nations, and that new leadership is somehow coming to the forefront. What can you tell us on that? Candidly, if you cannot, we will wait until the closed session, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary RUMSFELD. I think I would prefer to do it in closed session.

Senator WARNER. All right. Thank you very much.

I think it is important the record reflect that you give us the latest on bin Laden. I think we know the answer, but the record should contain it. Mr. Secretary?

Secretary RUMSFELD. You want me to once again acknowledge the reality that we do not know where he is or if he is alive. He is either alive and in Afghanistan or someplace else, or he is dead. He clearly is not active and engaged to the extent that he was previously. If he is alive and if he is functioning, he is functioning in very difficult circumstances where life is harder for them, the senior people, in terms of movement, in terms of communication, in terms of raising money, and in terms of training terrorists. That is a good thing.

Senator WARNER. Do you anticipate that we will see efforts to begin to get more security beyond Kabul, which is now the central focus? How soon do we hope to move out with other forces into

those areas to obtain the security and to achieve the very goals which you enumerated, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Senator Warner, I would characterize the country at the present time as being reasonably secure. It is uneven, but for the most part, except for a few incidents from time to time, most of the country is reasonably secure. It is secure because coalition forces are in a variety of locations. Special Forces are embedded into the regional leaders' forces. We have forces in Bagram and in Kandahar.

The one portion is the southeast area which tends to have the most incidents, because there is not a regional leader that has a good grip on things at the present time. I think we just have to live with that for a period and continue to work on that problem.

Senator WARNER. My time is up, unless the General wants to fill out any questions.

General FRANKS. I might just add to what the Secretary said. I checked this morning just before the hearing. As we speak today, we have our people, coalition and American people, in more than 40 locations inside Afghanistan doing the work that the Secretary described. So we are out and about.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. Thank you, Senator Warner.

Senator Lieberman.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, and thanks, Secretary and General, for your extraordinary leadership, and thanks to the American men and women who are serving in uniform under your command who have performed brilliantly. I think it is important to restate what a lot of us felt, which after September 11, when this response was being planned, there were naysayers who were reminding us that the Afghans had slaughtered the British in an earlier generation and defeated the mighty Soviet Union and that we were getting in over our heads.

But thanks to great leadership by the two of you and, with all respect, even greater effort by those on the ground, together with the terrifying force of our high technology weapons, we achieved an extraordinary victory over the Taliban and did disrupt al Qaeda. I think as we go on to the next phase, we should not lose sight of that great victory and what it suggests about the dominance of the American military in a world that remains dangerous.

General Franks, I did want to ask you about one of the operations you referred to, Tora Bora, because from within the United States and outside Europe and even in Afghanistan there have been criticisms of that operation, some of them stating that we allegedly used more Afghani fighters than we should have and not enough U.S. troops on the ground.

There have been some criticisms from, I gather, reported in the press and from Afghan commanders, who said U.S. forces were not being aggressive enough on the ground to defeat the guerrillas. I wanted to ask you if you would respond to those on the record.

General FRANKS. Senator Lieberman, I would be pleased to. Let me first say thanks to you and other members of the committee who have visited our people in Afghanistan. I believe your visit was back in January when you had an opportunity to see our people first-hand.

In Tora Bora, in early December 2001, the United States of America at that time had about 1,300 Americans in country in 17 different locations. Kandahar was at that time still not fully under control. We had our Marine forces operating out of Camp Rhino, which was our initial point of entry into Afghanistan. We were very mindful—I guess I will take credit or blame for this. I was very mindful of the Soviet experience of more than 10 years, having introduced 620,000 troops into Afghanistan, more than 15,000 of them being killed, more than 55,000 of them being wounded.

We characterized this effort in Afghanistan as a complex and unconventional effort from the very day we started. As of that time in early December, we also kept in mind that the country of Afghanistan, ultimately, must belong to the Afghan people. It was Afghans who wanted to attack in the Tora Bora area. We had Special Forces troopers with those Afghans, to be sure.

We had linkage with the Pakistanis, who some would say, although not much reported at that time, had in the vicinity of 100,000 troops on the western Pakistani border along a great many of the likely points of exfiltration, from Afghanistan into Pakistan.

Did the enemy get out of Tora Bora? Senator, yes, to be sure. As we looked at the plan—and I looked at it before the operation, obviously, and I have looked at it since the operation—to see what did the plan say or do within the context that I just described to you that should have been done perhaps differently.

The plan called for an approach up two parallel valleys with blocking forces at the ends of those valleys. The relationships that we had at that time with the Afghan forces on the ground were in their beginning state. Based on that information, we determined we would not try to stop the Afghans who wanted to move into Tora Bora, where we had done a great deal of operational fires or kinetic work, as you would recall, since February 7, when we began the operation.

As the Afghan forces moved to contact, they encountered al Qaeda and residual Taliban elements. I have seen speculation as to the number of enemy forces in Tora Bora that range from a few hundred to a few thousand. I believe that we do not know what the total size of that enemy force in that area was. I believe that some of those forces to be sure did move into Pakistan, and the reason I know that, Senator, is because almost 300 of them were captured by the Pakistanis along that border that I described a minute ago.

Senator LIEBERMAN. General, do we know how many of the enemy we killed at Tora Bora?

General FRANKS. Senator, we really do not know how many we killed at Tora Bora. You will recall perhaps a similar question on Anaconda or how many did we kill. The pounding that we put into that area, the numbers of caves and compound complexes that were closed in that fight over the duration of it, make it virtually impossible to know how many were killed. The assessment that I have read, and I believe it, is in the hundreds.

The elevations that our people and the Afghans themselves were working in ranged from 5,000 up to 13,000 feet. So this was not a fight or armored vehicles and so forth. I am satisfied with the way this operation was conducted—no, I will not say that. I am

satisfied with the decision process that permitted the Afghans to go to work in the Tora Bora area.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you.

My time is up. Perhaps in the closed session I would ask you, since Tora Bora was in the nature of a first battle and adaptations and adjustments are always made after first battles, what lessons we learned from it for successive actions.

General FRANKS. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.

Senator Inhofe.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know we have a lot of members. I will try not to use all my time.

In concern to the budget I thought it had two glaring deficiencies, one of which I would like to bring up now that has already been touched on. The chairman talked about the distant future on end strength. We have called up 80,000 Guard and Reserves. We put stop-losses on those that are there right now.

I think those of us on this side of the table can tell you that there is a serious problem with our Guard and Reserve components, because we measure that by letters that come in. These people are loyal. They want to fight and they want to be there. But by the very nature of their job they cannot be fully deployed all the time.

Now as you look into the future, there is going to be a time when the stop-loss is lifted, when the Reserves and the Guard go home. General Franks, how do you plan to continue the war effort when that time comes?

General FRANKS. Senator Inhofe, thanks for visiting a couple of months ago, by the way.

I think probably the Secretary is in a much better position to answer than I am. I will give you a short combatant commander view as a receiver of forces provided by the Services for our efforts in Afghanistan and, in fact, across my area of responsibility. We have a great many Guardsmen, Reservists, all Services, doing an absolutely remarkable job.

Probably the comment that I could make is that it makes a great deal of difference to us to have that pool from which to draw, because one of the things it does for us, Senator, is it permits us to cycle our people through so that we do not put everyone in an overseas circumstance for the duration. That, sir, is the best I can give you from a combatant view.

Senator INHOFE. Before Secretary Rumsfeld responds, I can remember back during Bosnia and Kosovo when the 21st TACOM—they have changed the name of it now—said that if there was another war effort, they would be totally dependent upon Guard and Reserve. Of course, this is exactly what has happened. That is why I have a great concern that it is something we need to address.

Mr. Secretary, any comments about that?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Yes, sir, Senator. You are right, we have 85,000 Reserve and Guard personnel in the present call-up. We have some 20,000-plus stop-loss. We are currently over our previously authorized end strength, in the plus 2 percent level. We have a significant effort going on in each of the Services to look at how they can increase their tooth to tail ratio—reduce the tail and increase the tooth.

It is time to do that. We are capable of doing a much more efficient job and it is important to do that. To an extent if we cannot get what we need by making those efficiencies, then obviously we will come in for more end strength if we need it. But at the moment, we do not even need to. I am told the emergency allows us to go up, in all Services, I think all Services except the Marines are currently above that prior authorized level.

I will say this. The reason for having the Guard and Reserve is because we considered the total force concept. Using them is not bad. It is the way the thing was designed. It is working very well.

Now, are there folks that are inconvenienced? Yes. On the other hand, there are a great many of those people who are volunteers. I do not know what the fraction is, but it is not a trivial portion of the total number of Guard and Reserve who are serving on a volunteer basis as opposed to a mandatory basis.

Senator INHOFE. That is reassuring. I think we hear from a lot of them that are called up. As I say, they want to fight, but they cannot handle the length and the number of the deployments.

I want to bring up something on mobility. I put that in two categories: one on our refueling capacity and another on lift. I was, as you were good enough to point out, General Franks, on the U.S.S. *Kennedy* when they were doing operations up in Afghanistan, where F-18s were taking off and coming back. They not only required refueling capability, but multi refueling capability on those particular exercises.

I know that we have a shortage of KC-135s, and I think they were using KC-10s at that time up there. But I would like you to tell us how were you affected adversely, General Franks, in Afghanistan by the lack of KC-135 refueling capability?

General FRANKS. Sir, probably the best answer I can give you is maybe by way of example. We like to use our global reach and global power capability. In order to do that, we have to position tanking capability in numerous different places. When you do that, you fragment the numbers that you have, which if all together in one piece of geography might be absolutely ample in order to do a major war, small scale, or something else.

In the particular case of this fight halfway around the world and the use of global assets—B-2s and so forth—we find that it did not kill us in Afghanistan because we were able to have air power coming from our carrier decks, which were close enough to be able to have one tanker up in orbit over Afghanistan and be able to refuel multiple attack aircraft from it.

Had the circumstance been different, then 135s or KC-10 refuelers would have been a problem. Sir, I cannot give you the numbers and I cannot quantify beyond that.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.

Secretary RUMSFELD. I might just say, if I may, that the place where the strain or the inconvenience would show up, to use your word, would not be in Central Command. It would be in the other commands. To the extent you have these high demand, low density assets and capabilities, it is in the other CINCDoms that you end up with something less than they might prefer.

Senator INHOFE. I understand that. But if something happens there, then there is a problem.

Secretary RUMSFELD. You are quite right.

Chairman LEVIN. "CINCdom"? Okay.

Secretary RUMSFELD. I did say that, didn't I? [Laughter.]

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Cleland.

Senator CLELAND. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, General, Colonel, welcome. We appreciate your service to our country and especially the leadership you provide to our young men and women out there who are doing a fantastic job.

Mr. Chairman, I would like unanimous consent to enter into the record an article in *Army Times* titled "What We Learned from Afghanistan," and an article in *Defense News* titled "U.S. Army, Navy Mull Lessons Learned in Afghanistan War."

Chairman LEVIN. They will be made part of the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

Army Times
 July 29, 2002
 Pg. 10

What We Learned From Afghanistan

By Sean D. Naylor, Times staff writer

The decision to leave artillery at home and rely on precision air power in Afghanistan left U.S. troops vulnerable, according to the officer in charge of assessing the lessons to be learned from the war there.

From October through July, U.S. forces in Afghanistan, including the 10th Mountain Division (light Infantry) and 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) battalions who fought Operation Anaconda in March, had no artillery support. For reasons still unclear, the 3rd Brigade of the 101st was told not to deploy with the 105 mm howitzer battalion that would usually accompany it into battle.

When those troops found themselves under heavy mortar fire during Anaconda, the only fire support available other than their own mortars, was close air support from AH-64 Apache helicopters and precision-guided bombing from jets.

That approach, according to a Center for Army Lessons Learned briefing obtained by Army Times, had some significant drawbacks. Not the least of these was the difficulty coordinating suppression missions - those requiring a heavy volume of fire over an area rather than against a single target - when only precision munitions were available.

"Precision guided munitions are very accurate for specific target coordinates, but not every fire support mission lends itself to the requirement for specific coordinates," says the briefing, "Emerging Lessons, Insights and Observations - Operation Enduring Freedom." The briefing primarily was based on information gathered by teams from the center who visited Afghanistan in January, March and April. The teams gathered information from Army, special operations and Joint sources.

Col. Mike Hiemstra, the Center's director, said it would be "a legitimate conclusion" to assume that, had there been a battery of howitzers on the Anaconda battlefield, the guns could have shut down al-Qaida mortars that inflicted most of the roughly two-dozen U.S. casualties on the first day of battle.

The 82nd Airborne Division troops replacing the 101st troops in Afghanistan deployed with their 105 mm howitzers.

"You could argue that we've learned a lesson and said, 'Hey, there is room for artillery on this battlefield, and there is a reason why the artillery plays a significant role in the construct of the battlefield as we envision it.' And that's a hugely important issue," Hiemstra, a field artillery officer, said.

"The maneuver commander needs to be provided with a full range of fires. And if you don't provide him with that full range of fires, then you open up a vulnerability.

"Precision fires are good, but they are a piece of the pie, not the entire pie. There are still times when you don't need precise effects, you need area effects - a lot of effect, over a wide area.

"The cannon artillery system is still the only all-weather, day/night, close support fire capability

available to the ground commander. By not having it there, the ground commander then has to rely on other things."

Those "other things" included mortars and Apaches, both of which proved themselves in battle, Hiemstra said. The 60 mm mortars that each light infantry company has were "very effective," according to the briefing.

But mortars have drawbacks, he said. First, they have a limited range. They also consume ammunition at a high rate, which imposes a strain on the logistics system in an austere environment like Afghanistan, Hiemstra said.

In the case of the Apache, commanders took a weapons system designed primarily for night attacks against Soviet armor formations following behind the first echelon of an attack, and by adapting quickly to the situation on the ground, used it instead for day and night attacks against close-in guerrilla targets.

The Apache's inability to hover at high altitude meant that instead of crew members firing from a hover position, as they would under normal conditions, they attacked enemy positions during Anaconda using "running gunfire," swooping down on the enemy while firing rockets and chain-gun rounds. This tactic required a greater level of coordination with ground troops, according to the briefing.

"My understanding, from the people that we've talked to, is that it worked very well," Hiemstra said.

Getting It Together

From the platoon up to the three-star general level, the war in Afghanistan has required units who do not have a habitual relationship to work closely together. This process has not always been smooth, the briefing suggests. "The Army needs to examine how it . . . develops trained staffs that trust each other," it states.

"Friction" between higher and lower headquarters is inevitable, Hiemstra said. "One of the ways that you help to work through that is to train together as much as you can, and learn to trust each other as a result of that habitual association."

The briefing also suggests that the pressure to keep the number of troops in Afghanistan to a minimum created some command and control (or C2) problems.

"Force caps and mobility constraints forced [the Army component of Central Command] to flatten the traditional C2 structures," the briefing states. "The flattened C2 structure supported deployment restrictions, but created C2 problems."

Normally when military members talk about "flattening" organizations, they mean removing layers of command and control. But in Enduring Freedom, the layers seemed to be present: the 101st's 3rd Brigade headquarters answered to the two-star 10th Mountain division commander at Bagram air base, who answered to Lt. Gen. Paul Mikolashek, the coalition forces land component commander. Mikolashek's boss was Central Command chief Gen. Tommy Franks.

While there was no corps headquarters in Afghanistan until XVIII Airborne Corps took over from 10th Mountain recently, there are only about 7,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan - about half of a normal division.

Hiemstra was reluctant to go into detail about the command and control problems, saying some of the command relationships are still classified. But he implied the term "flattened" referred not to missing layers of command, but rather to smaller-than-usual staffs at some levels.

"That required people to use a great deal of innovation, and find a number of workarounds, to make things work."

The Nitty-Gritty

The lessons-learned briefing does not concentrate exclusively on issues related to high-level command-and-control relationships and combat tactics. It also deals with more mundane issues.

"Field sanitation is a lost art," according to the briefing. "Units need to deploy with materials to build showers and latrines."

Since the end of the Cold War, the Army has conducted large-scale deployments to southwest Asia, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Albania and Kosovo. The notion that somewhere in the middle of this high operational tempo units have forgotten how to take care of field sanitation might strike some observers as odd.

Environmental restrictions at home posts are partially to blame, according to Hiemstra. "There are limitations in most training areas today about digging a slit-trench latrine - you can't do it," he said. "Those are environmental considerations ... because you're using that same terrain to train in all the time, and so there are hygiene considerations."

"If you look at our training in the United States, we rely a lot on fixed-latrine kinds of facilities, even if it's a port-a-potty," he said. "Then you go into a very austere theater like folks are in in Afghanistan, and the local port-a-potty contract isn't there anymore."

"There's a specific discipline that goes with being able to take care of yourself in the field for a long time, ... [and] we don't train to that standard in normal training here in the States."

Hiemstra noted that disease had cut a swath through Soviet and Russian forces in Afghanistan and Chechnya. "Disease and non-battle injury casualties can bring you to your knees," he said.

Other lessons learned cited in the briefing included:

** The "Gator" all-terrain vehicle has proven its worth in the mountains and the base camps in Afghanistan.

** Soldiers prefer the Camel-bak hydration system to the canteen, because it allows them to drink without fumbling with a canteen cap or forcing their eyes upward.

** The operational environment in Afghanistan places a high demand on human intelligence sources.

** Bottled water is not the solution to the challenge of meeting potable-water requirements in an austere theater.

** "Army engineers need to be trained and equipped to perform rapid runway repairs."

** The ground-laser designator being used by conventional forces is "too heavy and cumbersome for use in mountainous terrain."

** "Small, lightweight binoculars, laser range-finders and global positioning system [receivers] are indispensable."

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U.S. Army, Navy Mull Lessons Learned In Afghanistan War

By Amy Svitak

Operation Enduring Freedom highlighted the U.S. Army and Navy's innovative approach to fighting a challenging new kind of war but revealed vulnerabilities in planning and command and control, according to service lessons-learned documents obtained by Defense News.

For example, the Army's lack of artillery in Afghanistan forced soldiers to rely on precision air power, which made heavy-volume suppression more difficult, according to a June 25 Army briefing document, "Emerging Lessons, Insights and Observations: Operation Enduring Freedom." Produced by the Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, Kan., the report drew on information gathered by assessment teams that observed operations in Afghanistan in January, March and April, as well as from Special Forces and conventional units.

The decision to leave artillery at home left U.S. troops vulnerable, according to Col. Mike Hiemstra, who runs the center. "Precision fires are good, but they are a piece of the pie, not the entire pie," Hiemstra said. "The maneuver commander needs to be provided with a full range of fires. And if you don't provide him with that full range of fires, then you open up a vulnerability."

When troops found themselves under heavy mortar fire in March during Operation Anaconda, the only fire support available, other than their own mortars, was close air support from AH-64 Apache helicopters and precision-guided bombing from tactical aircraft.

"Precision-guided munitions are very accurate for specific target coordinates, but not every fire support mission lends itself to the requirement for specific coordinates," says the briefing document. Hiemstra said it would be "a legitimate conclusion" to assume that a battery of howitzers could have shut down the al-Qaida mortars.

Air Force AC-130 gunships provided effective close air support — when they were not being used by higher-priority special forces missions.

Apaches proved themselves in battle, after commanders took a weapon system designed primarily for night attacks against Soviet armor formations and adapted it for day and night attacks against close-in guerrilla targets, he said. But the Apache's inability to hover at high altitude forced them into dicier swooping attacks on enemy positions during Anaconda, whose goal was to destroy al-Qaida and Taliban forces fortified in mountainous positions in eastern Afghanistan.

The war in Afghanistan brought unfamiliar units together, which sometimes produced less-than-smooth working relationships, the briefing suggests.

"The Army needs to examine how it ... develops trained staffs that trust each other," it states.

Friction between higher and lower headquarters is inevitable, Hiemstra said. "One of the ways that you help to work through that is to train together as much as you can, and learn to trust each other as a result of that habitual association." In Operation Enduring Freedom, the Navy creatively used systems made

for an other era to achieve effects-based outcomes in joint warfighting, according to Navy officials and documents.

For example, the Navy was able to use the P-3, an anti-submarine aircraft designed for blue water operations, to carry special operations forces over land and to use the aircraft's intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance sensors to share information, a Navy official said July 19.

"It's been like a manned Predator" unmanned aerial vehicle designed by General Atomics, San Diego, he said. "It's a transformational way of doing business." However, the Navy suffered from poor integration between special operations and conventional Navy forces, according to an undated Navy document that details lessons learned in Afghanistan.

The service also needs to improve command and control, and force sustainment, including the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile's reload capability at sea.

"The Navy is unable to reload Tomahawks at sea," said Michael Vickers, a director at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment. "Also of interest is the perennial desire to create a Tomahawk forward-replenishment capability."

Insights, Observations

As the U.S. Army and Navy sorted through the lessons of Operation Enduring Freedom, several categories for improvement emerged. Some of the lessons, as given in the services' recent lessons-learned reports, include:

Army

Communications

- * Need smaller, more deployable, higher-bandwidth communications packages that can be shipped on pallets or moved on single vehicles.
- * FM radios are not sufficient for Afghan terrain.
- * Need to automate and expand routine updates to the common communications operational picture.
- * Digital systems that don't work together are becoming more of a problem.
- * Increasing troops' access to information creates new problems.

Operational Intelligence

- * Terrain analysis is critical to anticipating enemy action.
- * More highly mobile reconnaissance forces are needed to verify information from other intelligence sources.
- * Ground commanders often used unmanned aerial vehicles for command and control instead of intelligence.

Fire Support

- * Some fire support missions, like suppression, were difficult when aircraft had only precision weapons.
- * Unable to hover, AH-64 Apache helicopters are firing on the move, which requires more coordination with troops.

Engineer Operations

- * Need training and equipment for rapid runway repairs.
- * Need smaller, more deployable Bobcats, forklifts, compactors, concrete saws.

Mine Operations

- * Establish anti-mine centers quickly.
- * Effective against mines were: Norwegian flail, U.S. MCAP and mine-sniffing dogs. Not very effective: U.S. miniflail.
- * Clutter made standard mine detectors almost useless.

Force Protection

- * Made more difficult by noncontiguous battlespace, geographically separated units and hard-to-define rear area.
- * Need wide-angle, handheld and vehicle-mounted thermal imagers; metal and explosive detectors; prisoner-of-war detainee equipment; and mirrors.

Navy

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Needs

- * Better ISR connections for "trigger pullers"
- * Means to send P-3 images to distant receivers
- * More P-3 sensor kits
- * Persistent ISR
- * Fleet-based tactical UAVs

Operations

- * Make maritime intercept operations a core competency and standardize mission packages, training, equipment.

- * Better integrate special forces with Navy conventional forces.
- * Standardize combat search-and-rescue operations.
- * Improve and standardize close air support procedures.
- * Improve coalition interoperability.
- * Coalition operations should be part of every field-grade officer's resume.

Sustainability Needs

- * Bigger U.S. Central Command munitions stockpiles.
- * Faster way to reload ships' Tomahawk missile batteries.
- * Better spare parts tracking.

Sean Naylor contributed to this report.

Senator CLELAND. Thank you very much.

Mr. Secretary, for me, Operation Enduring Freedom has become Operation Enduring Frustration. I can remember the aftermath of September 11, the feeling on Capitol Hill, the sense of outrage, the sense of focus, and the sense of purpose. For me, having served in the military, that clarity of purpose, that clarity of commitment, enhanced our military capacity to do the job.

For instance, we passed a congressional resolution that gave the President the ability to use all necessary force and it specifically mentioned September 11. In other words, we gave you the authority to go after those who came after us. For me that is still mission number one. I think it is fine to nation-build or liberate Afghanistan, but the frustration continues because we still have not killed or captured Osama bin Laden and his terrorist cadre.

Do you happen to know where he is?

Secretary RUMSFELD. I responded to that when Senator Warner asked it and the answer is obviously the United States of America does not know where he is. We do not know if he is dead or alive. We do know that he is having a great deal of difficulty functioning. He may be dead, he may be seriously wounded. He may be in Afghanistan, or he may be somewhere else.

But wherever he is, if he is, you can be certain he is having one dickens of a time operating his apparatus. Now, is he critical? Well, he is important, but there are plenty of people, 6, 8, 10, 12 people probably, who could take over the al Qaeda network. They know where the bank accounts are. They know the names of the people who are trained. They know the sleeper cells that exist around the world.

So the task is not a manhunt for Osama bin Laden, as your question suggests. The task is to find the terrorists wherever they are, bin Laden plus all the others, and deal with them and the countries that are providing safe haven to them. That we are trying to do.

Senator CLELAND. Well, that is my question. If we do not know where he is, how can we go after him?

Second, is he not in western Pakistan, basically in a sanctuary there, an area where even the Pakistani troops are not welcome? Are we not vulnerable then to another attack or his continued organization of attack against us? One of the things I learned in Vietnam was if the terrorist does not lose, he wins. This is why I am so committed personally to making sure that his end is in sight. It troubles me and I am frustrated that his end is not in sight or is the end of this terrorist cadre in sight. That for me is mission number one for our government and mission number one for our military.

Second, I am frustrated by the fact that in the biggest operation of the war, Operation Anaconda, apparently, according to the *Army Times*, the third brigade of the 101st Airborne-Air Assault was told not to deploy with their 105-millimeter howitzers that they would normally take into battle. In other words, here we are sending a brigade into the biggest battle of the war without their artillery support.

Is that normal? Is that something we are going to do? I am especially bothered and frustrated because you cancelled the Army's latest artillery piece, the Crusader. Is that a new way of deploying the Army, without artillery support?

Secretary RUMSFELD. I would like to have a chance to answer those questions. First, if we thought he was in western Pakistan, the Pakistani government, the army, and the folks that are working in that area, I believe, would go find them. We do not know that he is there. That is pure press speculation. People are saying that.

Yes, he might be anywhere. But do we know where he is? Do we have coordinates? No. Are we trying hard? Is intelligence working on it? You bet it is. So simply because something like that is in the press does not mean that he is in western Pakistan, although he may be.

You said mission number one ought to be the al Qaeda and the Taliban. That is exactly what we are doing, and we are doing it all across the globe. People are getting arrested every day. Arms caches are being discovered every day. People are being interrogated, and people are being detained. It seems to me that the United States Armed Forces were designed to deal with armies, navies, and air forces. Doing a single manhunt is a different type of thing. The intelligence community is working hard on it. General Franks is working hard on it. People across the globe are working hard on it.

You can be frustrated if you want. I am not. I think that we have a serious effort going on and serious work is being done. The pressure that is being put on those terrorist networks is important and it is causing them difficulty in all the things they have to do, like raising money and recruiting and retaining people. Does that mean there will not be another terrorist attack? No, there may very well be. Terrorists can attack at any time, any place, using any technique.

I would like General Franks to talk about the howitzers. He is an artilleryman.

General FRANKS. Sir, I would be glad to talk about the howitzers and the 101st, as well as the overall structure inside Afghanistan.

Actually, I have not read the *Army Times* article, but I will respond to the question that you asked.

The elevations in question in Operation Anaconda were at the low end, just below 8,000 feet, and at the high end, above 12,000 feet. An M199 howitzer weighs 4,520 pounds. The maximum ordnance for a 119 howitzer, Senator, how high it goes, is 8,000 meters. That puts it at 24,000 feet, whereas the ordnance for a mortar is less than one-half of that. That affects the literally hundreds of aircraft close air support sorties that are available to the combatants on the ground during Operation Anaconda.

Senator, a 60-millimeter mortar weighs 47 pounds. An 81-millimeter mortar weighs 89 pounds. A 120-millimeter mortar weighs in the vicinity of 400 pounds. A total of 26 of those systems were available for use during Operation Anaconda.

I have spoken to the brigade commander. I have spoken to the division commander. I have spoken to the land component commander both before and after Operation Anaconda, and I, sir, find no justification for the comment that you made with respect to the cannons coming with the 101st Airborne Division Air Assault.

Senator CLELAND. I am getting this out of the Center for Army Lessons Learned briefing obtained by the *Army Times*, where Colonel Mike Hemster, the Center's Director, said it would be "a legitimate conclusion to assume that had there been a battery of howitzers on the Anaconda battlefield, the guns could have shut down al Qaeda mortars that inflicted most of the roughly 38 U.S. casualties on the first day of battle."

I was just interested in how we were deploying our forces here, especially since the Secretary has cancelled the latest artillery piece by the Army. Then I find that we are sending a brigade into battle here without its normal artillery component. I just wondered if this was a new order of battle or if it was something special.

General FRANKS. Sir, the Secretary may want to respond more. Sir, from your military experience as well as I know from mine that each and every deployment and each and every mission that we undertake is going to consider all that is necessary the mission to be done, the enemy that we are going to fight, the terrain in which we are going to fight, and the lift assets available and what to do with it.

In this particular case, with respect to the Center for Army Lessons Learned, I simply do not agree with the observation, sir.

Senator CLELAND. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Cleland.

Senator Roberts.

Senator ROBERTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, thank you for a very comprehensive statement in regards to our mission in Afghanistan. I hope all of our colleagues read your full statement. There have been some sour notes in what has been a chorus of support up to this point as to the conduct of the war.

I listed from your statement seven positive accomplishments, ranging from the 70 nation cooperation, which is certainly unique and unprecedented, to intel and transformation lessons learned. I want to also thank General Franks and would likely draw the attention my colleagues in the Senate to page 11 of your statement,

where you listed four suggestions imperative, I think, to our military success in regards to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, new threats, transformation, and what we need to do. You listed four and I thank you for that.

Now, let me say that Senator Inhofe gave me a segue. It is not atypical of Senators to jump from one pasture to another, so I am going to jump from one country away.

Winston Churchill in his comment on dictators, and I think it applies to Saddam Hussein: "Dictators ride to and fro on tigers; they dare not dismount, and the tigers are getting hungry." I have met with some Iraqi dissidents and I could feel the hunger of the tiger in their desire to take their country back from that tyrant.

We have had a lot of discussion in the press recently on the potential war against Iraq. Should we have that kind of a conflict in the immediate future, in the spring, or wherever—and I know that decision has not been made—that would cause some concern in regards to the mission that we would not be able to complete?

Churchill also said, "It is better to jaw-jaw than to war-war." So this question would be for the Secretary: Do you see any opportunity to safeguard the Middle East and the civilized world in reference to Saddam Hussein by jaw-jaw containment rather than war-war?

Secretary RUMSFELD. I guess that is a question really that is best posed to the President, the Secretary of State, and Congress. But there is no question that the problems in that part of the world need to be addressed and have been addressed from a diplomatic and economic standpoint. We must address the sanctions that the U.N. has had in place, the enormous number of countries that have worked on the other problems in the Middle East apart from the specific one that you mentioned, and the worldwide efforts against proliferation.

But over time, the economic sanctions weaken and the diplomatic effort seems to get a little tired. The progress that he has been able to make in providing support to the terrorist states all across the globe is serious. I guess there is room for all types of efforts—political, economic, diplomatic, and military.

Senator ROBERTS. Should the decision be made to take military action, do you feel you have the authority to "go to war" against Iraq based on terrorism connections or the U.N. resolution or Public Law 102-1, the Gulf War, without any further approval of Congress?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Those are issues for the President and I would not have a comment on them.

Senator ROBERTS. In fact, on lessons learned, the U.S. military is conducting a significant experiment exercise called Millennium Challenge 2002. Do you see any opportunity to bring forward some of the capability demonstrated in that exercise and that challenge to put it to use in either Afghanistan or a possible military conflict in regards to Iraq?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Senator, I would not want to talk about a possibility of a conflict in Iraq. This is an Afghan hearing. But with respect to Millennium Challenge that the Joint Forces Command is conducting, I was down there earlier this week. There is no question that the exercises and experiments that they are undertaking

are valuable, interesting, and will have applicability to all things that we do in any area of responsibility across the globe. I am very encouraged by what they are doing.

Senator ROBERTS. General Franks, there is a recent article that stated friendly fire still plagues the U.S. military. We talked about that before. Would you comment on this continuing problem and also the interoperability of our own equipment?

General FRANKS. Senator, I think by and large that the interoperability of our equipment has been good. I think that the lessons that we have learned in Afghanistan will cause us to think hard about how we distribute pieces of equipment. In an unconventional sort of conflict, we wind up using people to do things that may be their third or fourth or fifth priority function in terms of the way they are equipped. So I think we will take that kind of lesson to heart.

In terms of friendly fire, I will say that any time there is a friendly fire incident, whether it has to do with one of our military youngsters or whether it has to do with a civilian, it is not only a sad thing, it is something that we want to avoid, something that we want to find either technological solutions, training solutions or tactics, technique, or procedure sorts of modifications, that enable us to not have repeat performances.

This committee knows—and sir, you certainly know—that we have never had the perfect circumstance for a war. We find Afghanistan no different. We have had loss of life because of friendly fire incidents in Afghanistan and I regret that. I will say that I do have great confidence in not only the young people, that being the sergeants and the young captains and so forth on the ground doing the work, I also have confidence in their leadership.

I have confidence in the flag officers, the generals, and the colonels who look at every report of these sorts of incidents and try to figure out how can we avoid a repeat. Sir, that is the best answer I can give you.

Senator ROBERTS. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. I just want to add one thing.

Mr. Secretary, in regard to Scott Speicher, the Navy pilot we left behind in the Gulf War, I wrote in February of this year requesting that Scott's status be changed from missing in action. First he was killed in action and then we or the Department had him changed to missing in action upon a request. My request now is to prisoner of war status. I want to thank Assistant Secretary Wolfowitz for the continuing dialogue in that regard. But we have not had an answer and we just need some assurance that the decision on the status will be made soon. Of course, if it is a decision we do not want, do not send it up. But we hope the decision will be reached and I wanted to mention that to you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Thank you, Senator.

Senator LIEBERMAN [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Roberts.

Senator Reed.

Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Rumsfeld and General Franks, let me commend you for your leadership and your determination over these many months. Also, I think it is fitting that you asked Colonel Mulholland to join

you. He is here today representing many younger special operators. I think he would be the first to admit they carried the ball for us. They did a magnificent job. Thank you, Colonel and General.

Let me follow up a bit the line of questioning that Senator Cleland opened up. First an informational question: Did the 101st have 105s in country ready to operate in Anaconda?

General FRANKS. No, sir, they did not have 105s. At that time, we had no cannon artillery in Afghanistan.

Senator REED. So with the availability of 105s, the decision to employ or use or have them available was made many weeks or days before Operation Anaconda, correct? They simply did not have the pieces in country, is that correct?

General FRANKS. Sir, they did not have the pieces in country. When our land component commander decided to bring the 101st brigade over, he performed the analysis of the terrain where that brigade was going to be used and determined that it was not necessary to bring the cannons with them.

Senator REED. Now, the absence of field artillery places much more emphasis and importance on close air support. In your observations at Tora Bora, Anaconda, and throughout the course of the operations, do you think there has to be additional work to harmonize the doctrine of the Air Force, the Navy, and the Army with respect to close air support? Is there a common doctrine? Is there misunderstanding? Does this operation represent not just the absence of field artillery, but genuine misunderstandings about what close air support means and what it will provide?

General FRANKS. Senator, that is a fair question. I do not think so. I believe that we would never say in the middle of a battle or of a war, "Gosh, everything is just right and there is no lesson to be learned." We have learned training lessons about this. We have learned how to better advantage training opportunities, where for example we will have both the Naval and Air Force aviation employed at the same time. We have learned things about how we can better harmonize our technology to be sure that we do not have one form of airplane used by one Service that is not able to acquire and attack based on laser work that works with another sort of airframe.

So, of course, we have learned these kinds of lessons. But, Senator, doctrinally, I believe that it is recognized that United States Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps aircraft provide close air support. So, we have learned the lessons. My view is that the lessons we have learned have not been catastrophic, but the application of those lessons will make us better in the future.

Senator REED. Thank you, General.

Mr. Secretary, you indicated in your remarks that we have American personnel in the headquarters of every warlord, or something to that effect.

Secretary RUMSFELD. A lot of them.

Senator REED. What happens if these warlords are responsive to us but not responsive to Karzai or vice versa? Do you have any advice?

Secretary RUMSFELD. It is a complicated problem and it is one I will discuss at greater length in the closed session. But the short

answer is that the Afghan regional leaders have armies, they are in charge of them, and they pay those people.

Our Special Forces are embedded in most of those units. They are young folks and they do a great job in guiding and offering advice, but they are in charge of those armies. When there is any kind of a difficulty where two regional leaders seem to be having a dust-up, then we have tough choices to make, not just in terms of participating in their dust-up, because that is between them, but in seeing if it can be stopped and, if it cannot be stopped, how our folks avoid getting in the middle of it.

Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Secretary, we are trying to create a national army, which I presume means at some point these warlord armies are disbanded. Would you comment upon that process of building a national army and the future demobilizing of these private armies?

Secretary RUMSFELD. There again is an issue that is going to play out over a period of time. It is unlikely that the regional leaders are going to disband their armies if there is not something that is providing security in those regions, or not something that they feel they have a voice in. It is going to be a difficult task for the central government's leadership to fashion a set of relationships—political relationships, financial relationships, military relationships—over a period of time. As the Afghan army and the central government's border patrol and police forces evolve and develop to the extent that the interaction between the center and the regions evolves properly, one might hope that that would happen. But it is not written how long it will take or whether it will be even symmetrical in how it plays out.

Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Thank you, General.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Reed.

Senator Bunning.

Senator BUNNING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you both for coming. I appreciate it. I have been greatly disturbed by press reports of potential operational plans in Iraq. I strongly urge you, Mr. Secretary, in conjunction with the FBI, to do your best to find those who are leaking classified material to the press and send them to jail for a long time. I think it is vital to our national security. There is none of us up here that know anything about the plans, so it is coming from within. I suggest that you make a very strong effort to find out where it is coming from and treat it thusly.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Senator, I am doing everything that is legally proper to do.

Senator BUNNING. Well, do whatever it takes.

Secretary Rumsfeld, there have been reports of al Qaeda members active in the disputed region of Kashmir. Have you made any progress in rooting those terrorists out? Has Pakistan been cooperating with your efforts?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Senator, the reports about al Qaeda in Kashmir are ambiguous.

Senator BUNNING. Ambiguous, not true?

Secretary RUMSFELD. They are ambiguous. That is to say, there is not real clarity as to whether they are there or not. If so, how

many or where? First of all, the phrase "al Qaeda" is a definitional issue to some extent. The scraps of information that we get are suggestive but not conclusive.

Second, I personally believe that the answer to the second part of your question is that the Pakistani government, if they believed and knew there were al Qaeda in Kashmir, would go do something about it. They have told me that and I believe them.

Senator BUNNING. My follow-up question was that if President Musharraf's government did know would they pursue. They would?

Secretary RUMSFELD. I believe so. Do you not, General?

General FRANKS. Senator Bunning, I would add that I do agree with what the Secretary said. I agree with it because, just as Secretary Rumsfeld has spent considerable time with President Musharraf, I have spent time with him. What he has proven over time by having already given us—and I am not sure, sir, what the number is, but literally hundreds of prisoners from a great many nations—leads me to believe that, yes, he would do that.

Senator BUNNING. I am going to follow up on Senator Reed for a second, because I have a letter from General Myers telling me that part of the reason artillery was not taken into Afghanistan was "the ability of U.S. air assets to deliver precision munitions at any time." We both know that air power, while it can be very awesome and do wonderful things, it cannot do everything. It cannot deliver munitions at any time for the simple reason that it is subject to on-station time, the number of aircraft available, weather, anti-aircraft threats, and sometimes even altitude. Do you agree that air power cannot be all things to all people? Why do you think General Myers said this to me?

General FRANKS. Sir, I do not know. I know him very well and I think that he very well recognizes that the mortar, for example, as I talked about it a minute ago—

Senator BUNNING. I was told that by others before.

General FRANKS.—is a very capable all-weather, day and night system. I will say on behalf of air power—I am an air power advocate and I am a believer in air power—I think it needs to be coupled with a capability on the ground that gives you an all-weather capability.

I cannot talk specifically to what Dick meant when he sent you the note. But I do know that he very much believes in the use of systems like the mortar and so forth to give that 24-hour all-weather capability.

Senator BUNNING. Well, my concern obviously was for the safety of those doing the operation, and I know your concern as the commander over there would be just the same. But depending on air power and its reliability when, in fact, it could possibly not be there when you need it seems to me to be questionable at best and risky.

General FRANKS. Sir, for sure, but thanks to this committee, we have equipped those Army forces with a magnificent mortar in the 120-millimeter mortar. It is a very capable system. I am an artilleryman by upbringing and so I am not anti-artillery. But I recognize things. For example, you can put four 120-millimeter mortars and the ammunition that you want for a given fight in one helicopter, a CH-47, whereas if you do that with these lightweight howitzers it is one howitzer per helicopter.

So it is hard for me to make a comparison that one would like to be drawn to that says there is something terribly wrong with not having had cannons.

Senator BUNNING. The biggest problem, General, is that sometimes the helicopter cannot fly at certain altitudes and, therefore, you cannot use it.

General FRANKS. Sir, that is absolutely correct without a doubt. We inserted the people for these operations based on a pretty thorough plan using helicopters. On the same type helicopters that we used to insert the people, we also inserted the equipment at those altitudes.

Senator BUNNING. My time has expired. I want to thank you both for being here.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Bunning.

Senator Carnahan.

Senator CARNAHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would also like to thank our witnesses today for their outstanding service to our country during these troubling times.

General FRANKS, I understand that the Iranians were at first very cooperative in our operation within Afghanistan and now we are hearing reports of their efforts to undercut on the ongoing U.S. mission there. Could you discuss the nature of our relationship with the Iranian forces that are deployed in Afghanistan?

General FRANKS. Senator, the Secretary will give a much better answer than I, but let me give an operational level sort of an answer. As we have worked Afghanistan, we have found two large problems. One is this inclination for tribals and ethnic backgrounds within the country to contest one another. The other has been the interests of nations around Afghanistan in terms of wanting to influence what is going on on the inside of Afghanistan.

My appreciation with respect to several countries—Iran is one of them—is that they have not been entirely helpful in everything that we have tried to do in Afghanistan. I would turn to the Secretary.

Senator CARNAHAN. Have the Iranian contacts with the warlords in any way compromised the Central Command's relationship with friendly Afghan forces?

General FRANKS. Ma'am, it is hard to know. For example, one regional leader in the west, obviously being very close to Iran, has a great deal of traffic back and forth between Iran and Afghanistan and has had relationships with the Iranians for a long time. The specifics of whether or not that has complicated our efforts to stabilize and to kill and capture the Taliban and al Qaeda in that part of the country, that has not been an effect, a direct operational effect, that I have seen.

Senator CARNAHAN. Mr. Secretary, with the assistance of the Russians, Iran has made substantial progress toward constructing a nuclear reactor and reports indicate that it could be completed as early as 18 months from now. I know the administration shares my concerns certainly as to what the impact of this reactor might have on regional security as well as national security, and I was wondering if you would comment as to your views about the threat that this reactor poses and how the administration plans to handle this issue.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Senator, I think that your concern and the administration's concern is very well placed. Iran is probably unquestionably burning off, wasting, more natural gas and the energy that it would provide than the entire nuclear system that they are building would provide them. They are not short of gas or oil. They do not need the nuclear facility for anything that is legitimate by way of energy in their country. It is a concern to us that the Russians have been and are continuing to provide that assistance.

With respect to your first question, the United States and most coalition countries are trying to do things that will strengthen the central government of Afghanistan. Therefore, our work is to help build a national army and to see that the assistance that comes in from abroad is funneled through that government so that they have some leverage and begin to work with the regional leaders in a way that is advantageous to the population as a whole.

To the extent that Iran deals separately with regional forces, obviously, it is unhelpful to the central government. To the extent that al Qaeda remnants are able to move back and forth across the Iranian borders and find safe haven in Iran, it is notably unhelpful to the global war on terrorism.

You are quite right, there was speculation about the degree of their assistance early on. But I think if one wanted to net it out, it would be hard to say that they have been a constructive force with respect to the global war on terrorism. They are sending assistance, weapons, money, and people into Damascus and Lebanon, for fostering and fomenting terrorist acts. They are far from clean.

Senator CARNAHAN. General Franks, the U.S. Transportation Commander, General John Handy, was quoted in the paper the other day describing projected shortfalls in aircraft capability as the war on terrorism continues to tax our fleet of C-17s, C-130s, C-141s, and C-5s. Would you describe what you think is the importance of our airlift and how it has played in rapidly deploying our combat forces there? Also, could you comment on the DOD's airlift needs?

General FRANKS. I included in my written statement what I think would be taken as an agreement with General John Handy with respect to strategic lift. If you look at Afghanistan, you are talking about a landlocked country. So whatever we are moving in and out of Afghanistan, at least for the first several months until we were able to start using land lines of communication, we did by air.

Transportation Command has done an incredible job with the assets available to them. I think John Handy's view is that the number of airframes needs to be increased. I agree with that view. In terms of the way it is prioritized, I cannot talk to how many that means in a given year. But I think we all recognize that for our work in the future strategic lift is going to be absolutely critical to us.

Senator CARNAHAN. Thank you. My time has expired.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Carnahan.

Senator SESSIONS.

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary and General Franks, thank you for your service, your very fine service. This is a great and free country. It is appro-

priate that the leaders of our war effort come before the committee and answer tough questions, complaints, and second-guessing, and from that we learn.

My observation is that our military is taking extraordinary steps to learn. It is creative and innovative, perhaps more than any military in history. It is transforming itself in remarkable ways, and for that I salute you. I have no doubt that the next conflict will be better than this one, but it was a tremendous improvement over the last one and it continues to improve. I think all of us have to recognize that and salute you for it.

We had complaints before this war began, fears expressed that I was just thinking about recently: oh, we are not going to be able to win this war; the Russians had failed; we were going to fail; we cannot succeed in this far-off place; we cannot get enough friendly nations to help us move our material and personnel in; if we attack, it will really make the terrorists mad and they will really bomb us even more than they are today; that the Arab street would go up in arms; that the Afghan people were not going to like American troops coming there, would not accept our effort, and would not be friendly to us; and that Arab nations would all in a unanimous effort oppose what we have done.

So facing a lot of difficulties and a lot of challenges, you have negotiated those with great skill, I believe, diplomatically, militarily, politically. We have made more progress than we have a right to expect at this time. I just want to say on behalf of myself, along with others in this country who agree with me, that we have done very well. We thank you for it, and we have achieved tremendous military success.

This Taliban government, that we had the capability of defeating, has been defeated. It no longer exists. Yes, we have not captured bin Laden, but I do not think anybody could make it a policy of the United States to guarantee we could capture one person anywhere in the world. If you give me a head start in Alabama, you will have a hard time finding me, I will just tell you.

So I am not disappointed. I would be disappointed if he were still orchestrating and pulling the strings behind his terrorist network. I think we have to be pleased with what has happened in Pakistan. They have taken a stand on the right side. The Philippines have made tremendous progress against terrorism, killing the leader of that group and making real progress there. We have gotten greater help from the Europeans from intelligence. Other Arab nations have helped us with intelligence and insight into this terrorist network. I believe we have done a lot of good.

Mr. Secretary, I know you have been criticized for not moving far enough in nation-building, as some would like to call it. My understanding is first of all we have about 5,000 troops in Afghanistan. Is that correct?

Secretary RUMSFELD. A little more.

Senator SESSIONS. A little more. We have 7,000 in Kosovo with no prospect of getting a lot more of those home very rapidly. I think you have been exactly correct to do everything within reason to not allow our presence to expand unnecessarily and to allow ourselves to be committed unnecessarily to our military forces to do things we cannot achieve.

Are you satisfied where you are in that effort in terms of striking the right balance between helping rebuild this country without turning our military into a police force in every village, hamlet, and farm in Afghanistan?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Senator Sessions, first thank you very much. You are right. You have posed the tension that exists as to how to manage a difficult and delicate situation.

In thinking about some of the earlier questions as to how we got to where we are, it seems to me there were several things that took place. First, was that the nature of the Taliban was so repressive and egregious that the people of Afghanistan felt liberated.

Second, a lot of Afghan people did not like the foreigners, the al Qaeda, coming in there and taking over major portions of their country.

Third, you are right; the decision to have a relatively limited footprint, unlike the Soviets and other countries might have, and avoid being seen as a foreign occupying country, particularly in a place like Afghanistan, was terribly important.

Next, we made a determined effort to avoid collateral damage. For a country that has been bombed like it was during the civil wars and Soviet occupation, and all the people that were killed, and all the carnage, and the damage to vineyards, buildings, institutions, and religious idols, the fact that we have been so careful was respected.

General Franks from the very first day started humanitarian assistance, and it seems to me that has helped as well.

The one area where we are really uneven is in countering lies and disinformation by the Taliban, the al Qaeda, and the forces that oppose us. We have not done a brilliant job there. Their training manuals organize them to do it. They are skillful at it. They are on the ground and were able to constantly try to make it look like it was an anti-Afghan effort, or an anti-Islam effort, or a foreign occupying effort.

We were constantly trying to correct that. Every time they would do it, they would have free run of the media for a period of time before we could get ourselves organized to try to counter it.

But your question is right on the mark. That was the tension all along, how to do that. I appreciate your comment.

Senator SESSIONS. Well, thank you for that.

General Franks, just a brief question with regard to airlift and precision-guided munitions. You made reference to that in your statement. This budget has increased funding substantially for both of those. It is something that is very critical, as well as to unmanned aerial vehicles. Are we where we need to be? I frankly think that we could find more if you have to have it. Where are we in terms of your satisfaction level with the increase in airlift, unmanned vehicles, and precision-guided munitions?

General FRANKS. Sir, thank you for the question. There has never been a combatant commander without an appetite. I am one with an appetite for the sorts of systems you talk about. I think that what we see with precision-guided munitions right now instructs us a lot for the future of warfare. I think what we have seen with unmanned aerial systems and the way we have seen

them used in Afghanistan, while imperfect to be sure, has taught us about what we want to do.

I think we have seen that the requirement to move a number of people and tons a long ways by air taught us something about our strategic mobility. So my appetite for those systems as a combatant is insatiable. But I am also pragmatic enough to recognize that there will be only so much resource and that some prioritization will have to be done there. So if I just keep my humble position, then more is better. But I recognize that a sense of prioritization will have to be done within the various military Services and within the secretariat.

Senator SESSIONS. On those three things, I think they should be prioritized and we should not skimp on those.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Sessions.

Senator Dayton.

Senator DAYTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary and General, I want to join with others in saluting both of you for your extraordinary efforts and your successes in the last 2½ months. You accomplished more in about a 10-week period late last year than the old Soviet Union accomplished in 10 years in Afghanistan. You routed an enemy which believed itself to be entrenched and equipped to prevail against you, and you initiated a military engagement in about 6 weeks versus, as I recall, in Operation Desert Storm which took about 6 months a decade before.

From all accounts and those who have more expertise in this realm than I, your prosecution of the war was if not transformational, at least it involved a lot of breakthrough innovation. I assume this will be studied for many years to come, especially the combination of precision targeting and the delivery of overwhelming force to maximize lethality against the enemy and minimization of the casualties to our own forces, our allies, and even the civilians in these enemy-occupied territories. This is really exceptional and again enormous to your credit.

It seems to me that one lesson of all of this, going back to the beginning on September 11, is that even with this overwhelming superiority militarily, we as a country do not enjoy invincibility. We can retaliate, we have proven with devastating punishment against an enemy attack, but the damage and the death and the destruction that attack can cause against us causing an unprecedented menu of options that our enemies have available. These blows raise some obvious questions like: can we afford to wait to retaliate in future situations?

I believe it is that question which caused the President to raise at West Point the possibility of preemption. I guess in my view, its appeal is matched only by its peril. If it is employed, it seems to me it is going to have profound implications for our country and for other countries around the world, friends and foes alike, and for the future of military conflict in this world.

So I would ask each of you in turn, Mr. Secretary and General, how do you apply the experiences of the al Qaeda attack on this country and the subsequent Afghan war to the groups and governments which pose these prospective threats to us today?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Senator, your question is central. It is one that not just Congress or the United States, but the world, is con-

sidering. It is elevated because of several things. Most importantly, it is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The 21st century is a period where our margin for error is modest, where we put at risk not by weapons of mass destruction hundreds, or thousands, but hundreds of thousands, or potentially millions of people.

If one looks at what happened, Afghanistan did not attack the United States. Afghanistan behaved in a way that harbored the al Qaeda, who did attack the United States. As tragic as it was, it was not with weapons of mass destruction that time. The United States made a conscious decision to engage in what people call preemption, preventative action, or anticipatory self-defense. I think of it as self-defense. We went after Afghanistan, which had not attacked us, but we went there to eliminate the Taliban as a governing body. We also eliminated the ability of the al Qaeda to use that country as a base for their terrorist network.

We did it because we knew we could not simply sit here and allow them to continue to train thousands of additional terrorists who will without question get their hands on weapons of mass destruction in the period ahead. It is written. It is not "if," it is "when." There is just too much of it around the world, too many terrorist states that are engaged in weapons programs, involved with chemical weapons, biological weapons, and aggressively pursuing nuclear weapons.

Therefore, what you have raised is exactly what this country and the world has to consider, because we are in a 21st century security environment and it is notably different than the 20th century.

Senator DAYTON. General?

General FRANKS. Senator, the only answer I can give is just the notion that says to take the fight to the enemy. The operational concept is maintain initiative by taking the fight to the enemy.

Senator DAYTON. Mr. Secretary, given with what you said, that we are likely to live the rest of our lives in the foreseeable future in a world where, given the proliferation of both the technology as well as the scientific and technological know-how to put that into effect, there will be groups or governments who do or may have these capabilities who are inimical to our interests, who may perceive us as enemies, what are the triggers? What are the tripwires that we use? Do we go in preemptively every time we have identified such? How do we frame that debate and deliberation?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Senator, it seems to me that is something that this body and other nations and academic institutions need to consider. What one has to do is to balance the advantages, as General Franks suggested, of anticipatory self-defense or preventative action, against the disadvantages of not doing it. One has to weigh those. There are a number of factors that have to come into play.

Obviously, there are countries like the United Kingdom that have weapons of mass destruction. Democracies do not tend to attack other people. They do not tend to go after their neighbors. They do not tend to sponsor terrorist states. So if one wants to look at one differentiation and a way to do a quick triage, democracies that have weapons of mass destruction tend not to be threats.

There are other countries that, depending on their degree of intimacy with terrorist networks, obviously elevate themselves as problems. My guess is that our society and the world will end up

reading and listening to what the dictators and the repressive regimes around the world say about what they think those weapons ought to be used for, what they think of their neighbors, and how they condemn the alleged illegitimacy of their neighbors, and the things that they tell to their people.

We have a wonderful way of turning a blind eye to what these people are saying. If we sat down and looked at what they are doing to their own people—starvation, repression, butchery, use of chemicals—and if you look at the aggressiveness of their programs, which is another measuring item, how close are they to having these weapons and how close are they to using those weapons? You would have to agree that these are tough calls.

But if you look at what they are doing to their people and then look at what they are saying they want to do to other nations in the world, pretty soon people have to nod and say, “Well, they are nominating themselves, they are not being nominated.”

Senator DAYTON. My time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Dayton.

Senator Allard.

Senator ALLARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, I would like to start off, Mr. Secretary, by saying you are doing a great job. I can recall during your confirmation process there were a few naysayers out there, but I think you have proven them wrong, and your leadership of our Armed Forces during some very timely, some very trying times, is very much appreciated, and particularly by myself. I just wanted to express that to you in a public manner today.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Thank you very much.

Senator ALLARD. I think that your efforts to take a serious look at our legacy systems is appropriate. I continue to hear people expound upon wanting to stay with some of the older legacy systems. I have always felt that we need to work to modernize our forces. That is going to be the strength of our country and I think that your efforts in trying to modernize those forces is going to make a difference 10 or 20 years from now.

I just have heard the comment from some individuals that maybe we should have had more people on the ground; if we had had more people on the ground, maybe Osama bin Laden would not have escaped. But I do think that fewer people on the ground and higher technology saved American lives. If I were to make a tradeoff there, I will take the American life any day. So that is where I am coming from and I just wanted to say those things to you, Mr. Secretary.

My question is to you, General Franks. You have been there. You have talked with people on the ground. I would like to have your honest assessment of how our space-based assets have helped during Operation Enduring Freedom. I would also like to have you discuss where we may need improvements in the future as far as our space-based assets are concerned.

General FRANKS. Senator, I will tell you that the pieces of this operation, which have been successful, would not have been so without space-based assets. It is simply a fact. I will give you only one example, but I could give you many. We could talk about command and control of unmanned aerial systems. We can talk about

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability. We could discuss this, sir, in closed session. But I will use a different example.

I will use the example of what we have referred to as offset command and control for many years in our Armed Forces. But until this particular effort in Afghanistan, we actually have never seen it. What I mean is the business of having combatant command and control located in Tampa, Florida, with a war fight or in control of a war fight that is going on in Afghanistan.

Is that a perfect circumstance? Of course not. The one thing that this committee recognizes is the ability to reach out and touch people and explain to them. That care is a part of the military work and so we miss that. On the other hand, space-basing has given us the ability through huge pipes to be more situationally aware thousands of miles away from this battlefield, I would posit, than we have ever been before when we were on the battlefield.

Senator ALLARD. Could you comment about the role of commercial space-based products and do you see an increase of their role in the future?

General FRANKS. Senator, I would have to give you something for the record, to be very honest with you. I see a great many space-based products from the commercial sector, but I do not have an informed or mature view of it.

Senator ALLARD. I understand that we had to rely on commercial space imaging, for example, to help us some during this process. When you respond in your written response, I would appreciate it if you would make some comments in that direction.

General FRANKS. I will do that, sir.

[The information referred to follows:]

Space-based commercial imagery products have played and will continue to play an increasingly important role in intelligence monitoring and operational planning.

The National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), in concert with government contractors, has developed collection and production processes to incorporate commercial imagery into our intelligence-gathering efforts. NIMA's Central Imagery Tasking Office validates CENTCOM's commercial imagery requirements, works with vendors to accomplish collection, purchases appropriate licenses, and makes the imagery available to U.S. Government organizations via NIMA's web-based Commercial Satellite Imagery Library.

At CENTCOM, geospatial information analysts use the imagery data to create a variety of geospatial products (such as image maps, map revisions, precise geo-location graphics, and situational awareness tools) at the unclassified level. The data can also be incorporated with classified products. However, the availability of unclassified commercial imagery products is extremely useful for collaboration with coalition partners and non-governmental organizations, because classified national imagery products are generally not releasable to them.

National intelligence agencies, Service intelligence centers, CENTCOM, and our Service topographic units routinely use commercial multi-spectral imagery to evaluate the battlefield. Examples include: the identification of drop zones, landing zones, areas of limitation, and trafficability of hostile forces. As commercial hyper-spectral imaging capabilities become more robust, we will be able to accomplish these tasks with more accuracy. Hyperspectral imagery also holds great potential for the development of enemy activity signatures, perhaps most significantly the identification of chemical and biological weapons activity.

Another important role for commercial imagery products lies in the arena of public affairs. When we release statements concerning enemy activity supported by evidence from commercial imagery sources, any charges of DOD manipulation of the imagery are thwarted because the same imagery is available to the public.

Since the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom, commercial imagery has been used to update 1:50,000- and 1:100,000-scale topographic maps, which are essential combat planning tools for forces on the ground in Afghanistan. I have incor-

porated commercial imagery into many of our operational planning tools, and used it routinely in briefings to coalition partners. Commercial imagery products have been especially useful in debriefings of detainees.

Although commercial imagery has great utility in support of military operations, it cannot be used as a substitute for existing and future national imagery sources. National systems will remain vital to our intelligence efforts, especially in the CENTCOM area of responsibility.

Senator ALLARD. I appreciate that very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Allard.

Senator Landrieu.

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I know the time is getting late, but I appreciate, Mr. Secretary, seeing you and having you here. General Franks, thank you for your extraordinary service.

I have a statement I would like to submit, Mr. Chairman, for the record. I ask unanimous consent.

[The prepared statement of Senator Landrieu follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR MARY L. LANDRIEU

Thank you Mr. Chairman:

I would like to thank you for calling this hearing. I would also like to take this opportunity to welcome and thank Secretary Rumsfeld and General Franks for the outstanding commitment they and every uniformed man and woman, here and across the globe, continue to bring to the war on terrorism.

The prosecution of this war, under your watchful eyes, has now moved into an even more difficult phase. Our mettle and resolve as a united nation is now under its most stringent test—will we be able to continue winning the war on terrorism without the “popularity vote” of the evening news? Will our troops still be in the forefront of the minds and hearts of Americans? I say the answer to that is “YES.”

Mr. Secretary and General Franks, now more than ever before, as the American public and the world settle in to the idea that we will be fighting this war for months, even years, you must continue to provide the leadership and the guidance by which our defense priorities are set for our two most important goals: Eradicating terrorism—not unilaterally, but with the support and participation of our allies and friends—and, fostering the growth and stability of freedom and democracy for citizens in those countries who have been gripped with terror for so many years.

As we move into planning for the next phase of this war, it is clear we must be thoughtful, systematic, determined, and have “right” on our side. Only then can we feel justified in taking the necessary steps to eradicate terrorists. We look forward to the day when terrorist groups are few or none, and do not receive support from any governmental body, in any country. There will soon be nowhere for terrorists to hide and no training grounds for their particular kind of evil.

The war in Afghanistan is proving to be a catalyst for change in our military. We are successfully transitioning from our legacy force and concentration on multiple major theater wars to a lighter, leaner force, which is able to take on any asymmetry of war which may arise. Most importantly—and I cannot emphasize this enough—we need to be able to successfully stabilize previously destabilized regions and begin the long process of helping to rebuild these nations through careful planning, persistence, and innovation. This is the only means we have to ensure our long term success in keeping terrorists from regaining control over the societies we have set free. The women and children in these countries must have the freedom to study, to walk along the streets, to receive healthcare, to play, to worship—and all without fear of being killed for the simplest of life’s liberties.

This committee relies on your visits to us and our visits to these regions to provide the firsthand updates we must have to ensure all the needed resources are available to our troops. We take this responsibility to heart each and every day and our thoughts and prayers continue to be with our men and women in uniform and with their families.

They have our respect, our admiration, our support, and that of the American public to continue winning this war by defeating those who would take away our freedoms, our very way of life, and who would leave a legacy of conflict, fear, and oppression for our children.

Once again, I thank you both for your dedication, guidance, and leadership of our troops now, and through the duration of the war on terrorism.

Senator LANDRIEU. Let me emphasize, though, one part of the statement and it will lead into the two questions that I have for you gentlemen.

One part of the statement says—and Senator Lieberman really honed in on this in terms of his line of questioning and comments—that there is no question that we have been extraordinarily successful in our military operations. There is not a critic that I know of in the world in terms of that. We might have made a small mistake here or there, but, overall, it has been an extraordinarily successful operation because of our superior technology, our organizational skills, and our just overall capacity.

But I think the challenge that lays before us is after winning the war how to establish and stand up the peace so that we are not continuing to fight the same wars, so that we are not accomplishing great things on one battlefield only to lay the seeds of, unfortunately, another battlefield in the future.

So my statement says something about the challenge before us to be able to successfully stabilize previously unstable regions and to begin the long process of rebuilding these nations through careful planning, persistence, and innovation. There does seem to be some disagreement about what we call it, but I am not sure there is any real disagreement about the need for and the necessity to finish a job we have started. Finishing has to do with eliminating the operations of a terrorist organization and eliminating its possible rebirth. That is a greater challenge and it is harder to put our hands around.

Given that, how are we explaining our plan to President Karzai, who has asked for additional help and support outside of the region that we have defined? How do we explain to our partners and allies, who have asked for support outside, what we have determined we should do? What do we say to them after the agreements that have been signed about helping to stand up the peace? What is our explanation to why we quasi-considered, but not accepted, their invitation to expand our operations to prevent another war or prevent the seeds of discontent from sprouting up again? Mr. Secretary?

Secretary RUMSFELD. It is a question, Senator, that is critical. Our country and the world needs to help find an answer to it. Afghanistan is a country in which the institutions of government have been destroyed for a couple of decades. It is without a lot of the normal things that one would have like: an army, border patrol, police, courts, and all of those ministries that need to do things.

For it to be able to assume responsibility for its own security so that people return, economic activity can go forward, and humanitarian assistance can be provided, it will require a period of time. What we have said is that we want to do everything humanly possible to help the central government, and we are trying to see that every type of assistance comes through that government so that it becomes stronger.

We are helping to train the Afghan army. We are helping to ask the world for money to come in and help provide border patrols and

help provide police training. We are the ones who helped encourage the countries to volunteer for the International Security Assistance Force, recruited Turkey to become the successor leader, and now trying to recruit other countries to succeed Turkey in December.

When we deal with President Karzai, he knows that. He understands that. When we talk about priorities as to what we ought to be doing, and he agrees with us that our first job is to stop the al Qaeda and the Taliban from retaking the country.

Senator LANDRIEU. But in all fairness, Mr. Secretary—and I agree that we have done an extraordinary amount of work and that we most certainly cannot do it all—the long-term success would be rebuilding that country and helping them. But is it not true that he has asked us for this assistance and to go outside of Kabul and to stand up the multinational force with some more assets of our own?

Secretary RUMSFELD. There is no question that President Karzai would like that. There is no question that we would like that. The question is, what ought we to do with what resources we have and how can we be most helpful? I think if President Karzai were here, he would agree with us that what we are doing in supporting the ISAF, in training the Afghan National Army, in going after the al Qaeda and Taliban, and by having our Armed Forces with most of the regional political leaders' and warlords' units to provide security around the country is a higher priority than having additional ISAF, notwithstanding the fact we would like to see that happen.

Senator LANDRIEU. I appreciate that. I just think that in this whole debate, which is complementary or fits the debate about Iraq and what we need to do in Iraq, I agree with you the threat is real. This country has no good intentions. It is of great interest and should be to every American about what is going on in Iraq and what our measures are to deal with it.

But I am going to have difficulty trying to explain to at least my constituents in Louisiana why we would be looking like we are somewhat hesitant in Afghanistan when the job seems more doable than what we are facing or potentially facing in Iraq. It is not a clear message.

So while I am thinking, knowing, and believing the threat is real and being one of the Senators willing to do something, we would have to come across with a little more direct words matching effort to go there.

I am going to submit my last question, which has to do with our commitment to stand up civil affairs, which is a very important component, General Franks, to what you are doing. Again, we are excellent at winning the war. We have the capability for it. I think the Army has the capability. I do not question the capability of our service men or women in any way. It is the political will that I wonder about and if it is there to step up to the civil affairs aspect of this so we can keep our men and women out of harm's way in the future.

I will submit my additional questions, Mr. Chairman, for the record.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Landrieu.

General FRANKS. Senator, I might give just a quick response on civil affairs. The Secretary mentioned earlier the humanitarian as-

sistance since the very first days of this. Also, since the very first days of it, we have been using civil affairs people and, in fact, have had a flag officer inside Afghanistan since, I believe, December as a civil affairs commander. When I mentioned the 300-plus non-governmental organizations and the projects, it is actually those civil affairs units who are affecting the coordination that is bringing all that to pass.

Senator LANDRIEU. But for the record, Mr. Chairman, we have, I think, approximately 4,000 civil affairs and we have 158 in the country. Can you clarify those numbers were the numbers?

General FRANKS. I do not know what the civil affairs numbers in the country are right now. I will supply that for the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

The breakdown of Civil Affairs personnel within the U.S. Military is as follows:

U.S. Army Reserve	3,024
U.S. Army Active	220
U.S. Marine Corps Reserve	275
Total	3,519

Of the above numbers, 155 U.S. Army Reserve and 15 U.S. Army Active Civil Affairs soldiers are currently deployed to Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Mr. Chairman, may I make one comment on this subject?

Chairman LEVIN. Sure.

Secretary RUMSFELD. One of the dilemmas is that to the extent the United States or any country goes in and substitutes its other capabilities for the absence of a capability. One has to know that that is a good thing if it is temporary and if it stabilizes the situation. It is a bad thing if it creates a dependency on the part of that country for those capabilities.

What we saw was a promise to get out of Bosnia by Christmas 1996 and we are still there. What we need to do is find how can we provide the Afghan government with the kind of support that will enable it to develop the strength to provide for its own security and that other countries—ISAF, coalition forces, the U.S. or anyone else—will not have to be there at all.

Trying to do that, there is no road map for it. It is not science; it is art. We are doing it as well as we know how. My impression is that the priorities are right, and my impression is that President Karzai would agree with the priorities. But that is not to say he would not like more help. He would.

You are quite right, we have to get other countries to step up and deliver on their pledges of money and support.

Chairman LEVIN. Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you.

I thank both witnesses for their patience. It has been a long afternoon. I add my voice to the chorus of appreciation for the great job you are doing for the country.

I have been listening carefully to the questions and the answers and, I am reminded of my old, dear friend Morris Udall, who once said everything that can possibly be said on this subject has been said, only not everyone has said it; the issue has been pretty well covered. But I do have several comments.

First of all, Mr. Secretary, since the issue of Iraq and leaking was brought up, I am entertained because you have been around this town a long time. The fact is that I am reminded a bit of Claude Rains' protestations about what was going on in Rick's Casino. The fact is there are competing proposals within the administration and certain people are using or attempting to gain advantage by leaking information.

We have had leaks on everything short of the use of tactical nuclear weapons. When it is resolved within the administration, Mr. Secretary, as to what the strategy will be for the regime change in Iraq, which the President has been steadfast and I strongly support that has to be done, then I think you will find the leaks will stop. But it is a game that was played when you first came here nearly 30 years ago and it will probably be played 30 years from now.

As far as Tora Bora is concerned, we all know we needed more boots on the ground, but we learn lessons. We learn lessons and the following operations have been much more successful.

But the main thing I want to comment on is the situation as regard to Afghanistan. Many of us remember 1989 when the Soviet Union, with our help to the freedom fighters and resisters, was driven out of Afghanistan. We, rightfully perhaps, given the challenges at the time, turned our back. Chaos ensued and the Taliban came to power.

It is very clear the lessons of history. You said, "It is not art, it is science," but we all can learn from history, Mr. Secretary. When we turned our back on Afghanistan, the people preferred a totalitarian government to chaos. Right now outside of Kabul, we are bordering to some degree on chaos. You mentioned yourself that there are warlords who are fighting against one another and we do not know whose side to intervene on.

The fact is we need to expand the peacekeeping force. We cannot expect any other country to do it. Yes, we were supposed to be out of Bosnia by Christmas, but we have a reason to remain in Bosnia. We need to expand our peacekeeping forces or we will repeat the lesson of 1989. The assassination of the vice president clearly indicates that. The need to provide U.S. troops as security forces for the president within his own capital clearly indicates that.

You will be making a serious mistake if you say, "Well, we expect other countries to step up." We are the world's superpower. We have to step up.

Finally, I want to discuss with you just briefly this whole issue of aircraft leasing. I will not go into a diatribe about it except to say that the American people right now are very upset at major corporations cooking the books. You are about to cook the books on this lease arrangement for either 737s, 100 of them, or 4 VIP 767s. I have two questions.

One, where was the four VIP 767 aircraft on your priority list? I cannot find it anywhere. Second of all, would you agree that it is necessary to get authorization from this committee before entering into any lease purchase agreement of any either 737s or 767s?

I thank you for your patience and I thank you for being here to give us your very enlightening answers to many very important questions.

Secretary RUMSFELD. May I make just three quick responses?

Senator MCCAIN. You can do anything, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary RUMSFELD. On the leak issue, I do not doubt for a minute that there are differing views about what one ought to do. I can tell you one thing: the relationship between the senior civilian leadership in the Department, between the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Central Command, General Franks, is working well. The discussions that take place and the process that has been established have been working as well as I have ever seen.

To the extent there are people down at lower levels who do not agree with one level or another—

Senator MCCAIN. Or other branches of the government.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Whatever. You are quite right, I came here in 1957, and it has always been so.

Second, I do not agree that the situation in Afghanistan outside of Kabul is bordering on chaos. I think it is reasonably secure, but it is less secure and worse in the southeastern part of the country. The one location where there is an ISAF, Kabul, the vice president was assassinated. So it is an untidy place, but it is a lot tidier than it used to be.

I agree with you; there simply must be more capability, from wherever, to assist the Karzai government in security, theirs and elsewhere.

Last, on the lease arrangement, you are quite right; some of the specifics that you referred to were not in the President's budget. I do not know the answer technically as to what authority the Department has or does not have with respect to lease arrangements. I know that in the private sector, one always looks at the lease-buy alternative and makes a judgment with it as to what is the most effective.

I am told that the Air Force has the responsibility for reviewing these things and is doing so.

Senator MCCAIN. Could you answer the final question that I asked? Do you believe that before entering into a lease-purchase agreement or leasing agreement that you should get authorization from this committee?

Secretary RUMSFELD. That is what I do not know the answer to. That is a technical question. I would have to go back and check.

Senator MCCAIN. What is technical about it? This is the authorizing committee, Mr. Secretary. You have been around long enough to know whether it should be approved of by this committee or not, or should it be done unilaterally? I do not think it is a technical question. I think it is a very important question about the authority and responsibility of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Secretary RUMSFELD. I guess I answered it as well as I can. I would have to go back to see what is in the authorization language, what is in the appropriation language, and how the conferences came out. I just do not know the answer. You may not think it is technical, but it is.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary RUMSFELD. But if I answer it wrong, then I have to go back and correct the record, and I simply do not know what authority the Air Force currently has with respect to it.

In accordance with section 8159 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2002, the Air Force may enter into a lease for up to 100 commercially configured, general-purpose, Boeing 767 aircraft, 30 days after submitting a report to the congressional defense committees concerning the proposed lease.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. I just would make a quick comment before we close this meeting. A number of us have raised the question about whether or not we should be doing more to assist the Afghan government to assure that there will not be a return to chaos in the rest of the country outside of Kabul. I must say I agree with Senator McCain and others who have raised the point that we must lead in this area.

U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan has said that a limited expansion of the International Security Assistance Force to areas outside of Kabul would make a huge contribution to the consolidation of peace. I would hope that the administration would consider that additional support.

Mr. Secretary, you have said a number of times that the allocation of the forces that we have there represents the top priorities and that you believe that President Karzai would agree if he were here. I think that is correct. The question is whether any additional resources should be offered, particularly if it might result in other countries coming through with pledges and with forces so that we could heed that advice of Secretary General Annan and get some forces, like the International Security Assistance Force, to the areas outside of Kabul. I would hope that this administration would consider that. That is a huge issue and I think we do not want to win this war and then lose the peace in the sense of seeing a return to chaos. I do not think anybody would want that to happen.

Your last comment is that more capability is needed “from wherever,” to use your word, to assist the Karzai government. “Wherever” may need to include some contribution from us if it is going to include contribution from other places. I just hope that that remains a possibility in the thinking of the administration, because the stakes are so huge here.

We will recess now, unless you want to add a comment. We want to thank you again for your presence, for your tremendous energy, for what you have done to really make it possible for us to have the successes we have had in Afghanistan.

We will now resume promptly in closed session in room 222 of the Russell Building. Thank you both.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARY L. LANDRIEU

IRAQ

1. Senator LANDRIEU. Secretary Rumsfeld, at this morning's Foreign Relations Committee hearing on U.S. policy towards Iraq, Anthony Cordesman—who also testified at a hearing of the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee that I chaired earlier this year on Iraq—stated that he believed that the U.S. should not give up on containment of Iraq until “nation-building” is a bipartisan term. What he was highlighting was the fact that after every major military operation, there is almost inevitably some peace operation that follows. If we are not willing to commit more U.S. troops to support multinational peace operations in Afghanistan—measures Chairman Karzai has requested—how can we even think that we would

persuade our allies and Iraqis that we would be serious about ensuring peace and stability in Iraq after we have removed Saddam Hussein?

Secretary RUMSFELD. The President has not made a final decision regarding military options on Iraq. That said, if the U.S. coalition partners move against Iraq, our strategy will have a post-Saddam component, which would seek to establish a broadly-based representative government. Such a government in Iraq would generate confidence that it will be committed to meeting the needs of the Iraqi people. Any presumed U.S. or coalition role in the post-Saddam period must necessarily be conditioned by the fact that we seek no permanent territorial presence there. However, that should not cause anyone to think that we will shrink from urgent post-Saddam responsibilities there. The post-Saddam situation is difficult to predict, but, before departing, the U.S. will work to ensure that the new government renounces weapons of mass destruction, poses no threat to its own people or to its neighbors, and does not engage in any activities that pose a threat to international stability. Our intention is to stay as long as necessary, but not a minute longer.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND

ROLES OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

2. Senator THURMOND. Secretary Rumsfeld, historically, the United States has relied on non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to provide the bulk of humanitarian aid and support for rebuilding the nation's infrastructure. What support are the NGOs providing to Afghanistan and how are their efforts coordinated into the U.S. plans for Afghanistan?

Secretary RUMSFELD. There are currently over 300 NGOs in Afghanistan. U.S. Government Agencies (U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Department of Agriculture, the Department of Defense, and the Center for Disease Control) are working with over 30 of these NGOs to provide services in the areas of food, water, shelter, health, agriculture, education, reconstruction, work programs, and demining. Of the approximately \$513 million the U.S. Government has spent for aid to Afghanistan in fiscal year 2002 approximately \$135 million has been given to NGOs. U.S. civil affairs soldiers in Afghanistan have spent about \$8 million on humanitarian assistance activities, mostly involving schools, hospitals, and water projects. A number of these projects have been developed in direct coordination with NGOs.

COORDINATING COALITION FORCES

3. Senator THURMOND. Secretary Rumsfeld, our experience in Bosnia and Kosova highlighted problems in coordinating the efforts of the coalition forces. The war against terrorism has forged a coalition of more than 60 nations that has complicated the coordination effort. What are the most significant issues in coordinating the efforts of the coalition in its fight against the terrorists and how is the Department addressing these problems?

Secretary RUMSFELD. The United States has benefited greatly from having more than 60 countries involved in the military portion of the war on terrorism. These benefits have been political as well as military in nature. Our coalition partners have provided indispensable assistance ranging from direct military action to logistical and humanitarian support. We would not have been as successful as we have been to date without such a robust coalition. Coalition support and assistance has allowed U.S. forces to concentrate their efforts and reduced the financial costs of the war to the U.S. Government.

Some of the most challenging issues associated with the coalition stem from the fact that initially coalition partners offered more forces for the war in Afghanistan than the U.S. Central Command was able to use. Our inability to use all forces offered immediately did create concerns for some coalition partners. The passage of time and the phased inclusion of more coalition forces in the war on terrorism have contributed to alleviating these concerns. Also, CENTCOM's inclusion of the coalition senior national representatives in the day-to-day planning process at Tampa has demonstrated the importance that we place on the coalition.

LONG-TERM PLANS FOR BASING U.S. FORCES

4. Senator THURMOND. Secretary Rumsfeld, what are the Department's long range plans for stationing U.S. forces in Afghanistan and the nations that currently provide basing rights?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Currently, the United States plans to maintain a military presence in Afghanistan to complete Operation Enduring Freedom and to train the Afghan National Army. However, even after these missions are completed, the United States plan to continue providing Afghanistan with long-term military assistance and educational opportunities through our Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs. These program activities will be administered through our Office of Military Cooperation (OMC) in the American embassy in Kabul. Beyond these steps, any decisions on a future United States military presence in Afghanistan will have to take into account any requirement for an actual force presence (as opposed to base access rights or other arrangements), the success of the Afghan National Army training program, and the wishes of the Afghan Government. The Department has not made any decisions on a future military presence in Afghanistan.

In addition to considering a future United States force presence in Afghanistan, the Department believes that we must also maintain our cooperation with countries in the Central Asian region. Although we do not envision permanent U.S. bases in these states, we do intend to increase long-term security cooperation and to pursue future access to Central Asia.

COMBAT ROLES OF COALITION FORCES

5. Senator THURMOND. General Franks, because of its parochialism, the U.S. media provides almost daily accounts of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan. What combat operations are our coalition partners conducting in Afghanistan and how do they compare with ours?

General FRANKS. Today, our coalition partners are conducting the same demanding combat operations as our U.S. forces on the ground in Afghanistan. These missions include: [Deleted.]

QUALITY OF LIFE

6. Senator THURMOND. General Franks, based on the Department's experience in the deployment of forces to Bosnia and Kosovo (where we built facilities for our forces that rivaled what our forces have in Germany), what are your plans for housing and caring for our forces in Afghanistan?

General FRANKS. I strive to provide the best possible facilities for American forces serving in Afghanistan. We established a baseline to ensure quality of life was consistent across the CENTCOM AOR. We develop our camps consistent with our mission, resources, and long-term objectives.

We recently published a guide for contingency and long-term base camp facilities. The CENTCOM Contingency and Long-Term Base Camp Facilities Standards establish facilities consistent with the base camp's mission. The Services and component commanders use the guide for planning and forecasting construction requirements. Master planning provides an integrated strategy for construction and maintenance of required facilities at the best possible cost. The level of detail of the Base Camp Master Plan depends on the maturity of the location, the speed at which the operational need for a base camp develops, and the expected length of stay.

The CENTCOM Contingency and Long Term Base Camp Facilities Standards provide consistent standards and expectations across Service components for infrastructure development, security, sustainment, survivability (essential for the quality of life), safety, and affordable working and living environments. The components are required to adhere to the publication to ensure adequate facilities are provided for personnel deployed in contingency and long-term operations within the CENTCOM AOR.

TRAINING THE AFGHAN ARMY

7. Senator THURMOND. General Franks, recently, the United States completed the training of the first Afghan army battalion. I understand that the French are training a second battalion. How will the training of the Afghan military be accomplished and to what standards are you training these forces?

General FRANKS. The training of the Afghan military will be accomplished in a deliberate manner in order to facilitate a stable environment in Afghanistan. The Commander of the Combined Joint Task Force 180 (CJTF-180) is leading the CENTCOM training effort. CJTF-180 has the mission to assist the Afghan government in organizing, training, and equipping the Afghan National Army (ANA).

Our approach to the training of the Afghan military is to strengthen the center first while working to cement relationships with the regional leaders. We are focused on building a military capability for Afghans to handle their own security in a way that is closely integrated with other internal security institutions and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. We believe the key to the successful establishment of the ANA is to focus the effort on “Afghan Supportable” standards, using weapons and equipment already in Afghanistan as much as possible in order to complement donors’ contributions in funds, resources, and training support.

Based on the Secretary of Defense’s approval of the “Quick Start” plan in May 2002, 1st Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group (FOB-31), has developed a standard program of instruction (POI) for an infantry battalion. ANA battalions will begin training with individual skills then progress to squad, platoon, and company level operations. The ANA battalion staff will receive training separately to enable them to integrate into platoon and company level operations. The 10-week course gives the ANA battalions a minimal level of proficiency on which to build. Each iteration will be broken down into three phases: the first phase will focus on inprocessing, basic infantry skills, and basic rifle marksmanship; the second phase will focus on specialty infantry training consisting of mortar, demolition, recoilless rifle, machine gun, medical, communication, and combat support training; the third and final phase will focus on platoon and company collective tasks culminating in a battalion level coordinated Field Training Exercise (FTX) integrating all three line companies, the battalion heavy weapons company, and battalion support assets.

We continue to work through the many challenges to this start-up effort. This process will require a long-term commitment on the part of the United States, the United Nations, and the coalition.

SUPPORT OF U.S. FORCES

8. Senator THURMOND. General Franks, the tragic effects of collateral damage have provided fodder for the media and led to press accounts that the United States forces are losing the support of the Afghan people. What is your assessment of the relationship between the Afghan civilian population and our forces? How does that compare with the relationship between our allies and the Afghan people?

General FRANKS. While these incidents are regrettable, there has been no noticeable effect on the support of the Afghan people. The Afghan view of the U.S. is that we helped them dismantle the oppressive Taliban regime and we are in Afghanistan to assist them in rebuilding their nation. Most Afghans believe that the U.S. is the primary source of humanitarian assistance throughout the country, even though this is not necessarily true.

In the near-term, the Afghan people view the U.S. and coalition forces as critical to the establishment of the necessary infrastructure to allow Afghanistan to become a viable country. Sustaining this positive attitude will be tied directly to the progress in our developmental efforts because the Afghans have very high expectations in this area. If there is not a noticeable improvement in quality of life and the supporting infrastructure, we may encounter a decrease in the acceptance of U.S. and coalition presence by the Afghan populace.

These isolated occurrences of collateral damage have not materially effected the overall support of the Afghan people for our operations. Our efforts are still perceived to be essential for the development of a viable Afghan nation and a better life.

LESSONS LEARNED

9. Senator THURMOND. General Franks, as you rotate forces through Afghanistan, how do you ensure that the lessons learned are passed to the incoming units? What in your personal views do you consider the most important lesson learned at the unit level?

General FRANKS. *Joint and Service-oriented Lessons Learned.* There are a number of means by which CENTCOM and its component commands are able to ensure that lessons learned are transferred as units deploy and redeploy to and from the CENTCOM AOR. Web databases like the Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP), Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Naval Lessons Learned System (NLLS), and the Air Force Center for Knowledge Sharing Lessons Learned (AFCKSLL) all provide valuable information to units as they prepare to deploy to Afghanistan while fine-tuning joint Large Force Exercises (LFEs) and Service inter-deployment training and readiness matrices.

CENTCOM AOR Indoctrination Training. In addition, CENTCOM headquarters and its component commands have a formal indoctrination (INDOC) process that officers and enlisted are required to complete prior to deployment and/or immediately upon arrival in the CENTCOM AOR. These INDOCs are continually updated through real-world lessons learned. Rules-of-engagement, operating areas and procedures, command and control procedures, public affairs and safety are addressed.

U.S. Army Transfer Of Authority (TOA)/U.S. Navy "In-Chop" Process. The TOA/In-Chop processes are another means of passing lessons learned from one tactical/operational commander to another prior to transferring responsibility within the CENTCOM AOR. In addition to the formal administrative transfer of equipment, the out-going commander provides a TOA/passdown briefing to the in-coming commander.

Unit-level Lessons Learned. Clearly, we have the best-trained military personnel in the world and the Services should be proud of that fact. Still, Operation Enduring Freedom has taught us a few things. I would say that one of our greatest lessons learned is the need to incorporate high altitude operations into our unit-level training and to continue to refine our tactics in this area. Specifically, with the majority of our forces operating at altitudes well above 6,000 feet Mean Sea Level (MSL), we are learning just how hard it is to operate in the high-altitude environment. This is compounded by the fact that the majority of our Large Force Exercise (LFE) military training areas within the U.S. are at altitudes below 2,000 feet MSL. Our troops have had to adapt to their environment and have done an outstanding job in developing innovative ways to maintain combat effectiveness in the harsh environment of Afghanistan. In addition, I would add that we need to aggressively incorporate new technologies and systems into unit-level training exercises in order to improve the weapons, equipment, and command and control systems our soldiers use in combat.

10. Senator THURMOND. General Franks, are the Services incorporating lessons learned in their professional development courses?

General FRANKS. I hesitate to speak on behalf of the Services. I will say that all the Services have a means by which to archive lessons learned for incorporation into their Service professional development courses. Service databases like: the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Naval Lessons Learned System (NLLS), and the Air Force Center for Knowledge Sharing Lessons Learned (AFCKSLL) all provide valuable information that could be incorporated into Service advancement courses and professional development programs.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BOB SMITH

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND TAIWAN

11. Senator SMITH. Secretary Rumsfeld, I'm going to veer off the hearing subject, because I believe developments in Asia are critical, and it's not often enough you're before us and we can bring matters directly to your attention.

Specifically, I have concerns about the renewal of military-to-military contacts with the People's Republic of China (PRC). It was evident to us in the past that the Chinese were benefiting from these exchanges far more than we were, and that the past administration let PRC officers garner militarily useful information helpful to them in their ongoing preparations for the invasion of Taiwan—a visit to FedEx in Memphis where they learned about bar-coding comes to mind.

I'm already disturbed to learn that this administration classified its latest military-to-military report for no apparent reason. Can you explain to me why this issue shouldn't be in the public domain, and can you tell me why we should restart these exchanges, when it's self-evident they will never be either reciprocal or transparent?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Our military contacts with the PRC are an element of our overall China policy and reflect the President's realistic view of the PRC. The administration continues, moreover, to adhere strictly to the provisions of Section 1201, P.L. 106-65, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 which prohibits the disclosure of certain categories of information that could enhance China's military capability. No exchanges similar to the People's Liberation Army visit to the Federal Express center in Memphis are planned or ongoing. The Department of Defense will continue to conduct a case-by-case review of all military contacts with China to ensure compliance with the President's policy and legislative guidelines.

Second, in an effort to prepare a more substantive and comprehensive report, the 2001 Annual Report on the Current State of Military-to-Military Exchanges with

the People's Liberation Army drew upon classified materials for the first time. The use of these materials required the entire report to be classified. Your staff can access the classified report, which is stored in Room S-407 in the Capitol.

12. Senator SMITH. Secretary Rumsfeld, we have still not delivered AMRAAMs promised to Taiwan, despite recent news that China conducted two tests of the Russian-made AA-12 Adder medium range air-to-air missile. Why not?

Secretary RUMSFELD. The Department of Defense is firmly committed to implementing the obligations of the Taiwan Relations Act, and to providing Taiwan with all necessary defense articles and services. U.S. policy on providing AMRAAM is that we will not be the first country to introduce these weapons into the region. In light of reported Chinese acquisition of the AA-12, the State Department, in cooperation with DOD, is in the process of reviewing this policy.

13. Senator SMITH. Secretary Rumsfeld, since President Bush endorsed, during his campaign, the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, why would DOD not embrace the House language in the defense authorization bill on training Taiwanese officers? Why can't we engage with Chinese democrats in Taiwan, as opposed to the dictators in Beijing? I know the State Department already has its talking points out opposed to this House provision on Taiwan, before the DOD even makes up its mind—but I hope you come down on the right side of this issue, consistent with President Bush's campaign commitment.

Secretary RUMSFELD. While we welcome Congress' support for the U.S. commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act and for the President's commitment to the defense of Taiwan, we believe that the objectives of Section 1202 are best achieved by preserving the traditional statutory role of the Secretary to exercise authority, direction, and control over the Department of Defense to conduct such activities as are appropriate to support those commitments, including his authority to preserve the confidentiality of such activities.

PERSONNEL ROTATIONS

14. Senator SMITH. General Franks, I have recently read articles and reports addressing a concern about the military personnel system and the manner in which the people—the service men and women who are truly responsible for accomplishing transformation—are rotated in and out of jobs and billets too quickly. That personnel cycling does not allow the individuals the time necessary to become a master of their assigned duty, let alone a true expert before moving on to “check the box” somewhere else. While I have been impressed with the results of our forces to date, I would like to know how personnel rotations affect your operations at your staff headquarters?

General FRANKS. Rotation as a matter of policy has had very little, if any, affect on operations in the headquarters. Let me address the issue from two perspectives, permanent party and temporary duty, since they are managed very differently.

From a permanent party perspective I believe our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines enjoy tremendous stability and clearly have an opportunity to not only develop professionally but contribute significantly in a joint environment. For officers, Goldwater-Nichols requires specific minimum tour length. In general, our officers will serve a minimum of 3 years on the staff. Typically, the only time we reassign an officer short of 3 years in the headquarters is to take command of a unit or attend a service Professional Military Education school—both great opportunities. While not governed by law, the same is generally true for our enlisted members. In fact, many of them seek, and are granted, authority to stay a fourth year.

As for individual augmentees, those assigned in a temporary duty capacity, Service policies today rotate them somewhere between 90 days and 1 year. Again, as a matter of policy I have not seen any significant negative impacts as a result of these rotations. When we ask for augmentation, we are normally looking for specific skill sets—we expect these folks to show up already possessing the requisite skills and be ready to go immediately to work. Almost without exception, that's the case.

There are some challenges with regard to our mission in our theater of operations—specifically with respect to our more technical career fields. Shorter rotations tend to give our technical folks less time to become familiar with deployed systems and have much opportunity to subsequently use that familiarity to contribute. We're working with the Services now to address these issues.

15. Senator SMITH. General Franks, additionally, how do full unit rotations, like the one recently completed by the 101st Airborne out of Afghanistan, affect the sta-

bility and proficiency on their assigned areas of responsibilities? What are the benefits of having a unit in place for only 6 months at a time when I am sure it takes much longer to learn the nuances of combat operations and the local culture and such things—both tangible and intangible—that make the units truly effective and even more efficient?

General FRANKS. This question is better answered by the Department of the Army. As a general comment regarding the effect of operations in Afghanistan on the readiness of our Armed Forces, it is my opinion that the operations we have conducted in Afghanistan have strengthened the overall combat readiness of our troops by giving them a taste of what real-world combat operations are all about. The fear, anxiety, boredom, physical pain, and sense of accomplishment that combat offers a soldier cannot be fully simulated during a training exercise.

Still, this qualitative information is not easily transferred to an analytically based, post-deployment Training and Readiness Report. Normally, a unit is at its combat training and readiness peak when it deploys. During the course of any deployment, some mission areas will not be performed as often as others. Those missions and skill sets performed often will result in razor-sharp combat readiness in those areas. Obviously, those skill sets and missions not performed as often due to the nature of the deployment will need to be refreshed following redeployment.

[Whereupon, at 5:20 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

